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*A QUARTERLY REVIEW
to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

KIERKEGAARD • PLÉ • DANIELLOU
BALTHASAR • CASSERLEY • MAYDIEU

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WE—AND THEY

EDITORIAL

AT PRESENT there seems to be a wave of enthusiasm for a rather undefined "religion" in America. What is its origin? There is fear in the atmosphere: fear of the unknown forces in man, fear of the natural forces he has learned to release without yet knowing how to control. But the fear emphasized by the new religionists is chiefly fear of "the others" as "we" feel it. Well publicized and shrewdly aware of our general uncertainty, the movement appears to give calculated encouragement to an attitude which at its mildest is the vague, almost unconscious resentment against the neighbor who always crosses our lawn to get to his back door; at its worst, it is that of a lynching mob. These two terms, "we" and "they" deserve analysis.

It ought to be perfectly clear who "we" are. We are the people who talk to each other, who trust each other, who feel secure with each other. We have nothing to hide. We never joined any but the "right" organizations; none of our friends were ever in jail or declared themselves bankrupt. In the great crisis of our time we stand ready: ready to defend God and our country against their—and our—enemies.

But beware, the "we" changes. There is the "we" of Labor, of Big Business, of professional organizations, the clergy, the laity, racial groups, etc. For some Catholics, "we" is opposed to a "they" which may mean all non-Catholics. Although it is evident that language is necessarily inadequate here, it ought to be clear that this is a hopeless description: certainly there is no one who thinks of himself as a "non-Catholic." The dubious assumptions involved in the very name of such an organization as "Protestants and other Americans" are probably more obvious. It is, of course, far from our intention to deny the necessity and utility of church groupings, political parties, or fraternal associations. Nevertheless, there is a genuine psychological and spiritual danger in defining the "we" of our audience in terms of this exclusiveness. The attitude can be so exaggerated that no-one will recognize himself; there is even a pharasaism for non-conformists: "Thank God there is no ghetto mentality in our group!" What must be guarded against is the constant temptation of all of us to erect our social, religious, political or other group into such a totality that it contains all the possible virtue of its kind. This amounts to a fantastic ego-projection in which by a sinister and often unconscious process those who are not members of our group become "the others." It is "they" who are the faceless opposition. If only it weren't for them! But who are "they"?

One doesn't need rules. We know, when we meet someone: he isn't one of us. The trouble, of course, comes from him and his kind. There may be only a few of them—in America, at least—but they are very powerful: they are undermining our government, our churches, our schools, our homes. They refuse to sign loyalty oaths, they profess not to see the point of adding "under God" to the oath of allegiance. They never cooperate when we, along with all right-thinking people, campaign against indecent literature. They don't even show much

enthusiasm for the H-bomb. We are all ready to fight—against them. For although we are not perfect, the evil comes from them. If the evil is not destroyed, it might infect us or our children. Of course, some of them may be destroyed in the process, but in a situation of such peril we must fight fire with fire.

In the very depths of his being, man is still profoundly affected by ancient instincts which try to establish some fixed and final order. These essentially pre-Christian attitudes are still very much alive in us as in various ways we tend to anticipate the Last Judgment; they are governed by the fear of others and the need to affirm oneself against one's enemies. The one God is surreptitiously replaced by partisan gods, and we proceed on our crusades under divine—but curiously partisan—inspiration. In this way closed worlds have been and are maintained, of which concrete traces may be found even in the division of churches.

There is need for serious political, intellectual and religious commitment, but simultaneously, there is equal need for an openness in acting on this commitment. A closed Catholicism, for example, should be a contradiction in terms. Father De Lubac's understanding of the often thorny formula, "outside the Church, no salvation," emphasizes the appeal to all men of good will: "it is by the Church and by the Church alone that you will be saved."* There is a related understanding of the essentially missionary character of Christianity, and the need to guard against various proselytizing perversions, in much that is most significant in the Ecumenical movement that has grown out of the modern Protestant revival.

WE OUGHT not to miss the connection between religion's greater respectability and America's increasing burden in the current world struggle. The major part of our budget—and our hopes—is to go for military purposes, but apparently it will do no harm to have God as an ally. It is hard to be against such a partnership, since no real commitment is required, the premium payments are low, and obviously Communist China could never be a member! A call for national penance is mistakenly made for a patriotic holiday; that the religious significance of penance was as ill understood as the original meaning of the holiday was then underlined by making the day the occasion of the usual suburban country-club recreations. This kind of religiosity, in which no personal *metanoia* is necessary or possible because all our energy is concentrated in attacking those who have refused to accept "salvation," obviously has many points of comparison with the paranoiac hunt for American subversives which is constantly accompanied by the inability to take seriously the real challenge of world Communism.

What must be protested is the way in which the simple piety of many good

* Henri DeLubac, *Catholicism* (Longmans, New York, 1950), p. 118. Also: "And so it is that God, desiring that all men should be saved, but not allowing in practice that all should be visibly in the Church, wills nevertheless that all those who answer his call should in the last resort be saved through his Church. *Sola Ecclesia gratia, qua redimur.*" (p. 117)

people is being deliberately imposed upon. Unfortunately, when they remember their difficulties not so many years ago in acquiring a few minutes of radio time for a religious program, many genuinely religious men are apt to think the millennium has arrived if a group of Hollywood stars appears on a lavishly promoted and popular program in order to recite the rosary. They seem to be willing to accept any allies who claim to be against "godlessness"; like other minorities arriving at new prestige, they do not always resist the instinct toward aggression. It is in just such a climate that the ubiquitous presence of the advertising men, who were so successful in "packaging" the 1952 Presidential campaign, may soon make God as American as apple pie. Religious leaders, if embarrassed, are largely silent: "after all, it won't do any harm." A moment's silent "meditation," aided by canned organ music, is a feature of the six o'clock news.

A religion without content is apparently considered an additional aid in the over-all concern for security. There are, of course, comic aspects to a situation in which ex-Communists are well-paid authorities on Communism (would ex-patriates be the logical experts on America?), and Catholicism may be an additional recommendation for jobs with the F.B.I. and the State Department (a situation shamelessly exploited by those pharisaical Catholic journals which exult that "our schools are recognized as needing no security investigations"). An effort at sympathetic understanding of the present situation must be made: even a failure of nerve or the identification with the community on the level of most parish activity can be a useful first step to an act of genuine worship. Despite all the dubious publicity surrounding the preaching of a Billy Graham or a Bishop Sheen, their large audiences testify to a wide-spread spiritual hunger. Ultimately, however, a judgment of some discrimination must be made in regard to our current "revival".

To begin with, ought we not to be suspicious of an attempt to stampede men into a declaration of faith? "Beating the drums for God" may simply obscure the seriousness of an interior choice. God may be more blasphemed against than honored when He is put on a postage stamp, or government workers are asked to take a special (and completely anti-theological) oath of belief in Him. True, all of our worship may be impure; we add all kinds of inconsistencies and incongruities in the offering of our hearts and minds. Nevertheless, we are right in being particularly suspicious of those aspects of the current "revival" which encourage the exclusive "we", which erect a political, national or even quasi-theological group against "the others". We must maintain a critical attitude toward those converts who remain understandably but excessively fascinated with the position or group they have left, so that they express their new commitment largely in terms of a bitter warfare against their former associates. Nor can we help wondering about the discernment of those Christian groups who allow themselves to be used as pawns in nationalist opposition to the United Nations or Unesco,* or whose honest confusion over the means whereby a religious concern may be transmitted to public school children gets mistranslated into support of the various attacks now being made on those schools.

Sometimes the situation seems a peculiarly American parody on the un-

* J. L. Casserley's article in this issue, "Christianity and Democracy", may place this situation in a broader context.

lamented *Action Française* mentality. Nothing very definite is believed in, but if you are not "religious", you are "un-American". Famous men in all walks of life tell us of the "faith" that helped them to their present prominence. Prayer is seen as somehow related to the secret of executive ability, and our present administration accordingly insures the smoother functioning of its cabinet meetings by opening them with privately-selected prayers. Should we not say simply that such a condition, when it is accompanied by a constantly revised (but always in the same direction) anti-Communist ideology, and a multitude of continual pressures toward conformity, seems a perfect breeding ground for the development of hypocrisy, but that a present-day Julien Sorel, unlike Stendhal's hero, would be spared the bother of memorizing the Bible or entering a seminary?

IF Christians refuse to recognize the debasement of religion, a great opportunity may well be lost. Much of the deepest evidence for the possibility of a spiritual awakening in the United States today comes from those who are profoundly disinterested in the Christianity that they see about them. These men suffer with their own uncertainties, but are in part sustained by the realization of the struggle of mankind toward a new and greater unity. To them, we Christians must often appear to be little more than another faction, another pressure group. When we say we are defending God's interests, their critical eyes may well note the degree to which in practice these interests represent our own bare ideas, our selfishness and our egocentric concerns. They can well complain that they see only a closed Christianity, available for private individual use, a means of pious and egocentric satisfaction. Such a self-centered piety prevents the Christian from becoming adult and from acquiring a mature personality which would be creative because it knew how to understand—and to assume in its own life—the questions, the trials and the agonies of other men.

With a Christianity that can say "We" in addressing all mankind, there will be an atmosphere of openness in the family, the nation, and the international community. When our prayers truly recognize that there are no "others" who must be excluded, that the "enemy" is within ourselves or a product of our own fears, we will find ourselves with less of an unhealthy itch for "security" and more of a readiness for the supreme risk of the total abandonment of ourselves to God.

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

CHRISTIANS AT WORK

A. J. MAYDIEU

Why Do Christians Concern Themselves With The World?

Christians Have Something Else To Do

THIS IS the first objection which comes to mind: "But what does faith have to do with all these questions?" Why do Christians unite to concern themselves with things so foreign to their faith? Of what use to them is their faith in inquiries of this kind? None, say some. We think, however, that Christians have to concern themselves with the things of this world.

In order to justify this, we shall not claim that all religious effort must begin with this investigation of the world; we know nothing of that. We believe rather that monks and pure contemplatives are necessary in the Church. But we do not intend to discuss these here, and if they accomplish good, as we believe they do, it is not subject to our review. Christ, however, did not call only contemplatives, but first of all disciples who did not have to retreat from the world. Since they must work in the world, Christians have thought that they must interest themselves not only in problems proper to the Church (to which have been dedicated almost in its entirety the *Editions du Cerf* of which *La Vie Intellectuelle* is only one part), but also in the problems of this world in which the Church at present continues her mission. Christians have to understand, as Robert Delavignette puts it, "the reality in which they have to live their *credo*." Moreover, the movement of Christian life seems, at least in France, strongly oriented toward this view. When Catholic Action was born more than twenty years ago it set for itself a purely apostolic end; the necessities of the apostolate led to an interest in the living and working conditions of Christians. Fifteen years later, when Abbé Godin raised his cry of alarm, *France, mission country*¹, he believed at first that it was time to return to this more spiritual concern. It did not take his followers long to see that the problems of housing, of work, and of the many realizations of human solidarity, were still present. One could cite many examples. . . Of the many pontifical documents, those of Pius XII as well as of Pius XI have reminded us that the Christian cannot be uninterested in the things of the world. When such a permanence is revealed in the life of the Church it is difficult not to see the will of the Holy Spirit. He breathes where and as he wishes. . .

Father A. J. Maydieu, O.P., is editor of *LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE*. This article appeared as the conclusion of a special 25th anniversary number of that review, "*Le monde se fait tous les jours*" (Aug.-Sept. 1953—now available as a separate volume of essays), after a vigorous examination of the direction of the modern world by many of the review's regular contributors. A précis of the Christian faith, considered in the perspective suggested in this article, has been published by Father Maydieu as *CATECHISME POUR NOTRE TEMPS* (*Editions du Cerf*).

To explain it, one ordinarily appeals to charity; and the justification is valid. "Do not be content to love with words, but with acts," says Saint John. Saint James and Saint Paul used to say the same thing. All were echoing Our Lord's precepts. One can easily see that in order to be effective, charity cannot limit itself to individual miseries, if the suffering so recognized is part of the conditions of the collective life. One can also make a detour by way of justice and say that charity cannot exist where injustice is tolerated. The thoughtful Christian, in order to obey the precepts of Love, is required to apply himself to understanding the real world and its conditions of existence. But we believe that he must go further. It has been said many times in this Review that the justification of such a concern should not be made primarily in terms of charity. Faith as such obliges us to be aware of what happens in the world, and to discover the aspirations and sufferings of humanity. The preaching of the Gospel is an announcement of salvation for humanity: will this declaration be heard if the one who states it does not know what the man of his times requires in order to be saved, what he desires to such a degree that if it is refused him, he will not think that he is saved?

A man will not be understood if he speaks of Jesus Christ while ignorant of the humanity which he is addressing, and this is true for a fundamental reason: he will become incapable of understanding the words of Christ in their full significance. For Christ speaks both in the Gospel and by the events that He directs. For the Christian the two must clarify each other. The God whose death and resurrection he preaches is not a God foreign to this world. He is the Word by whom all has been accomplished, the succession of times as well as everything else; He is the Crucified One Who was born and who suffered for the world of which He is the Creator. To shut ourselves off from the effort and suffering of humanity is to shut ourselves off from part of Christ's discourse, and in such a fashion that one risks being made a stranger to his whole preaching. If we do not understand the message of Christ in its entirety we will not know how to repeat it. It is precisely this experience which made such an impression on modern Jocists and missionaries. The most supernatural aspect of their teaching was no longer heard; even more, it risked losing its meaning if Christians were obstinate in not living in the time in which they live. For these backward Christians delude themselves if they think they are living in the time of the first apostles: in truth, they are engulfed in a most difficult period, in which they retain only the residue of a more glorious age.

We Expect Nothing Of Christians In This Matter

WE WISH at least to recall that in order to act as a Christian, the Christian must apply himself to understanding in the most exact fashion the world in which he lives. However, if we take as our goal the acquisition of precise information, the searching exposition of a complex situation, faith can be of assistance in this area. In saying this, we do not contradict what has been said before, but on the contrary take it for granted: in any isolated case, faith does not replace competence; but when a man discovers his limitations and his incompetence, and

when he desires to remedy these, then faith can help him to do so, for it permits fruitful collaboration which prevents him from limiting himself to a partial view of things.

We do not wish to say here that a man cannot by the effort of his reason consider all the components that make up his world. On the contrary we think that man by himself and reason by itself ought at the very least to be in a position to correct these partial and biased views. But there is often little right in the existing reality, and faith confirms this pessimistic judgment. For the Christian, the world is a created world, a sinful world, a redeemed world. It has been created by God who has given men power to imitate His creative act; but in his creative activity man is deficient. This does not have to be demonstrated today: concentration camps, wars, unjust trials, and various social injustices are enough to reveal the criminal deficiencies which open the eyes of Christians to the revelation of original sin. This is far from being, as some wrongly believe, a revelation of our misery which hardly (alas!) needs to be revealed. The dogma of original sin is already an announcement of hope: God participates in our misfortune since he willed to be offended by it, and having been the "injured party" in our fall, He insisted on playing an active part in our Redemption: "God so loved the world that He gave His only Son." Confident in this love, Christians appeal to their faith in order to triumph over evil, and over that vanity—an evil small in its inception but weighty in its consequences—which prevents the recognition of one's limits and in matters where one is ignorant, an appeal to someone more competent than himself.

Perhaps we are too solemn in arriving at so modest a declaration, but this tone underlines the fact that the whole mystery of faith is already involved in our chosen attitude, in spite of its apparent modesty. For faith permits and facilitates a meeting of Catholics with divergent viewpoints, with opposing opinions. Of course, it is not necessary to be a Christian in order to continue to converse in spite of difference of position and intelligence; we are not here proposing a doctrine, but reporting an experience. Christians have thought it good to unite to attempt the precise exploration together of the present complex situation and have found in their faith a common meeting ground which, by its very transcendence, puts each of them in a position to continue to discuss considerations and interests of this world with those who think differently from them.

A Mortal Temptation: Integralism²

SUCH an effort, however, is difficult, even among Christians. For when we say: faith facilitates it, we rather should say: faith ought to facilitate it, or better still: faith obliges resumption of the discussion with whomever we consider as an adversary. But in fact Catholics only too often have a tendency to bolster up their own positions with faith. The extreme deformation of such an attitude is, as everyone knows, integralism. For we must not expect the integralists to cling to the complete Word of God as it is contained in the Gospels and in the entire Old and New Testaments, as it has been kept and lived for twenty centuries in the Church. On this point, there is no one less "integral" than our integralists. To go beyond their own human vision by recourse to the word of God is repugnant

to them; the only thing they uphold with integrity is the barrier which they set up in any given era between their opinions, and sometimes even their interests, and the behavior of Christians. However, it is a blasphemy and a betrayal of faith to raise to the same level as the Word of God what is properly a human problem. To combat integralism is not to wish to limit the ascendancy of faith or to yield to any "irenicism"; it is, on the contrary, to possess the passion of an intransigent faith and a refusal to tolerate the compromises that some men would like to impose. Alas! each Christian insists on his own vision of the world, and the moralism that we have so often criticized is also a form of integralism: it bolsters with the absolute what is not absolute, thus falsifying not only its relation to the absolute, but also the truth which it has grasped, but which it has failed to keep in its proper sphere.

Moreover, an intelligent look at the world in order to see it as it is, in order to accept the complex situation as it is, is somewhat similar to the attitude needed to be a follower of Jesus Christ. It is also a decided preference for the Truth on its own terms. In order to grasp truly this human world, which man determines more than nature, there is no better way than to exchange places with others, to supplement one's own technique with that of others, one's viewpoint, opinions, interests and personal drama with those of your neighbor. We thus will achieve a more exact knowledge of the issue, a more complete grasp of the complex situation. Once this method has been discovered by some, it shows its fruitfulness by its attention to other groups with similar attitudes.³ But fidelity to our method prevents its limitation to groups with which one feels most friendly; discussion must be attempted with those who hold clearly different positions, indeed opposing ones. It is true that we have just criticized integralism and moralism sharply. However, "orthodoxy" is intolerable in the analysis of a complex situation. Unfortunately, today it merely suffices to try to know objectively the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Tito, Bevanism, or the situation facing Christians in "people's democracies" in order to see, even in the search for facts, various brands of conformism.

No more than we claimed that only Christians can thus mutually converse do we suggest that Christians ought to converse only among themselves. Among those writing for our review, some belong to groups called "confessional," such as the Christian unions, but they also teach in universities or work in factories. As for others, theirs is the secular world of professional, labor or political action. Their experience is important because they work with men of every conviction, speak with them at large of their existence, discuss and investigate through this conversation the demands of their calling and the situation in which they must practice it. To refuse these necessary communications would be to impair the clarity of Christian judgment.

*An Unfortunate Deformation: "Laborism"*⁴

Some Christians therefore have grouped together to correct in each other inadequacies of information, in order to eliminate the deviations that their personal preferences or passionate attachments will always impose on the analysis of a complex situation. But they will not attain a perfectly objective knowledge of the facts. Modern man has finally recognized that in every field, even the

scientific, the knowledge of facts depends on his method of investigation, the prior experience of his intelligence, and his own interests. The complex situation that is being explored together by a group of men will depend on the common interest which unites them. In what are they interested?

Obviously, we are Christians who are interested in the relations between the Christian faith and the modern world. Can we be more precise? Perhaps by warning against an error which harms even what it pretends to serve. Let us recall how from 1830 to 1950 French Catholics who have had the greatest solicitude for renewing contact with the modern world have progressively carried their interest from the political problem to the social question and, more precisely, to the labor movement. Catholics today are rightly sensitive to the labor problem, but if they try to center everything on it they will distort the perspective and harm the labor movement itself.

Of course, we can never concern ourselves too much with the working class. The workers were for a long time the group which was most sacrificed to technical and industrial civilization; even today, with the exception of the many aged who are seeing their savings melt away, it is still among the workers that we would find the greatest misery. But our concern should be not only for reasons of compassion. The workers have glimpsed a great hope in their fight against injustice: that of a world which they can improve by their own efforts. To this ambition, we must be alert; but its total comprehension obliges us to distinguish two very different problems which our time poses: that of the working class and that of a civilization of work.

The working class was born on that day when one category of men was deprived of its share of the material, intellectual and moral rewards that the progress of civilization procured for humanity. Such a privation is especially intolerable, for not only does it deprive this class of men of the benefits to which they have a right, but also condemns them to a misery greater than any known prior to this growth of civilization. To live in Paris fifty years ago in a room which had neither water nor electricity was not a sign of misery; today, it occurs only in the worst slums. Two hundred years ago, one could live without knowing how to read, write or count; today, the child without education must accept, as an adult, the worst jobs. Two hundred years ago, one could live in a society without having taken part in making its laws; today whoever, in one manner or another (legislatures, unions, etc.) can not make his voice heard among the people, in the nation or in the state, is blocked in his wish to be free. It is useless to insist; the study of hunger with its distinction between a primary and secondary phase has brought the problem fully to light. It seems curious that it is necessary to mention such common truths, for every man is affected by their misapprehension; for a long time, however, some men, including many Christians, have accepted the fact that a continually growing minority has been deprived of the triple benefit of our civilization. It is therefore important to say clearly that we here maintain the firm desire to fight against every injustice which the working class suffers, or rather against any injustice which reduces a class of men to the state of slaves.

Being in close touch with the problem presented by the working class is one thing; that of a civilization of work is something else. We can say that work will characterize the world of tomorrow. We have said that the cosmic world, or the world of nature, is gradually giving way to a human world that man has construct-

ed; this world ought to be at the service of man. Moreover, the more the construction of such a world progresses, the less man lives thanks to the possession of the goods of nature, and more and more thanks to participation in the fruits of humanity's labor.

Work is here taken in a sense wider than when we speak of it with regard to the working class. However, the two uses are not completely foreign to each other. The worker's labor is work with the hands. However, manual labor is gradually taking a greater place everywhere as science and technics extend their power. To remain authentic and true, even thought cannot remain a stranger to manual labor. The scientist in his laboratory, the surgeon in his clinic, are first of all manual laborers. The novel, with Malraux and above all Saint-Exupéry, has been renewed by attention to the use of the hands. As for philosophy itself, the happy formula "to think with the hands" was a success long ago. Another aspect: by its manual labor the working class was in a state of dependence; the civilization of work risks putting all its participants in a state of dependence. It must organize a state of interdependence where each one finds freedom and satisfaction. It is not pure coincidence if in the same era that manual labor was spreading its horizon, philosophy was discovering that man was acting for himself in ratio to his becoming interested in others, that is, his own consciousness was maturing as his interhuman relationships were multiplying and becoming more conscious.

Ultimately, the building of a civilization of work and the liberation of the working class have their destiny closely intertwined. The former will be only a prison if the latter is not freed. But, in turn, the working class will remain in subjection, that is, in the state of a "class," if man does not pay attention to all the components which are preparing the civilization of tomorrow. The labor problem is not the only one and therefore must not be separated from the world in which it will have more and more of a tendency to come up. Its importance resulted from its being a crystallization, anticipating the dangers which will menace the entire world of tomorrow. But in order to solve the labor problem, just as to build this world, we must be attentive, in the midst of the existing society, to everything that contributed to the birth of the working class, but which goes far beyond and conditions that particular phenomenon. We must therefore take into account all those bonds which link it not only to the economy, but also to politics, to the international situation, to the rise of minority peoples, to the transformation of culture, to contemporary myths, in order to make our analysis complete. Those Christians who give no consideration to anything but the Labor Movement give the impression of not even being aware of these ties. They therefore fail to grasp some highly important factors in their consciousness of the existing world; inasmuch as the workers' world is linked to this world taken in its totality, they mutilate it and betray it. This is the error of "Laborism."

"Laborism" is one of the modern forms of "moralism." Thus separated, abstracted from the rest of human life, the worker's life gives birth to certain affirmations, that are perhaps justifiable if we place them in the context of human life as a whole in order to understand them, but are completely unacceptable if we elevate them to the dignity of absolute principles, binding in themselves, independent of that human world from which they have been drawn. Rediscover-

ing these abstract principles, thus isolated, in certain communist positions, equally separated from their own system, has given birth in some men who have studied it very little to an enthusiasm for Marxism under its most debatable form, Stalinism. A most disastrous enthusiasm, if not for Stalinism at least for Marxism, for in it they have thus come to reduce carefully constructed and detailed doctrine to the level of a formula. We are not foolish enough to wish to pass judgment in a few words on the importance of a movement of which we can deny neither the reality nor the effectiveness, but we wish to denounce the error that has been made in transforming it into a formula. We insist that in order to liberate the working class, we must be attentive to the world and to the civilization in which it will have to live tomorrow. Only one who focusses his attention on the evolution as a whole will be in a position to guide his actions with an understanding of the problem's antecedents; as for those who cling to but one aspect of things, they will be its play-thing. To have accepted, while isolating them, the most important formulas of Marxist propaganda does not mean that one has seized upon the secret of dialectic; it will not suffice to say, "Marx, Marx" to enter into the meaning of history. Strange as it may seem, this enthusiasm for a popular Marxism is a clearcut form of clericalism, whether held by priests or by the laity. It might appeal to those priests who think they have had enough of it but are still eager for some form of Scholasticism, and those laymen, both on the left and on the right, who find it so convenient to question the clergy about the choice which should control their attitude. Indeed, it is so much easier to settle a problem by an appeal to so-called principles rather than to follow patiently the many nuances of a thought or a movement. But clericalism is even more widespread, alas, among the laity than among the clergy. It is so easy, even in a field where the laity should shoulder their own responsibilities, to rely on the counsel of the priest. Pétain's coming to power was the occasion of just such irresponsibility. How many priests have been subjected to the attack of Frenchmen who did not dare to decide for themselves! This is being repeated today with regard to Marxism. We can never repeat too often that the Christian must take an interest (in the strongest sense of the word) in the workers' movement; but we wish to note here that the Christian who has received the particular vocation of study and reflection, far from being dispensed, ought constantly to remind himself of the necessity for patient analyses of the world in which the worker must be liberated.

For a Christian Presence

If they agree on the demands rising from a patient analysis of the complex situation, Christians cannot resign themselves to remaining completely passive. They now have to consider the different levels of their action.

The Present Import of the Decalogue

IT IS AN action, or rather a reaction, which is affirmed spontaneously. If we are attentive to what happens in the world, the necessary protests will be aroused: "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness. Thou shalt not covet." These command-

ments arise as irrefutable condemnations in an age where men send all the members of a race to the gas chambers, where judges display partisan interest and make use of perjurers, where it is not enough for men to pass the death sentence but must debase personalities, where backward peoples are defrauded of their own lands for the profit of colonists and do not receive the education necessary to manage their own destinies, where workers are still denied the fruit of their labor. The Christian cannot tolerate such crimes. Still less can he tolerate the justification of them by the supreme interests of a people, a state, a nation, a class or a party. This violates the first commandment, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. . .," for God alone must be recognized as the supreme principle of Good and Evil. Let us take care on this point not to salve our consciences with the belief that such a menace is possible only under the totalitarian dictatorship of one man or of one party. The men in power, be they Radicals or Christian Democrats, will always have a tendency to stifle the protestations of the Decalogue. And it ought to be particularly odious to the Christian that they seize upon the values in which he believes in order to stifle the protests which arise in behalf of men against whom they are directing a new Crusade. No. The Decalogue has not lost its importance.

But we must be careful to take the Decalogue as it is and not turn it into this moralism that they claim to destroy. From morality to moralism is but a step. Attachment to the Decalogue, which is binding on every Christian, is the surest guarantee that morality will keep its reality. The error of moralism is to attach itself to some principle, isolate it from the conditions of its discovery and birth, and set it up as an absolute. However, the Decalogue as its name indicates is an ensemble of ten commandments which, far from being limited to one aspect of human life, sees it in all its complexity. We must always take care to obey not *one* commandment, but the *ten*; this will be the first safeguard against the moralist abstraction. The second comes from the taste that many Christians have rediscovered for reading the teaching of the Mosaic Law in its original context, that is to immerse themselves again in the history of the Chosen People which is continued in the life of the Church. The Christian thus sees that God did not make use first, or exclusively, of abstract formulas but rather used the patient linking of events in history in order to have men realize the fullness of his will and of his claims. It took long centuries for the Jewish people to see that the law thus promulgated included not just the most immediate neighbor, the man of the same race, but humanity in its entirety. In the time of Moses, the Judges, and the first Kings it was with a light heart or even with religious fervor that they massacred entire populations; the later Prophets were required to make them recognize that Yahweh, because he was the God of all, had a concern for all and wished that His Law be respected by all. Christ confirmed this progress and completed it: "You know that it has been said: Love your neighbor and hate your enemy (harsh form of the Aramaic equivalent to: You do not have to love your enemy). But I say to you: Love your enemies, pray for those who persecute you."

No more than in the time of the Jews can these teachings be cut off from the reality of the People who must live them. The Word of God is a living Word which the Church must guard, and confronted with new situations, with new attempts to organize the world, she reminds us of demands whose profundity cannot be discovered by a purely abstract knowledge. Pius XII after Pius XI and

Leo XIII, and the bishops in their different countries, have all warned against violations of the Decalogue, without specific reference to it. They do it in the fashion of the Decalogue, almost entirely in a negative form. Just as the Decalogue forbids nine times more than it commands, the teaching of the Church when confronting situations of this world is shown more by condemnation than by encouragement. However, we could not limit sins to those of commission and forget sins of omission, for at the center of all Christian morality is the positive command to love one's neighbor, confirmed and amplified by Christ in the dimensions of his own love for men. In this way we are reminded of the positive duty to take the initiative necessary to bring help to the great mass of men who suffer from hunger and thirst, who have been deprived of clothes or lodging, who have been subjected to the great injustice of not having their share of the benefits of civilization. An obligation is then made of an initiative, but this initiative receives from the Christian faith a positive spirit that the negative prohibitions have hidden and which we must now try to bring into the light.

Do Non-Christians Count On Christians?

In order to recognize the positive import of the faith which we pointed out had been obscured, it can be useful for Christians to question those men who today refuse Christianity. We are not thinking of those who manifest a shrewd hostility on details, sensitive above all to the failings of men or groups, but not intelligent enough to recognize—if only to combat—the human significance of the Christian fact.

The men who call for the most courageous reaction on the part of Christians are those who reject Christianity and are aware of their reason. The fact that we are poor Christians does not prevent them from recognizing the role of the faith in the development of humanity. They nevertheless reject Christianity because they consider it to be an outmoded moment of history. What was great at a given phase in history now finds its greatness in the fact that it prepared the way for something greater than itself. Christianity was such a phase, but in the past, and today we are in another phase. To return to a preceding phase of history would be an error and treason to the humanity of today and even to the past phase—i.e., Christianity—whose original import can be maintained from now on only by fighting for the realization of a new human life. Faced with such a criticism the Christian would no doubt first have to contend that his faith need not be *only* history in order to be in history, just as he himself, in order to be in the world, is not exclusively of this world (cf. John, xvii). For the moment, however, we will confine ourselves to that grandeur recognized in Christianity in the course of private conversations between one of the editors of this Review and, for example, one of the communist leaders: "If the Christian faith was able to do such great things (he had just evoked the middle ages and the cathedrals that in the course of his trips he liked to have his son admire) why could not a greater faith do greater things today?"; or from a philosopher: "We both believe in Christianity, but as for me, I believe in it as an outmoded phase." We could multiply such examples.

Christians might profit by learning the role that these non-Christians give to Christianity in history. Moreover, in their eyes Christianity played an essential

role in the evolution or even in the revolution of humanity: this overthrow of the world, the cosmos or natural world, into the human world where relations between men count for more than does nature's contribution, which technics alone could not have realized. We can even follow Father Dubarle and ask if modern technics was not greatly assisted at its birth by the theologies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In any case, technics has not sufficed: it was also necessary that man will himself to be in a position to master his destiny and choose his destiny. To this wish Christianity brought an essential contribution, indeed, a decisive one. But Christians no longer think as such. They have become discreditable Christians. The Christ and Lord taught the Christians of the past, and through them humanity, the desire to choose its destiny. Thus was revealed the grandeur of each human being, which has come to be a platitude in the phrase "the dignity of the human person," an abstract formula which strangely diminishes the Christian message. Christ Himself did not teach in this abstract language, but in words full of poetry and pith, and through the events of his life; this teaching received its light from his person and from the unique event toward which all was ordered: his death. The death of Christ, the death of a man unjustly condemned, manifested as no words could have done nor even any other kind of death that the unjust condemnation of a man could not be tolerated since, for the Christian faith, the man condemned by Caiaphas and Pilate was the Son of God. Similarly, not only was his death a protest against injustice, but his resurrection is the already assured victory of justice. In his image numerous martyrs, when they confessed their faith and presented their necks to the executioners, triumphed over violent oppression and chose their destiny and the significance of their lives as well as of their deaths. In their school man learned to know himself, to feel himself no longer crushed by the world which on the contrary he was called to dominate.

Non-Christians who believe in Christianity but not in Christ judge that the faith belongs to another age, that Christian feeling must give way to a more rational will, that victory ought no longer to be assured in the hereafter, but here and now, that the single protest by death must give way to a more effective action. Christ was and remains a great phase of history, but he is nevertheless a phase of the past, a phase that is outmoded. The spirit has been given: now man is conscious of himself. He must extend this consciousness to the dimensions of the universe and of humanity. This new conquest can no longer be the work of Christ, it will be the work of man. To think otherwise is to be useless, to be lost: attached to something other than the present phase, alienated from today

Christ Is Not a Past Moment of History

THE FIRST reaction of the Christian ought to be decisive and clear: Christ is not and cannot be a past phase of history. He should waste no time in useless justifications. He has the Word of God and the faith of his Church: he clings to it and it supports him. As attentive as he may be to the repercussions on humanity of the Christian message, it is the faith itself which for him is essential. Moreover, the faith declares itself first in the recognition of Jesus as Christ and Lord,

Son of God, Word of God, God Himself. To consider Christ as a phase (past or not) of history is meaningless and an absurdity to us, for although born under Augustus and crucified under Tiberius, Christ, the Word of God, transcends history.

As for the repercussions of his coming among men, we do not feel that it has put us in a better position to become more complete men, leaders, inventors, geniuses, but that we have been called to be children of God. As great as the world may be, however high humanity reaches, neither one nor the other can add a cubit to our stature as creatures; however, with that cubit which marks the passage from human to divine life, the Christian is or should be intimate. We *believe* that for this there is no other way than Jesus Christ. That is why faith in Christ will *always* be required. Christians do not turn up their noses at being an inventor or a leader of genius, and success in these things pleases them, for the seeds planted by the Creator in the soul of man ought to grow in him as well and man must exert himself. But such is not the concern with which they have been charged in receiving the name of Christians. When, because of the growth of humanity and the clearer conscious grasp of its powers, faith in Jesus Christ is today called into question by the same people who speak of it with respect, we believe that the first task of the Christian is to assert with a clarity that we would like to call uncompromising (for it is clear, we hope, what sort of openness allows of this intransigence) that their first duty is the affirmation of Christ as Lord and God, Master of history in the twofold sense of the word Master as "one who directs" and "one who teaches."

A firm faith would put us more at ease in recognizing freely the manner in which our faith is present in history. We may thus reject every worthless apologetic that would try to find the true value of Christianity in trifles. How much human progress, previously claimed as an effect of their faith, is manifested in the work of men whom we don't know to have been Christians. (For example, the abolition of slavery, which objective study will show to apologists, who one day are full of conceit and pride, are quite grieved and very nearly shaken the next. Wisdom and faith demand the acceptance of things be the result of technical discoveries and social evolution.) Our professional as they happened, that is, as God willed them; what he willed or permitted is greater than what we imagine or wish. Those things that were believed to be Christian conquests, and which have been revealed in the long run to be human conquests could be made into a long list. The true Christian does not fear that this in any way attacks what is essential: Jesus Christ, as we said, is the great protest against any unjust condemnation of any man. Was his the *first* protest? This would be to forget Socrates. The parallel is striking: Jesus Christ was condemned unjustly; so was Socrates. Jesus was condemned, among other things, for his protests against obsolete laws (hygienic restrictions, and above all, those concerning the sabbath); it was the same with Socrates. Jesus Christ respected the law even when it condemned him; as did Socrates. What is there in this to disturb the faith of the Christian? Christ claimed to be the Son of God, *He was the Son of God*; Socrates did not wish to be nor could he have been anything but a man. Peter, Paul and John have taught us to recognize in the divine sonship the essence of faith in Christ. In what way is the repercussion of the Christian faith on the world diminished? Does God not manifest himself excellently as the One God

when, acting as God alone can act, he raises up men athirst for the good, who realise the good in this world and when, their work over, He confirms by the gift of his Son the good of this work and assures its efficacy? In comparison with the Old Testament, the words of Christ do not contain so many novelties: they retain from it the best that it contains, the most noble, elevating and religious: Moses and the prophets, whom Christ has come not to abolish but to confirm. Why would he not act the same way in regard to the effort of all humanity? Historical analysis can continue his work and discover as a human conquest what has long been believed to be a conquest of faith alone. Claude Tresmontant concludes his recent book:

Let us imagine a factory manager who wished to make his son the head of a factory similar to his own. He, the father, has fought, suffered, worked, created with his intelligence and genius this factory, his work. He wishes that his son whom he loves may become like him in every respect, that is, a creator who knows the divine joy of creating, so that he may be worthy of the riches and glory which may befall him.

What will he do? Leave everything, his factory, his work, to his son when he comes of age?

No. That would not make his son a creator as he was, a man in his own image, but a passive and unworthy heir. . . . The father loves his son too much to consent to that. By giving him the fruit of his genius and of his labor without exacting anything of him, the father would frustrate the best thing in life, the joy of being a creator and of being free.

The son must therefore—this is required by the very love that the father has for his son—recreate in some way and engender anew, with his own genius and his own labor, all the work of his father which is destined for him, and become in some way its author, making himself worthy of all this wealth which he is to inherit.

God found himself, if I may so put it, facing an analogous metaphysical problem.

God wished to create not a living puppet which was his toy, nor a happy and obedient animal, but a being "in his own image and likeness" (Gen. i, 26), that is, a god, as Scripture teaches: "I have said you are gods" (Ps. 82, 6), a phrase repeated by Christ in reply to the Jews: "Is it not written in your law: I have said you are gods?" (John x, 34).

God could have made subject slaves.

But God wished to create beings capable of participating in his triune life, in the joy of the three persons, creators, of the Holy Unity. If not, how could Wisdom have been able to say: ". . . My delights are to be with the children of men" (Prov. viii, 31)? . . . The method of God, demanded by his love, has been to create a being who can propagate himself and thus become truly a god, a being in the image and likeness of the Creator.

Thus the Christian will have only more faith as regards Him Who, acting as God alone can act, sanctions all that is reasonable in every human effort, quickens the conscience of man, gives mastery and responsibility, and finally crowns his highest aspiration by granting what no human effort could either attempt or dream of doing: to be in truth a child of God. In this perspective, the Christian faith, far from being diminished, can only become greater.

The Christian Has No Use For Ready-made Principles

BY THE rejection of mistaken apologetics which wrongly reassure Christians and scandalize non-Christians by their lack of truth, the Christian is able to be

totally cured of moralism. In the past, attention to so-called important details made him misconstrue the essence of faith in Christ; in the present and the future attention to so-called principles isolated from their context leaves him a possible instrument of causes which he has no desire to serve: an informed Stalinism with a dialectic which knows how to twist a principle into its opposite, or crusades for which Liberals, Radicals, or even Christian Democrats wish to enlist "spiritual values", but he knows he can preserve them in their validity only by keeping them in permanent contact with the totality which gave birth to them. He insists uncompromisingly on the totality of his faith; without abstracting or isolating any one aspect from it, he wishes to keep before him the totality of the present situation of the world. With all possible humility, he must seek, not for a purely theoretical knowledge, but for the sake of his own actions, the harmony between these two totalities: the totality of his faith and the totality of the world.

We will repeat therefore commonplaces, but commonplaces need to be repeated. The Christian belongs to two worlds: the world of eternity and the temporal world, the kingdom of heaven and the community of men, the church and humanity. These two worlds are essential to Christians in view of the fact that they can be totally in the one only by being totally in the other. Christians judge therefore that they will be active in the world only on the condition of being totally of the Church. If we reject moralism it is surely not because we deny that Christianity can act in the world; on the contrary, what we insist upon is that this action should be authentic and efficacious, and that no consequence of the faith is to be used against the faith. Faith, taken in its totality, is our primary activity in the world. This is not the place to outline the doctrine of this faith.⁶ It is enough to recall that the conscious life of faith ought to be an effort ceaselessly renewed, ceaselessly repeated; we forget this too often. For that, one must take care to live his faith *in the Church*. This obviously demands first of all attention to the latest teachings of the Church, but it means also that one must see to it that he identifies himself with the present spirit of the people of God, that is, to the ceaselessly renewed manifestations of the life of the Spirit. Today, a Christian in France—as elsewhere, no doubt—cannot be indifferent to the reading of the Bible and the Fathers, nor to the liturgical movement, nor to the problem of unity among Christians, nor to the missionary spirit, nor to the contacts with the Churches of foreign countries attempted under many forms. Finally, the Christian must be a devoted member of the cells that the Church patiently builds: parishes built up throughout the centuries, Catholic Action movements which were the novelty of our time. We cannot expand all these points; it is enough to recall that only fidelity, according to one's means, to the diverse aspects of the life of the Church today will raise up Christians alive with their faith.

But the Christian also wishes to be of this world. For his faith itself, in order that his speech should not turn into "pious drivel," the Christian must be an effective participant in the human community where he is a witness of the Word of God. He must become as exactly aware as possible of what is the effort of the human community and of what he can bring to it through his faith.

For his faith, in order to hear its message, to welcome it, to live it, to give testimony in his turn, the Christian needs a certain freedom. This can be seen clearly in times of persecution. The Christian therefore cannot withdraw his

claim to this freedom. But if he does not wish to be one who makes a claim for himself and gives nothing to others, in other words if he does not wish to arouse a kind of scandal which has nothing in common with the scandal of the Cross, he will demand freedom for each and everyone. To act in this way, through obedience to his primordial needs, he reunites himself with the deep-seated aspiration of the human community and continues to bring about that higher benefit recognized in Christianity by non-Christians.

For, without claiming to give a summary of universal history, each person must seek the place he wishes to take in a history of which he is, whether or not he wants to be, an active element. Moreover, if history has meaning for those occupied in the world (each can refuse to recognize meaning in it, but it is not to this kind of Christian that we speak here), it must be the acquisition of his freedom by man. Freedom here takes on a significance of which all do not conceive: it is a question of a freedom in which all participate, or rather ought to participate. So that the history which humanity presses Christians to take part in, is the extension of freedom to men who still do not possess it and the growth of freedom in each person. It is useless to reply to the too facile objection that we here approve of a very naive belief in progress. Too many contemporary facts would tend to have us believe in a regression of man, which each day threatens to reduce him to the grave or to the concentration camp. But too many Christians use this easy objection as an alibi: the transformation of the cosmic world into the human world, a transformation on which we here insist and which it is time that Christians recognize, must lead in spite of defeats and mistakes to a recognition of the growth of liberty in extension and in intention. Man achieves every day feats that were once forbidden him, and not only flying in the skies, sailing in the depths of the sea, making oneself heard instantly in the far corners of the globe, or splitting the atom; these conquests, reserved at first for a few, have gradually been extended to ever-growing numbers of people. Why should Christians refuse to take part in this acquisition of immediate freedom in order to lead those who participate in it to a more total freedom: that of choosing their own destiny? And if the reply should be made that this world called "human" is in truth an inhuman world, we say this is only more reason why Christians should insist on being present in it with truth and with knowledge of its source, in order to bring to it the salvation of which they are witnesses. A so-called informed pessimism is the most lamentable form of withdrawal.

If Christians have perhaps not received the mission of baptizing all nations, but of baptizing men in all the nations, if they can not be certain of saving the world but men in the world, if they do not have the privilege of knowing better and foreseeing the organizations required by a world which does not cease to grow in complexity, they ought to be aware of the force that Christ gives them, a special force in order to maintain with all men of good will the claim essential to humanity. Because they do not have the right to reserve the Gospel to a privileged few instead of preaching it to all, because they have the duty to begin with the humble and the small and to preach it first to the poor, they cannot accept the presence in the world of men who are slaves, that is, men who *in law or in fact* do not have sufficient freedom to hear and to accept the Gospel, men who have no part at all in human freedom and who are, in fact, not men. Because for a long time the condition of the workers was in fact the suppression of this freedom;

the scandal was such that the Church lost the working class. This is why we said that no concern for the workers' problems is too great. Because "laborism" risks the creation—and among the workers themselves—of new categories of slaves, we have warned against it, as well as all forms of moralism. Each time that Christians refuse to take part in the acquisition by humanity of its freedom, it is again the same scandal. But by taking as exact as possible a view of the world in order to be among those who acquire true freedom, Christians will continue the benefit that we have recognized as received from Him Crucified under Pontius Pilate, and will pull aside, as far as it is possible for men, all the veils which prevent them from seeing in Him the Son of God. By working in confidence with those who wish truly to free man, they will already be witnesses of that other freedom that man cannot acquire without Jesus Christ: the glorious freedom of children of God.

Man, Creator In The Image Of God

WHAT we propose here is not easy. It is difficult indeed to make the effort to know in its entirety the world situation in order to bring about the growth of freedom in it; it is as difficult as to bring about the growth of reason, which is the same thing. It is still more difficult whatever one may think, to join to this effort a deepening of our faith in its totality, and the living of it. But the times are difficult and it is ridiculous to propose easy tasks to a Christian. Moreover, for the first endeavor we have the support of a human nature created by God; for the second, there is the grace of Jesus Christ.

On the contrary, we refuse to concede that this is a task for "aristocrats," if one means by that Christians who place themselves apart from the ordinary flock. If those Christians who might accept the challenge presented in this article pointed out that they were not speaking for everyone, these would not be words of pride but of humility, in so far as humility is possible. Although pointing out what they saw for themselves, they would refuse to impose it on others. They deny that the task which they consider to be demanded of them is the privilege of an elite of intellect and spirit. They refuse the simplist moralism that now and then some have tried to impose, for in order to be Christians they have to refer not to isolated abstract principles but to the totality of faith in its dogma and morality; similarly, they reject it because in order to be men they must call upon the totality of their experience which reveals to them in quite simple fashion, through the daily effort of their education when they were children, through their family, working and group life, and even through their political struggles, the continuous effort of man towards freedom. Of this effort, each one, according to his degree, can become aware, as each Christian must investigate and live his faith. On the contrary, it is the moralism we deplore, the translation by the intellectual of a limited and arbitrarily isolated aspect of the life of the spirit, which would be an aristocracy in the pejorative sense in which the word has been taken, a paternalism. This is not to say that to make an effort and to carry on a struggle effectively limited to a particular field, men, and among them, Christians, do not have to unite. But if Christian reflection is added to this effort, the spirit may be opened to the infinite perspective in which is situated any limited activi-

ty. To act otherwise would be to lead Christians into infantilism, but our job is to prepare adults on behalf of themselves and their faith.

With these dramas, anguishes, and ambitions, this midcentury is one of the greatest of epochs. Perhaps every generation could say the same: we need only think of 1848, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Renaissance, the discovery of the New World, without going farther back. God is great enough to make ready in each generation of men a perspective worthy of humanity, of its freedom, of its love, of its reason. And it is for each generation to recognize the novelty which is offered it and which it creates to maintain and continue its endless initiation into ever renewed perspectives. The Christian who believes in God, creator of these worlds, who holds in his hands or receives in his mouth the Body of Christ, Redeemer and Lord, cannot be blinder than others to the magnificence of Creation, which in Genesis receives man for its king; forewarned of Evil as well as of Good, he has a supplementary mission to give witness to Christ whose Kingdom shall not pass away. Such a witness requires a flowering of Christians as well informed in their faith as in the direction of their times.

We need adult Christians. That is, Christians who witness to the fact that Christ has truly given to man the choice of his destiny since, facing their existence, they assume all the responsibility for it. That is, free Christians. In quest not only of their own freedom but of freedom for all. This, indeed, demands that these Christians, well instructed in their faith, living it according to the demands and wishes of the Church in their time, freely take, in the conditions in which they have to live, decisions for which they must assume responsibility. This is required not only for their own freedom but for the freedom of all. For the human world in which man today is obliged to live is a ceaselessly changing world, in all respects and at every turn. We find in these later years that it is changing too quickly but we have not found the means of slowing down this motion. Moreover, if some claim, as moralism does, to draw hastily from past experiences these absolute obligations to which future Christians would find themselves limited, rather than strengthen their faith so that they might discover themselves how to act together with other men, Christians or non-Christians, the result will be that, far from attaining the proposed end, just the opposite will have been accomplished. No one today can fix from the outside the conduct to be followed in a field of activity in which he is not master. The more ignorant he is, it is true, the more simple and easy he will believe it is to solve what he does not understand; this is a law which always holds true. If we neglect to train Christians who understand and live their faith, rather than content themselves with precepts of behavior and "ready answers" too readily applied, these disastrous precepts, disastrous for life and soon for the faith, will most often be applied.

There must be Christians therefore with enough perspicacity and boldness to look at the world as it is, to analyze its condition, and single out its components. Afterwards, they have to make their decisions and take sides. The greatness of the free man consists in discovering and fixing upon what will permit him to increase his freedom. All the elements of his knowledge once assembled, strong in faith and obedient to the teachings of the Church (this does not mean to the circumscribed ideas of Christians without the authority to limit the work in each domain), the Christian chooses the idea that he has formed of the world of tomorrow and the means necessary for its realization. It is necessary for him to make

this choice with a full knowledge of the situation for he must desire to be reasonable. This understanding and this action are not the deed of a man in isolation: he will do it therefore in solidarity with those who see as he does. In order to preserve his faith in every exigency we have said that he must live it in the Church and with regard for the organizations that the Church has established for his times; but in order to work for the liberty or for the liberation of man, he will unite with those who see, think and feel as he does. In his choice he will take into account the teachings of the Church most carefully, but his choice is a free thing. He makes it on his own responsibility, from which no one can dispense him. The objection that will be made is easy: the Christian will be in danger of making mistakes. But let us be shown any man, Christian or not, who has never made a mistake. One might be quite ignorant of history and still know that here below in this domain (which is not that of faith) man progresses through error upon error. We must lay claim to the right of being wrong for action in this fallible world; for to deny it is the only fatal error. Still it will be said: Christians will be divided. But are they not divided now in this regard? And have they not always been so? This division, recognized, accepted, is the first testimony that they can give of their freedom. A humanity no longer divided would be dead, for it would be enslaved, without vitality, without any affirmation of freedom. In a time when so many ideologies claim to impose automatic behavior, faith in Jesus Christ is great enough, perhaps it alone is great enough to give unity to the intransigence for what it looks upon as its own life, the fecund division necessary for freedom.

It is true that the attitude here extolled presupposes that man is in a position to invent, to create new techniques, new ideas, new values. But there is in this no assumption of "aristocrats." What we have said is a conviction born of faith itself. For "God created man in his own image. In the image of God He created him" (Gen. i, 27). God the Creator made man the creator and it is of this power that humanity has today become somewhat aware. We expect of the Christian who is attentive to the growth of the world that he testify that man is saved and that he insist only upon the triumph over evil and the growth of true freedom. He will give this testimony if he makes use of the gift of God: "Increase and multiply" (Gen. i, 28). It is up to the Christian to show that this gift of creation begins with the most humble of work and that the total power of humanity results from the sum of these humble efforts. Then he will recall with some chance of being heard by this **humanity that the** creative power is a gift, a recognition and by no means a denial of God, and that its use is beneficial only through the mediation of His only Son: Jesus Christ.

Translated by BRUCE MULLER

¹ The reference is to Abbé Godin's *France, pays de mission* (Cerf), adapted in English by Maisie Ward in *France pagan?* (Sheed and Ward). Tr.

² Translation of *intégrisme*. Cf. Yves Congar, "Attitudes toward reform in the Church," *Cross Currents*, Summer 1951. Tr.

³ Father Maydieu here lists *Esprit* and *Terre Humaine* (now defunct) in France; *Quaderni* of Livourne in Italy, *Frankfurter Hefte* in Germany, *La Revue Nouvelle* in Belgium, *Commonweal* and *Cross Currents* in the United States.

⁴ Translation of *ouvriérisme*.

⁵ *Essai sur la pensée hébraïque* (Cerf).

⁶ Cf. the author's *Catechisme pour notre temps* (Cerf).

CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY

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FEW twentieth-century tendencies have been more surprising, disappointing, and shocking to the modern western secular liberal mind, its convictions shaped by the eighteenth and nineteenth century phases of our culture, than the marked disposition of peoples and nations during the last thirty years or so to withdraw from and go back upon the basic tenets of democracy. I can well remember the consternation and perplexity of my father during the '20's and '30's. For him the movement toward and into democracy was an example of irreversible progress. No people who had once made this journey could be prevailed upon or even tempted to retrace their steps. Anti-democratic trends and propagandas he could only interpret in terms of downright wickedness or pathetic insanity. Since his generous, optimistic humanism made it difficult for him to think in terms of human wickedness, he preferred on the whole the category of insanity, with occasional lapses into the category of wickedness whenever he felt more than usually angry and frustrated. His was a not uncommon state of mind. It is difficult indeed to react to and interpret the more horrific and demonic events of our time without some employment of the categories of wickedness and sin. We may say in theory that we do not believe in sin, but it is almost impossible in practice to deny the reality of sinners and sinful actions when we see them before our very eyes. It is wiser, perhaps, to take reality seriously and to search for the causes and reasons of the things of which we disapprove rather than merely to deplore and denounce them as irrational perversions.

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What then are the most prevalent causes of the alienation of so much western thought and energy from democratic institutions and ideals? No doubt it is impossible for any one thinker to perceive and enumerate them all, but there are at least four tendencies at work which seem to me of the profoundest importance. I list them here not because they provide a complete account of the whole phenomenon, but as my own contribution to the discussion.

(1) *The democratic movement has ceased to be a revolutionary movement.* In most of the great and leading countries of the western world, democratic institutions, in one form or another, had been more or less securely established by 1914. Germany was perhaps the only significant exception, and even she possessed at least a plausible façade of democratic institutions. The democratic struggle after 1918 was thus in most western countries a struggle to preserve rather than to attain and establish democracy. Nowadays we talk about defending democracy,

not creating it. In other words, in countries like America, Britain, and France, enthusiasm for political democracy is an essentially conservative attitude.

There is nothing surprising about this. Every brand of revolutionism is transubstantiated into a form of conservatism once its goals have been attained. Nor is such a transition in itself a morally reprehensible one, for the conservative attitude has its proper place in a mature and balanced social outlook. Any community in which anything worth doing has been done and achieved is a community which embodies values worthy of preservation. A community in which nothing was worth conserving would be a very poor community indeed. What is worth doing in the first place is worth conserving in the second place. Nevertheless we must face the fact that a conservative emphasis finds it difficult to stimulate and sustain the zeal and devotion which revolutionary movements so easily arouse. A conservatism, however valid, is nearly always less exciting than a revolutionary propaganda, however mistimed and inappropriate. Ever since the French Revolution there has been abroad and at work in the world a certain mystique of revolution, and many of the most gifted and energetic of modern men and women feel intellectually, emotionally, and morally uncomfortable if they cannot tell themselves that they are on the revolutionary side. This is an undesirable social phenomenon, but it is a real phenomenon all the same. Revolution for revolution's sake is a poor and unconvincing kind of gospel when we put it in so many words, but people who live their lives on the basis of such a conviction very rarely put it into words. It is the excitement of it all, the sense of living dangerously, the conviction that they are on the side of the future against the past and the present, which warm their hearts and gladden their minds and give them a sense of purpose and validity in life which otherwise they could not find in our modern secular world. In short, the sort of people who once fought for democracy, precisely because it was not, tend now to fight against it, precisely because it is.

The greatest handicap of democracy in the modern western world is the fact it has arrived. It cannot be said that it has fulfilled all the hope and idealism of those who created it. In real history social and political programmes never do that. Society is still confronted by grave problems; masses of men are still frustrated and unhappy; if many old wrongs have been righted, many new wrongs have been swift to take their place. The utopian dreamers are always disappointed in the event. If we would avoid disillusion at the last, it is better not to cherish any illusions at the first. Yet if democracy has not brought with it social and moral perfection and the dawning of a golden age, it has solid achievements to its credit and it is churlish and ungrateful not to acknowledge the achievements simply because men once hoped for too much. Still the disappointments and the disillusion are real factors which our strategy for the defense of democracy must take into serious account.

(2) *At least in our western world democracy and nationalism have now parted company.* During the great period of the advance toward democracy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the cause of national independence and national unity often went hand in hand with the cause of democratic progress. To many thinkers and idealists they appeared to be but twin aspects of the same thing, for both were spontaneous uprisings of the people demanding at the same time democratic freedom for themselves and independence and unity for

the nation to which they belonged. It is true that even in this period they did not always walk together. Thus, for example, Germany achieved its unity under the leadership of Bismarck's authoritarian Prussia, and the German liberals and democrats lost prestige precisely because they were not the party which succeeded in creating modern Germany. Normally, however, it was democracy which liberated dependent peoples and united divided people.

At a later stage, however, nationalism and democracy tend to come into conflict. For the genuinely democratic mind the achievement of democracy and the rule of law within nations is usually interpreted as the necessary prelude to the achievement of democracy and the rule of law among the nations; national order is thought of as the foundation of international order. But nationalism, which is quite distinct from patriotism, usually rejects this second movement of the democratic mind and becomes the enemy of democracy in this later phase of democratic development. Nationalism can take either of two forms. It can think in terms of conquest and domination, or in terms of proud isolation and self-sufficiency. Sometimes the nationalist mind will oscillate bewilderingly between the two. Thus Nazi Germany tended to be isolationist and autarchic in its economic policy, and at the same time nationalistic and imperialistic in its military and political policy. Similarly we find not a few American isolationists alternating bewilderingly between a desire to cut themselves off from and take no responsibility for international situations—e.g. in the Far East—and a desire to dominate them. But whatever the form contemporary nationalism takes, its genius tends to be hostile to democracy. Nationalists regard the independence, security, and greatness of their nation as prior to and more important than its integrity as a democracy, and so they tend to become impatient with the strict observance of democratic forms, so essential to the survival and preservation of democracy, whenever they feel that higher and more important national aims are at stake.

(3) *The failure of so much western democratic thought and policy to preserve the essential foundations of human happiness.* In the most advanced western democratic countries the most marked and characteristic failure of a rather superficial humanistic and individualistic secular democracy has been its misinterpretation of the role of marriage and the family as one of the basic factors in human happiness. The two nations which most of all embody the democratic ideals and champion the democratic cause, America and Britain, are both of them areas of culture in which the unity and stability of the family are in greater danger than in any other part of the civilised world, except perhaps Scandinavia. They must both of them be described as societies given to the intemperate practice of divorce, with all the unhappiness, frustration, and neurosis which invariably accompany a gravely disordered sexuality. Few things are more essential to human happiness, and a rational and satisfying social order than a cohesive, coherent, and secure family life, and this is one of the great blessings which the most advanced democratic societies have most singularly failed to confer upon their peoples. The weakness and failure of the family under democratic conditions is like a malignant cancer gnawing at the very vitals of democracy. We should ask ourselves whether the so-called "democratic family" is really essential to democracy, or whether it is not, on the contrary, a tragic misinterpretation of

democracy, rooted and grounded not in democracy itself, but in the false understanding of democracy which has become widely current in its secular phase.

(4) *The prevailing secular tone of so much democratic thought, idealism, and policy has tended to estrange modern democracy from the religious motivations and impulses which lie at the heart of western civilisation.* When we find, as we do again and again in certain areas of western civilisation, Christian men dabbling and flirting with anti-democratic politics, this is almost always the root cause of the trouble. From their own point of view such men are rejecting not a democratic political order which represents and fulfills in political terms important elements in the Christian conception of man as a free person made in the image of God, and for the eternal service of God rather than the temporal service of the state, but, as they see it, a godless liberalism, a secular regime, which although it may make a show of tolerating Christianity, is either fundamentally hostile to it or contemptuously writes it off as a second class issue aside from the really serious business of life.

There is in fact a real conflict not between Christian faith and democracy but between Christian faith and the purely secular state, whether democratic or not. The widespread assumption that a democratic state must be secular, the tendency of not a few democratic thinkers and idealists to put forward democracy and what they call the 'democratic way of life' as though it were in itself a kind of religious absolute standing over against Christianity, or possibly including a drastically reinterpreted and liberalized Christianity, or even as something higher or more valuable than Christianity, is clearly an assumption which no Christian can conceivably accept. When democracy presents itself to the world and seeks to justify itself as a merely humanistic secularism, it cannot expect to secure the allegiance and support of a Christianity worthy of the name, of a Christianity reawakened, as modern Christendom tends more and more to be, to a new consciousness of its own essential point of view and a renewed faith in the power and necessity of the Gospel. For such a Christianity nothing in life is really secular, and the doctrine of the secular state is something which it cannot accept. The re-emergence in the twentieth century scene of a purged and disentangled Christianity, once more conscious of its Gospel and its own unique point of view about everything in God's creation, is again one of those factors which we cannot conceivably exclude from our attention when we are discussing the whole question of the strategy to be adopted in the defense of democracy. Democracy must make its peace with the religious forces at work in the western world if it is to succeed in uniting all its friends in its defense, and this means that the aggressively secular phase in democratic thought and policy must be brought to an end. It belongs to the eighteenth century, not the twentieth.

The main concern here is with this last aspect of the contemporary predicament of democracy—its ambiguous relationship to Christianity. For me it is Christianity, not democracy, which is absolute, and democracy, not Christianity, which lies under the judgment. The question before us is not: how democratic is Christianity? or, how can Christianity be so modified and interpreted as to make it compatible with the spirit of democracy?, but, how Christian is democracy? or, how can democracy be so conceived and formulated as to keep it in touch with the spirit of Christianity?

I am aware, of course, that there are some Christians, particularly in

Britain and America, who can see no problem here. For them apparently Christianity is the religion of which democracy is the practice; Christianity is the cause of democracy and democracy the fulfillment of Christianity. I mean no disrespect to democracy when I say that I cannot accept such formulas of concord as these. I do not believe that any proposition of the form, "Christianity is the religion of which democracy—or whatever you will—is the practice," can ever be valid. Christianity is the religion of which Christianity is the practice. It may very well be that social forms and institutions desperately need and require the inspiration, counsel, and spiritual force of Christianity to give them the strength and the will to survive, but to Christianity nothing is absolutely essential but Christianity itself. We must find some other way of establishing the importance and validity of democracy, which does not commit the error of identifying it with Christianity.

On the other hand, we do not wish to separate democracy from Christianity altogether, for that would be to secularise democracy. Modern democracy has a Christian theological sanction and to trace the history of modern democracy is to perceive its Christian origins. My contention will be that although we cannot properly say that Christianity needs democracy, we may say that our western democracy needs Christianity. We may also validly say that among the various alternative forms of political order between which we have to choose in a fallen world it is democracy which should be selected by the Christian mind as the best and most commendable type of political order here below, precisely because it has a theological sanction which no other set of political arrangements can claim to possess.

I propose to arrange my remarks under two heads: what can Christianity not say or do with or about democracy? and, what can Christianity say or do with or about democracy? I begin with two claims or affirmations concerning democracy which, in my view, Christianity ought not to make and cannot make.

(1) *Christianity cannot affirm democracy as higher than itself.* By this I mean that Christianity cannot conceivably accept the prevalent view that democracy has clearly grasped and put into practice truths and values to which Christianity was clumsily pointing throughout the predemocratic ages, without quite knowing precisely what it was doing. Some writers almost seem to suggest that Christianity is related to modern democracy rather as the Hebrew prophets were related to the coming of Christ. Christianity is much more than merely the prophecy which points toward a future fulfillment of its hopes in a democratic age.

We must remind ourselves again and again that democracy after all is no more than an important and valuable set of political arrangements. It is a way of carrying on the government of a group. Its great value is that if its forms and values are steadfastly respected, social change, even social changes of a very fundamental and revolutionary character, can take place without violence. In the same way the shifting of power from party to party and from group to group within the body politic which, apart from democracy, usually involves a certain amount of fighting and bloodshed, can be achieved by democratic means without any violations of public peace. The advantages of such a system are manifest.

Unfortunately, however, many people are not satisfied with democracy merely as a desirable and advantageous type of political machinery. They want to turn it into a moral ideal, almost an absolute religion. They desire to get out

of democracy more than democracy properly understood can possibly contain. Such an idealization of democracy is doomed to frustration. We cannot get a quart out of a pint pot. When we insist on using the adjective "democratic" to qualify social realities which lie deeper than the political level of human relationships we usually find that it does not fit this kind of reality at all well. Thus many enthusiasts have labored to describe what they call the "democratic family." But it might be better to say that the "democratic family" is simply a name used to describe the inefficient family, the kind of family that is always breaking down and persistently failing to fulfill its functions both as the nursery of human character and the architect of human happiness. The so-called "democratic family" means a matrimonial system in which divorce is almost as common as marriage, a family system in which children are continually and unjustly deprived of their human right to two parents; it means irresponsible parents and untrained children; it means the enthronement of insecurity and frustration in the very heart of the social life of the people. Such a radically unsuccessful way of conducting our domestic life does not merit such a high sounding adjective as democratic. Our modern family system is just an inefficient and insecure one. It is much better to call a spade a spade.

The truth is that there is no "democratic way of life." Most of the basic ways of human life antedate democracy. The function of democracy is not to overturn and transform the basic types of human order which preceded democracy in time, but rather to defend and uphold them. Similarly it is a mistake to suppose that there are any characteristically democratic ethical virtues or moral values. Of course, we cannot maintain democracy or any other form of social order without the great ethical virtues and moral values, but there are no ethical virtues and moral values which are peculiar to democracy and which simply do not exist elsewhere. Thus some people, for example, regard tolerance as a democratic value. Many non-democratic governments and societies in the past have believed in and practiced tolerance and some democratic societies, it must be confessed, have at times lapsed into intolerance. I would agree that a democratic society is more likely to be tolerant than any other, but it cannot be said that tolerance is impossible without democracy or that democracy automatically achieves tolerance. The great ethical virtues must be practiced and the great moral values must be revered whether our society is democratic or not. To appropriate some great universal virtue on behalf of some particular form of political order is as foolish and misleading as to appropriate some great virtue as though it were the peculiar possession of one particular nation. A phrase like democratic tolerance or democratic kindliness is quite as absurd as talking about British courage, Canadian honesty, or German self-discipline. The virtues and the values are not bounded and possessed in this exclusive way.

Democracy is primarily a political word, a word used to describe a particular technique for arriving at decisions which bind the group that makes them. Of course, the democratic group need not be a nation. It may, for example, be a church or a tennis club or a ladies' sewing guild. But whatever kind of group it is, it will be a democratic one if it believes in arriving at group decisions by way of open discussion, and perhaps by some technique which involves voting, the whole process being conducted in accordance with either a written constitution

or some more flexible set of conventions and traditions which are accepted as binding by the whole group.

It should be noticed that no democratic group exists merely or primarily for the sake of behaving democratically. The primary purpose of a tennis club is playing tennis; the primary purpose of a ladies' sewing guild is presumably sewing in a ladylike manner. They are democratic insofar as they are doing what they have gathered together to do in a democratic way. Similarly, the primary purpose of a democratic nation is not to be a democracy but to be a nation. The democratic nation is democratic because it is convinced that the best and most successful way of being a nation is to be a nation in the democratic way. In a sense the primary purposes of democratic and non-democratic nations are the same. Contemporary Russia wants to be Russia, just as America is determined to be America. It is their political techniques, their ways of implementing their kindred policies which differentiate them so sharply from each other.

Democracy is thus essentially a method of group behavior. It does not usually dictate the primary purposes of the group although it may, indeed must, restrain them from pursuing purposes and objectives—for example, the domination of other nations by conquest and military power—which in the nature of the case cannot be pursued in a democratic way. But the positive purposes of a group stem from deeper levels of human existence than those on which we are politically organized together. It is this fact which makes it necessary to say that democracy cannot amount to, must not pretend to be, a complete system of social ethics and social purposes. There is no democratic way of life. There is only a way of common life which employs democratic techniques for regulating group relationships and arriving at group decisions. Democracy, even for the democratic man, indeed above all for the democratic man and the democratic society, is neither the highest nor the deepest thing in life. To absolutize and worship democracy, as some modern liberal thinkers would seem to do, is to absolutize and worship a technique, a process as ridiculous intellectually as it is unsatisfying existentially.

It is important that the reader should not misunderstand me at this point. In saying all this I am not decrying or criticising democracy. I am only trying to ascertain what democracy really is, so that we can clearly understand wherein lies its real value and importance. Democratic philosophers who make false and inflated claims about democracy are not democracy's true friends. The false and inflated claims can be exposed, and those who expose them may easily be deluded into thinking that because they have refuted prevalent misinterpretations of democracy they have refuted democracy itself. So it is that I have set about the task of finding out what democracy is by saying in the first place as clearly as I can what democracy most certainly is not. It is not a complete ethic or a total way of life.

But a total way of life is precisely what Christianity is, and hence Christianity is both a higher thing and a deeper thing than democracy. What we really need in order to display to the world democracy at its best is a Christian society which practices and employs the techniques of democracy with sincerity and integrity. But to suppose that a society can survive and amount to anything in particular merely by concentrating on being a democracy and nothing else, would be like supposing that a man can become and be a real person and develop a rounded and balanced character simply by scrupulously observing all the ordinances of

statute law, or that a teacher can become a good teacher simply by learning the best educational techniques and without having any idea of what it is that must be taught. (This second example is really not so fantastic as might be supposed, for not a few modern teachers do seem to have embarked on their life's vocation with a merely technical preparation of this kind. But the result has not tended to increase the efficiency or the health of the educational system!)

Thus the essential first step in what I might call a Christian reinterpretation of democracy is this salutary assertion that democracy is a good and useful social technique, and neither a rather feeble and unsatisfying humanistic religion without worship nor a cold and unconvincing social ethic without God. We shall value democracy more highly if we value it for what it is. To hymn the glories of democracy while ascribing to it heights and qualities which it does not in fact possess is not really to cherish democracy at all. It is simply a way of cherishing our own illusions.

(2) *Christianity cannot affirm democracy as essential to itself.* This is so obviously true that the point seems hardly worth laboring. Democracy cannot be essential to the profession of Christianity and the survival of the Christian Church for the very obvious reason that the Christian Church succeeded in existing and maintaining itself for many centuries before the first modern democratic state came into being. It is true, of course, that from the days of the Roman Empire onwards the Christian Church found itself again and again at war with the kind of totalitarian state which is apt to demand that men should in some form or other worship the state itself and acknowledge their temporal secular loyalty to the state as the highest and supreme obligations of their lives. The struggle between the prophetic religion of the living God and the doctrine of loyalty to the state as the highest of all loyalties, before which every other loyalty must give way, is clearly and unforgettably set out in the great myths which constitute the narrative portions of the Book of Daniel. The principle laid down in that book is clear: those who know that the supreme loyalty and moral obligation of man is to be found in the sphere of his relationship to the living God, and that to this loyalty every secular loyalty whatsoever must defer, cannot conceivably worship any emperor or state or temporal political reality. Loyalty to God in and through the life of the Church takes precedence of any possible loyalty to state and nation.

But we must not suppose that all non-democratic states, simply because they are non-democratic, necessarily come into conflict and oppress the conscience of the Christian man in this way. It is quite possible for a state not democratically constituted and ordered to respect and even share the conviction of its Christian citizens that their primary duty and loyalty is to God alone. It is equally possible, alas, for a democratic state so to mistake and misinterpret its own nature as to put loyalty to itself above the loyalty of the awakened religious consciousness to the God who makes Himself known to men in the Christian Gospel. Indeed, when democracy interprets itself in a purely secular way this is what tends to happen again and again. Sometimes loyalty to God in and through the life of the Church is even represented as incompatible with the duties of a democratic citizen. This seems to be the main point, for example, of the anti-Catholic writings of Mr. Paul Blanchard. By the adroit strategy of concentrating his fire on the Roman Church, Mr. Blanchard has succeeded in gaining for himself a fair meas-

ure of misguided Protestant sympathy, but in reality his point of view calls in question the legitimacy in a democracy of any church or supernatural loyalty whatsoever. He does not really believe that the democratic man ought to entertain and cherish any loyalty higher than his loyalty to the democratic state.

In fact it is precisely this doctrine that the highest loyalty of man is his loyalty to the state, however constituted, which is the real essence of totalitarianism, for the totalitarian conception of the state is really the view that the state holds unquestioned sway over the total area of human existence. We should avoid confusing the adjective "totalitarian" with the adjective "authoritarian." All states, even the most democratic ones, claim and exercise some measure of authority. It is essential to the very nature of the state that it must do so. A state is authoritarian in the bad sense when it exercises its authority in a totalitarian way. "Totalitarian" is thus a profounder and more significant word than "authoritarian." A totalitarian democracy, a democratically organized state which claims and proceeds on the assumption that the total life of man falls within the sphere of its responsibilities, is at least a possibility, but it is a paradoxical possibility, for such a claim would contradict something which lies at the very heart of democracy. Democracy is essentially a way of organising the group life of a community which frankly acknowledges that there is much that is important and significant in the lives of the members of the community which does not fall within the scope of its authority.

"Man was not made for the state, but the state for man," we often say, boldly adapting a Gospel phrase for our own purpose. Do we pause as often as we should to consider what this means? If man was not made for the state, for what or for whom was he made? In what dimension of his existence does man transcend the sphere of the state's responsibility? Can we possibly say that man was made for himself? This, I suppose, is what a sheer individualistic humanism would have to say. But consider the enormity of such an utterance! It would mean that man transcends the sphere of the state in the dimension of his egocentricity, that his duty and loyalty to himself is somehow a higher thing than his duty and loyalty to the community in which he literally finds himself, which he needs in order to become and fulfill himself. It is surely impossible to hold that our self-hood is a reality prior to, independent of, and higher than the reality of the community in which we find ourselves. Although much more needs to be said on this point, the various forms of collectivism, totalitarianism, and communalism seem to me at least nearer to the truth than sheer individualism. Surely we can only say with any real conviction that man was not made for the state, but that on the contrary the state is made for the service of man, if we first of all believe that God created man for Himself, that the human being is a being with an eternal destiny and an eternal significance, whereas the temporal state is no more than the servant of his destiny, a means in and through which he journeys onward through time towards his final and eternal end. Such a doctrine as this clearly rules all totalitarianism out of court as, and this is the important point, no other doctrine of man succeeds in doing.

We have already pointed out that individualism and totalitarianism go together. If men left to themselves are no more than a chaos of self-regarding, mutually independent individuals, then, since for the sake of their own peace men have got to be united and welded together for common action somehow or

other, it seems plausible to suppose that the state is the best agency for bringing about this desirable result. The state from the point of view of sheer individualism thus becomes the creator and master instead of the servant of the community. All this was very clearly brought out by a great English political philosopher of the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was at the same time a completely individualistic philosopher and a preacher and defender of political absolutism. I believe he was utterly wrong, but I cannot deny that he was rigidly logical. It is not in the dimension of his self-hood but in the dimension of his duty to God that man transcends the state and is clearly seen to be more important than the state.

And this great truth, to return to our original point, can conceivably be realized and recognized in a non-democratic order, just as it may unfortunately be forgotten in a democratic one. What makes a political and social order Christian in the last resort is the extent to which it knows and recognises itself as a temporal order of being which is all the time transcended by the eternal destiny of each one of its members. It admits that it exists only to serve the temporal needs of the children. Thus, in certain favourable circumstances, a non-democratic social order may be a Christian one, just as, in unfavourable circumstances, a democracy may become a non-Christian, or even an anti-Christian, society.

But there is another and deeper reason why Christianity cannot conceivably concur in the view that democracy is essential to Christianity itself. The Church as we know it now in this world, the empirical church which acts upon the stage of human history, "the Church Militant here on earth," as it describes itself in its liturgical phraseology, does not contain or make manifest the whole reality of the Church. The prevalent habit of using the word 'Church' in general conversation to mean simply the empirical Church as we know it on earth is a misleading one. The theologian, when he talks of the Church, refers to the death-transcending, time-transcending Body of Christ, of which the Church Militant here on earth, as we call it in the Prayer Book Liturgy, is simply one phase or aspect, and not the most vital one at that. The full reality of the Church, its latent promise and inward yearning, will only be achieved and made manifest in the Kingdom of God. It is there that we shall see the Church as God intends it to be. The Church, in other words, is an *eschatological reality*.

Theological terms like this only cloud and mystify the issue so long as we are ignorant of their meaning; if and when we know what they mean, they clarify the discussion enormously. To say that a reality is eschatological means that it must be interpreted not in terms of what it is or has been but in terms of what it is becoming and what it is destined to be. Such a reality here and now only hints darkly at what it will be, and be seen to be, at the point of its ultimate consummation. So it is that the poet Wordsworth tells us that "the child is father of the man," the young growing human being is not merely what he seems to be at the present moment but, more truly and profoundly understood, he *is* what he is to become. Even so the latent promise of the being of the Church, as yet unfulfilled, will only be realized in the Kingdom of God.

Now the Kingdom of God, and this is the important point, cannot conceivably be described as a democracy. It is indeed a *theocracy*, in which the kingdom, the power, and the glory belong to God alone. The best earthly analogy to employ when we attempt to grasp and illustrate the nature of the Kingdom of God

in human images is not the democratic state but a serenely happy family, presided over and cared for by a loving and responsible father who is trusted and loved by his wife and his children. No other consideration makes so clear to us the reason why Christianity, insofar as it appreciates and affirms the value and importance of democracy, is compelled by its own nature to interpret democracy, not as an absolute and ultimate value, but as an essentially transitional, this-worldly phenomenon which is useful and perhaps even necessary in our present imperfect state of development, but yet at the same time an institution which must wither away and be no more seen when man is made perfect in the Kingdom of God.

BUT now, having briefly considered what Christianity cannot say about democracy, however much many enthusiastic devotees of democracy would like to have Christianity say it, let us turn to the more positive side of the picture. What claims can Christianity make for democracy in conformity with its own traditions and in complete loyalty to its own essential message?

(1) *Christianity can understand democracy and thus provide it with a really tenable philosophical foundation.* The great difference between the interpretation of democracy provided by secular humanists and the interpretation of democracy put forward by the Christian theologians is this: the secular humanist tends to understand and defend democracy in terms of a romantic belief in human perfectibility, whereas the Christian theologian prefers to understand and defend democracy in terms of one of his basic dogmas, the doctrine of original sin.

The romantic belief in human perfectibility is usually closely associated with ideas, more or less clearly articulated, about a law of moral progress for mankind which became almost an article of faith in the secular humanism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this twentieth Century the notion has had to withstand many hard knocks but it is not quite dead even yet. The notion is optimistic about man as he is; it supposes that he is already visibly better than he was in even the comparatively recent past, and that he will be better still very shortly. There are many different ways of formulating this doctrine, of which Marxism itself is perhaps the clearest and most cogent (that is why the secular humanist is often a poor defender of democracy against Marxism because he is already half a Marxist himself.)

As a basis for the defence of the democratic idea, this optimistic doctrine of man has two serious defects. In the first place, as it seems to me and to most realistic interpreters of the human situation in the twentieth Century, it is so plainly untrue. There never was very much to be said in its favor, and unless we are intellectual Bourbons, completely imprisoned behind the cozy walls of our optimism, incapable of either forgetting or learning anything, there is nothing to be said for it now. Man is not morally improved by the mere lapse of time.

The second mistake of those who use a notion of this kind as the foundation of a democratic philosophy is that it does not really or necessarily point in the direction of democracy at all. If men really are perfectible, and in fact moving rapidly toward perfection, is there any real reason why we should not trust administrative and technical experts to carry on the work of government on our

behalf? An optimistic view of the moral potentialities of mankind in general should surely include an optimistic view of the moral potentials of statesmen, administrators, and technicians!

If we reject the view of human existence which teaches us that men are corruptible, and that above all men are corrupted again and again by power, then there is much to be said for interpreting government as a task for experts, for men of particular gifts heightened and concentrated by a specialized training, and for consigning the burden and responsibilities of government to them alone, just as we leave science to the scientists, art to the artists, and so on. Optimism about men in general surely implies and includes optimism about the experts. There is indeed more to be said for this point of view than most of us care to admit. If we are to take the notion of progress seriously, then plainly the most obvious form of progress is technical progress. It is often said, in a trite cliché, that the alleged moral progress of mankind has not kept pace with the alleged technical progress of mankind. This is an understatement. Technical progress is not only a reality, but it has been carried very far indeed, whereas it is, to say the least, doubtful that there has been any moral progress at all. Civilised man is certainly as sinful, perhaps even more sinful, than the savage. Now one consequence of the technical progress of mankind, and this is one of the most acute problems which modern democracy has to face, is that more and more aspects of government have become highly technical matters. Whether we like it or not this is an age in which we are compelled increasingly to trust experts to do more and more of the things we want done because they alone understand the process by which they are done. Thus we are compelled to trust the physicist to create our military power, to turn to the economists for guidance in matters involving commercial and fiscal policy, to managerial experts to control and organize the vast bureaucracy that carries on the day-to-day business of the modern state, and the plain fact is that we cannot exist without such men. Simple societies no doubt could get along without the assistance of such people but to a complex society like our own they are absolutely essential. The 'apeheads' may furiously rage together and imagine many vain things, but they need the 'eggheads' all the same. That is why it is foolish of the apeheads to devote so much of their time to the criticism of the eggheads, for what would happen to the apeheads if the eggheads suddenly sickened of serving them and decided to seek more sympathetic and understanding masters, or even to become the masters themselves? A democracy that cannot understand and respect its experts, and provide an honoured place for them, is in mortal danger of being abandoned or even overthrown by its experts. The problem for democracy is the problem of retaining the service of the expert within a democratic framework. Part, at least, of the solution to the problem will be discovered by the democracy that learns to understand the expert and make him happy in its service. Yet although a modern democracy has learned to trust and respect the experts, it can never worship and trust itself to the expert without ceasing to be a democracy, and this is because the expert also is a fallen man. The uncommon man is a corruptible and corrupted sinner just as much as the common man. But the moment we see and say that this is true we are drawing attention to the fact of original sin.

THE classical theological term "original sin" is a somewhat misleading one now that we have acquired the habit of using the word 'original' to mean new, unusual or unique. Original sin certainly does not mean a new kind of sin that has never been sinned before. On the contrary, it refers to the spiritual sickness, the underlying sinfulness, which afflicts man from the very point of his origin, so that man is a sinner even when he is not sinning in any overt or particular fashion. We do not say that man is a sinner merely because he is observed to sin with regrettable frequency. That man is sinful is not an empirical observation based on a wide study of behaviouristic data, though no doubt such a generalization would be a valid and well-founded one. Man is not a sinner because he sins; on the contrary he sins because he is a sinner. The particular sins are facts which we observe; the doctrine of man's original sinfulness is a theological or philosophical category in terms of which we understand and account for what we observe. It answers for us the question, why is it that man is observed to sin again and again in this rather dull, repetitive fashion? Why is it that even when a man is not sinning in any overt recognizable way we have always to bear in mind the possibility that he may begin sinning in some overt recognizable way at the next moment? Why, in other words, is eternal vigilance the necessary price of freedom? Why is limiting and dividing earthly power and balancing the various forms of earthly power over against each other and subjecting earthly power to the rule of law, the only way in the long run to avoid being overwhelmed by earthly power? The answer can only be in terms of the doctrine of original sin.

It is because men are everywhere corruptible and always corrupted that no single man or group of men can be trusted with too much power, indeed with any power at all that is not in some way balanced and checked by the power of other men. For the same reason a social situation which leaves any particular man without any power, influence, status or rights whatsoever is one which leaves him at the mercy of the power of his neighbors. The wisdom of democracy is to divide and disperse, to limit and balance power, to reserve some tiny minimum of power for each citizen as his inalienable right, to create traditions, institutions, and written constitutional documents which insistently remind power of its responsibilities and its inherently limited character. But why is all this necessary and important? The answer is now clear: because this is a fallen world and because in a fallen world the problem of government and the consigning of power to particular persons and groups is the most hazardous problem of all. If men were morally perfect, or perfectible and rapidly approaching perfection, the case for democracy would not be so strong. But because this is not so the case for democracy is overwhelmingly strong.

To understand and interpret democracy in the light of the doctrine of original sin has the two-fold advantage of reminding us at the same time of both the strength and limitations of democracy. To say that democracy consists of a series of socio-political arrangements and techniques designed to avoid unhealthy concentrations of power, which will certainly be abused in a fallen world, is to put it in its proper place and to see it in its correct perspective. The liberal humanist tendency towards an idolatrous absolutising of democracy, which transforms it into an ultimate ethic or even a higher religion, is, of course, from

such a point of view as this, a ridiculous illusion. I believe that Sir Winston Churchill once remarked, although I have not been able to check the reference, that a democracy is the least unsatisfactory way of arranging our political affairs that we poor mortals have yet stumbled upon in this sinful world. To say this is to make a very great and important claim for democracy, but it is at the same time to reject entirely any ethical or religious absolutising of democracy. Now we can see clearly why it is that the Kingdom of God is not a democracy, and why Christianity cannot conceivably affirm democracy as something necessary to itself or higher than itself. Democracy is appropriate and valuable in the context of a fallen world. Outside such a context it cannot conceivably have such a meaning or relevance. But it so happens that our world is a fallen world. This world of ours is the context in which democracy is appropriate and valuable. The Christian doctrine that defines the limitations of democracy at the same time perceives and diagnoses its essential value and strength. To perceive the limitations of democracy is to state the case for democracy within its limitations. We know of no alternative to democracy that has anything like the efficiency and validity of democracy here in this fallen world. It is the best and most effective way we have yet devised for ordering the process in and through which sinners govern each other and themselves.

Perhaps we should say just a little more about the notion of human perfectibility. Christianity does not necessarily deny that man is perfectible, although some forms of Christian theology do come very near to doing so. For them the great problem is not so much the elimination of sin, the setting free of men from the power of evil which holds them enthralled, but the problem of the forgiveness of sins, so that even in eternity and the Kingdom of God men will be a community of forgiven sinners rather than a community of unjust men made perfect. But what we may call the majority view among Christian theologians, and it is certainly the biblical view also, thinks in terms not merely of the forgiveness of sins but also of an ultimate conquest of sin. Sin is not merely forgiven by the loving Christ; its power is broken by the victory of the sinless Christ. For Christianity man is not merely perfectible; he will, in the kingdom of God, actually be perfected.

The real difference between Christianity and secular humanism is that the latter believes not merely in the perfectibility of man but in the self-perfectibility of man. According to secular humanism, man will be perfected either through his own efforts or by the mysterious semi-divine force called progress, which may be no more than the apathetic doctrine that man will be perfected by mere lapse of time, or which may more positively interpret man's own efforts to perfect himself as an essential part of the process. According to Christianity man will be perfected neither by mere lapse of time nor by his own efforts, but by the power of the grace of God. Of course, the Christian may say that man will not be perfected without some co-operative effort on his part, nor, since man is a temporal being, will the process be an all-at-once process without any temporal aspect. Nevertheless, for Christianity the primary and central agent of the process is God, and both human effort and the lapse of time will be utterly in vain apart from the grace of God. So long as this world-order and the course of human history continue there can be no secure and abiding victory over the forces of evil, and we shall continue to be men struggling against the forces of evil in a fallen

world. So long as this world-order and history continue, therefore, democracy will always be a valuable and effective device appropriate to man's sinful condition, and necessary to his temporal and political well-being.

To state the case for democracy in these terms is to state it realistically and effectively. We endanger the cause of democracy by claiming too much for it, because there is always the danger that men who have attached themselves to democracy because they have accepted the inflated claims of democracy put forward by indiscriminately democratic philosophers will react against it and reject it at last in a mood of disappointment and disillusion. When we expect too much of anything we are sometimes so frustrated when it fails to live up to our expectations that we fail to recognize its real though limited achievement. Democracy is not a recipe for the speedy production of the millenium: it is simply a way of securing a reasonable degree of decency and order in the conduct of human affairs in a fallen world. Man will not escape by way of democracy from his basic problems or his ultimate spiritual predicament. Even democracy will always be corruptible and sometimes corrupt, and it offers us no salvation from the sins that beset us, but a really democratic nation may hope to avoid the evils of tyranny and gross injustice, and a really democratic world-order might even conceivably hope to avoid, or at least minimize, the evils of war. Surely to claim this for democracy is sufficient. It is quite unnecessary to try to present the kind of political arrangements and techniques that we call democratic as though they were an absolute ethic or an ultimate religion.

The Church can use democratic techniques in its own self-government and in the administration of its own affairs.

THE CHURCH itself is not and cannot be a democracy. It is, on the contrary, essentially a theocracy, the outlying earthly province of the Kingdom of God. Nevertheless the Church can employ democratic techniques in the carrying on of its earthly business and in fact it has done and does so. In our western civilisation the first parliamentary gatherings were in fact the councils of the Church, and during the Middle Ages the first parliamentary gatherings, the Cortes in Spain, for example, the States General in France, and the early parliaments gathered by monarchs like Edward I in England, borrowed their rules of procedure, and their way of conducting their business, very largely from the much older experience of the Church in the conduct of its synods and councils. And still today the bulk of church business is conducted in this way. Thus we see in a church like the Episcopal Church of the United States a large number of gatherings of elected representatives, parochial vestries, diocesan and national conventions, and so on, which carry on the day-to-day business of the Church despite the fact that the Church itself is not and cannot be a democracy.

The employment of democratic techniques in carrying on the business in what is fundamentally not a democratic society is quite a feasible and workable project. Thus a diocese may elect its bishop, yet the Church does not pretend that it is the election as such which makes a bishop a bishop. He becomes a bishop not when he is elected by the diocesan convention but at the moment when he is consecrated and raised to the rank and office of a bishop by other bishops. If

all the other bishops refuse to consecrate him, then he could never become a bishop though he were elected ten times over. The process of electing a bishop is thus democratic, while the process of consecrating a bishop remains hierarchic. This is a very clear example of the way in which democratic techniques can be used effectively and wholesomely in what nevertheless remains a non-democratic society.

Nor is this really a departure from what we might call the norm of democracy, for the truth is that no society is democratic through and through. There is, as we have already seen, nothing which in fact corresponds to what is sometimes called the democratic way of life, nor is there any really democratic society. What we call a democratic society is only a human society resolved to employ democratic techniques as far as possible in the carrying on of its social business. But the business itself which a democratic society carries on in its democratic way would have to be carried on in some way or other whether the society was democratic or not. The fact is that our basic social arrangements and necessities are pre-democratic and most of what makes up the common business of this life is in itself neither democratic nor undemocratic, it is simply human. For example, the family and the necessity of carrying on economic activities to support life are found in every form of human society. They are not in themselves democratic or undemocratic, though sometimes it may be possible to carry them on and protect them in a democratic manner. It is not necessary in a so-called democratic society that everything should be done democratically. Thus there is nothing peculiarly undemocratic in a father spanking his gravely disobedient son, nor is there any particularly democratic way of administering such a punishment. It may be important, indeed I think it is, that in a democracy fathers should occasionally chastise their sons, but the process itself is just a universally human one. It is equally necessary that fathers should chastise their sons even under a dictatorship. The family which does not discipline its children is neither democratic nor undemocratic; it is simply inefficient. Conversely it is a great mistake to suppose that everything which is done in a democracy must be democratic.

Even in a very democratic society most of the characteristic social customs are completely neutral so far as democracy is concerned. The clothes we wear, the code of manners we observe, our way of arranging our economical and matrimonial affairs, will most certainly include certain customary elements which neither affirm democracy nor call it in question. There is a wide-spread idea that any characteristically British or American customs must necessarily be democratic social customs simply because Britain and America are democracies. This is a great illusion which may do harm, for it leads us to suppose that other peoples can only become democratic by adopting the whole round of our social customs, music, fashions, matrimonial and economic arrangements and so on. Now quite possibly many peoples who would like to become democratic do not wish to adopt the entire cultural and social system of the English-speaking world. We have no right to insist that they should do so, and it may be unwise even to propose such a thing. The important thing to tell the swiftly developing peoples of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, is that they can become democratic and remain themselves, that they can adopt democratic government and social techniques without aping the cultural conventions and habits of the English-speak-

ing parts of the western world. We must beware of turning the democratic philosophy into an ideology which cloaks and conceals what we may call a kind of cultural imperialism. The suspicion that when we talk about democratizing the world, we really mean westernizing or even Americanizing the world, does perhaps more harm than anything else to the cause of democracy. I repeat, not everything in a democracy need be democratic, nor is everything that is done in the existing democratic societies essential to the democratic idea.

THE ESSENTIAL contention of this article has been that we can assert the case for democracy with greater effectiveness and more valid conviction if we are aware of its limitations. The best way of doing this in a democratic world is to rest the case for democracy fairly and squarely on a Christian philosophy of life. The Christian is unlikely to overstate the case for democracy because he can never forget that, "Behold a greater than democracy is here." But once he has observed the limitations of democracy he is in a position to perceive great strength within its limitations, for democracy has the priceless advantage among theories and methods of social organisation of taking the doctrine of original sin seriously, and the doctrine of original sin, as has often been remarked, is the most obviously true of all Christian doctrines, perhaps the only one which can be verified and proved to the hilt beyond all question by a mere inspection and experience of the facts of life.

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ST. THOMAS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FREUD

ALBERT PLÉ

WHAT could be more disappointing than the innumerable conferences and meetings at which Christian psychiatrists and psychologists put questions to the theologians? Despite the good will and common belief of those taking part, one gets an impression of a conversation between deaf persons. Everyone states his own case, but nothing results. This failure cannot be attributed solely to unavoidable differences in vocabulary, methods or "formal" points of view. There is something more to it: we seem to be confronted with a "pattern of civilization."

The civilization and culture which slowly emerged during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and were given their formal framework in the great doctrines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are perishing before our eyes. They were Christian in origin, but carried within them from birth a flaw which showed itself first in heresy and schism, and finally in a process of secularization which has gradually driven God from the life of men. Today we are in a position to observe how far man, deprived of God, has become dehumanized and dissociated.

Dissociation came first. It looks as if, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, men lost the feeling of human unity, not only in the field of politics (it is at this date that the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and its splitting up into national States was accomplished) but in the field of culture and of faith. The victorious nominalism prevailing in this period shows to what extent man, in his mental habits, was cut off from nature and from real things, of which he was convinced that he knew nothing but their names or at most the ideas he could form of them. The theory which restricted the efficacy of the sacraments to a merely "moral" causality gained ground to such an extent that no connection was allowed to exist between physical and human reality and the divine life.

Everything was seen to be disintegrating: the immanence of God appeared irreconcilable with his transcendence (herein lies the whole tragedy of Protestantism), men lost all feeling for "mystery"¹ and the liturgy. Mind became separated from matter, and man soon appeared to be divided into two heterogeneous entities—one an angel, the other a sink of iniquity; one a rational being, the other a machine. Left alone and in fragments man no longer understood himself. In his nominalism, voluntarism, rationalism and individualism he lost sight of the complex unity of his nature and the profound dynamism of his life, and

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was filled with fear. Both theology and mysticism tended to depart from their sources in the Bible, the Liturgy and the Church: theology, wedded to nominalism, revolved in a vacuum; mysticism became bogged in introspection, sentimentality, *dolorisme* or illuminism; morality degenerated into voluntarism and legalism.² It was not so much theological, philosophical or scientific doctrines as the general attitude of mind—the “pattern of civilization”—which suffered from the process of human disintegration.

It is this attitude of mind (which in many respects obtains today) that makes it so difficult for us to answer the serious questions put to us by depth-psychology, confronted with which we find ourselves disarmed, fascinated or perturbed. This would not be the case had not modern theology reduced morality to the study of the Law and of Conscience, leaving no intrinsic connection between morality and the psychological dynamism of love and the virtues. My own conviction is that a theologian can return no real answer to the question posed by depth-psychology unless he effects a complete change in his conception of man and of the moral life. We must get rid of the attitude of mind which has characterized the last six centuries, and recover—without falling into undue anachronism—that rich and balanced conception of man possessed by the first centuries of the Church, by the Fathers and by St. Thomas Aquinas.

ST. THOMAS, because he was able to combine the thought of Aristotle with that of St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius, and with the wisdom of the Fathers, teaches a morality built solidly round the dynamism of love and the virtues. For him, morality is a psychological reality which grips the whole man and transforms his very being. “When a man abandons virtue for vice he becomes a different man” (*fit quasi alius*).³

St. Thomas is unquestionably the “*doctor communis*” of the Church, but most theologians consult him merely for purposes of reference. In present-day teaching he figures only in a very materialistic and fragmentary guise. It could not be otherwise, for the habit of mind of the last centuries is too alien to that which he summed up and synthesized.

My object in this article is to recall certain major principles of the metaphysical and psychological conception of man which inspire the moral theology of St. Thomas. It is not my purpose to demonstrate that everything is to be found in St. Thomas, and that Freud made no new discoveries. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the true Thomistic psychology contains in itself everything necessary for supplying depth-psychology with the metaphysical background it needs—if, that is, it is to concern itself with the human personality as a whole and not merely with its psychological substructure. Moreover, St. Thomas's moral philosophy seems to me eminently fitted for the useful task of combining Catholic teaching and preaching with the scientifically established discoveries of Freud and his followers.

It is unnecessary to point out that the ideas of St. Thomas and of Freud are not on the same plane. St. Thomas is a theologian. The object of his quest is God and man's approach to God. He sets out to study the structure and laws of those acts which either (under the influence of grace) unite men with God, or se-

parate them from Him. These acts are not only conscious, but free and voluntary; in them, man develops the specifically human faculties appropriate to him as an incarnate soul—they are “human acts.”⁴ Such activities as digestion, dreaming, absent-mindedness, in which the specifically human factor in man is not involved, have only an indirect interest for the theologian. They are “acts of a man” (*actus hominis*), not “human acts” (*actus humani*).

Freud is a physician. The object of his investigation is the unconscious. Furthermore, he “discovered” the unconscious in the course of treating his patients. When he brought his observation to bear on the healthy, he seems to have met with only a very impoverished moral life—that of the conservative bourgeoisie of the Imperial Vienna of 1900, or of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.⁵ What he calls “the higher values of civilization” seem to him to find in the family and society their unique source and sole criterion:

It is easy to show that the ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for the longing for a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgment which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal produces the sense of worthlessness with which the religious believer attests his longing. As a child grows up, the office of father is carried on by masters and by others in authority; the power of their injunctions and prohibitions remains vested in the ego-ideal and continues, in the form of conscience, to exercise the censorship of morals. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feelings rest on the foundation of identifications with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in common with them.⁶

Many of Freud’s disciples⁷ have more or less freed themselves from these limitations, to the great benefit of depth-psychology. The term “depth-psychology,” borrowed from the current German expression “*Tiefenpsychologie*,” includes not only the Psycho-analysis, properly so-called, of Freud and his orthodox disciples, but also all those more or less deviationist psychologies which nevertheless derive from Freud their starting-point and basic principles, and are concerned with the study of the unconscious. Depth-psychology, in so far as it can claim to be a science, endeavors to observe psychological facts. Whereas the specific task of the moralist is to put forward intelligent norms of moral behavior.

The moralist studies primarily—though it is true that he must not neglect the sinner—man as virtuous and perfect. He must indeed take into account the fact that most men never succeed in living a specifically human life: they are the slaves of their passions.⁸ St. Thomas is well aware of this fact: he observes,⁹ following Aristotle, that immoderate concupiscence is “infantile;” the reason, he says, that a child entertains immoderate desires is that it has not yet reached the age of reason and is incapable of appreciating moral beauty; much the same holds good for the intemperate man who is the slave of his concupiscence. It was necessary, in our attempt to compare St. Thomas with Freud, to call attention to this “infantilism” of concupiscence when left to itself; but at the same time it is obvious how greatly our two authors differ, not only owing to the seven centuries separating them in time, but to the differences in the objects and methods of their investigations.

But whatever their differences, theology and depth-psychology must get to know one another, for man is one—a fact which neither science can ignore. Dr. Nodet once suggested¹⁰ invoking the metaphysical concept of analogy to explain

the similarities and dissimilarities which diversify and link together the various levels of psychological life. He applied this concept to the psychology of the child and of the adult, between which he saw an "analogy:"

It is extremely impressive to observe in the emotional life of the child up to the age of seven years, which lays the foundation of our unconscious life, experiences comparable to those exhibited in genuine moral life, i.e. the feeling of guilt and the demand for punishment, for making amends, for the total renunciation (not merely postponement) of love in order to gain a higher love. . ."

If it be granted that depth-psychology studies the lowest step or steps of this analogical ladder of the psychological life, then it is easy to perceive a point of junction with moral theology, granted that the latter's aim is to study the highest analogical steps of the ladder of a life which is essentially one. This analogical relationship between the aims of the two branches of study constitutes an undeniable connection between them. According to St. Thomas, psychology is "sub-ordinate" to theology;¹¹ that is to say it has its own specific aim and method, but is only relatively autonomous, since it studies man from only one particular aspect. It needs, therefore, to study its data from one comprehensive point of view—and that point of view is supplied by theology.

Theology, for its part, should make use of the light thrown by depth-psychology, thus gaining a better knowledge of the conditions and concrete laws, together with the origin, 'misfires' and aberrations of the moral life.

As thus defined, it seems to me that a comparison between depth-psychology and St. Thomas would be both possible and fruitful. In undertaking this task I propose to draw almost exclusively on Freud. For the purposes of comparison, important followers of Freud such as Adler and Jung deserve special treatment, but this is impossible within the limits of the present essay: the fundamentals can be dealt with by restricting myself to a comparison between St. Thomas and the 'father' of depth-psychology. I am not aware that this task has ever been systematically undertaken.¹²

I should like, in this essay, to embark on my comparison by centering it around three main themes:¹³

1. Hylomorphism¹⁴ and its Psychological Consequences.
2. Love, Joy and their Objects.
3. The Unity of the Personality.

HYLOMORPHISM AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

ACCORDING to Aristotle the soul and the body of living beings are not two distinct substances. Their metaphysical unity has such deep roots that it appears to him to be as impossible to separate them as it would be to differentiate between the matter and the form of a statue.

In the vegetable, animal and human species the form of their being is their soul: it is the soul which organizes the matter of which they are composed, making of it an organized, living, 'animated' body. Aristotle says:

If, then, we have to give a general definition, which will be a formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we shall say that it is the first actuality (entelechy) of a natural, organic body.¹⁵ That is why we can wholly dismiss

as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter.¹⁶

According to this metaphysical conception, man is not a soul *plus* a body; he is an animated body. It is impossible to conceive of a soul without a body, for the soul is something pertaining to the body; nor of a body without a soul, without which it would be a corpse. St. Thomas' view is that soul and body are not two, but one.¹⁷

This human 'compound' differs from an animal only by virtue of a specific quality of its soul, whose power is not restricted to the animation of an organized body, for it is capable of intellectual and free activities which do not of themselves have their locus in the material plane. It is true that an animal displays a certain degree of intelligence,¹⁸ but in man the life of reason succeeds in transcending matter:¹⁹ it is able to carry out the nonmaterial operations of the spirit.

But the principle underlying these spiritual operations²⁰ is the same as that which gives life to the body. Digestion, feeling and thinking are distinct activities of one and the same soul.²¹ The human soul is not only spirit but 'incarnate' spirit, and can attain to its highest operations only by setting out from its lower. In the depths of the human soul there lies a seed which germinates and develops in the nourishing soil of its 'vegetative' and 'animal' life. It is true that the soil does not secrete the seed, but it awakens in its bosom an already existing seed, which it harbours, fosters, and conditions.

It is accordingly only by degrees that the human soul attains to spiritual operations, while at the same time it should not and cannot part from its animal component. Man, we see, lives on the border of two worlds, one material the other spiritual;² it is his natural function by grading them to combine them.

This grading process is a special application of the cosmic order which was conceived by St. Thomas according to the scheme of the pseudo-Dionysius:

If we wish, to determine the end of a whole and of its parts, we find first of all that each part is arranged with reference to its operation (the eye is made for seeing), secondly that the less excellent part is subordinated to the more excellent (the senses are subordinated to the reason), thirdly that all the parts are subordinated to the perfection of the whole (as matter is to form), and lastly that the whole man is subordinated to an end which is external to him: the enjoyment of God.²³

Thus all human powers, whether vegetative (or, as we should now say, biological), animal (physical) or spiritual have their own proper activities, unified and co-ordinated by that one of them which is the most excellent. An example, to which we shall return, will serve to illustrate this principle. Our passions are, and must remain, 'animal': they are sensitive (psychical) movements, linked essentially to organic (biological) phenomena. But in man these passions need, by their very nature, to participate in the more excellent level of activity belonging to the spirit. Without losing anything of their animality, they receive from it an excellence for which man has a natural aptitude, an excellence which they could not possess in an animal.²⁴ For this reason the human body is endowed with a biopsychological organism, more complex and delicate than that of an animal:²⁵ the animal's sensory and emotional activities reach their perfection in man.²⁶

Conversely, the spiritual operations of man are closely linked to his animal

nature. It is through the operation of his sense and emotions that man achieves the life of reason and freedom.²⁷ Animal appetite can be the principle of a 'human act'.²⁸ The soul cannot do without the body if it is to reach perfect knowledge and virtue.²⁹

On the level of animal activities, sight is to the eye what the soul is to the body, or form to matter; on the level of spiritual activities, the soul is to the body what a workman is to his tool;³⁰ here St Thomas applies the general principle of instrumental causality.³¹ A workman must handle his tool with skill, and the tool, besides obeying to the best of its ability the driving power of its manipulator, must also itself exercise its own proper activity. A saw is called upon to saw, and if it is made of inferior steel, or is merely blunt, the workman will do his job badly. It is the same with spiritual activities: where they fall short, the cause is to be looked for in some bodily defect.³²

Such a conception of a man can readily be fitted in its entirety into depth-psychology. Freud discovered an active, though unconscious level of life which we might place amidst the vegetative life and the passions. Strictly speaking, Freud's discovery in no way detracts from the spiritual conception of man set forth above: it merely adds an intermediate level, unnoticed by the medical science of the thirteenth century, for which we of to-day can easily find a place in the scale of functions of the human soul.

The Thomist theologian is quite ready to enrich his synthesis, whereas an 'angelic' spiritualism cannot help feeling radically threatened by the discovery of the unconscious and its laws. I repeat, St. Thomas had, and could have, no knowledge of the Freudian unconscious. Nevertheless he allowed a place for the less excellent activities of human life. What he says of them is interesting: it is on this point that a comparison between him and Freud is most illuminating.

St. Thomas knows of a number of 'inferior causes'³³ which affect our acts. He frequently mentions those bodily states which are to virtue what matter is to soul.³⁴ Virtue finds a more or less favorable material in the constitution of the body and the arrangements of its organs.³⁵ Thus it comes about that some men seem naturally disposed to gentleness or chastity, to fortitude, moderation or knowledge, to bad temper or meekness, to generosity, to contemplation or action, to pity, to right judgement, to revenge or sin.³⁶

These organic inclinations towards virtue (or vice) are not virtues in the fullest sense of the word: nevertheless St. Thomas does not hesitate to call them 'beginnings' (*inchoationes*)³⁷ or seeds³⁸ of virtues, or again imperfect virtues.³⁹ Before they can become true virtues, these natural inclinations need to be vivified and controlled by the reason,⁴⁰ after which they become stable, and their possessor may make free use of them.⁴¹ Such virtues as temperance and fortitude are at bottom none other than the natural inclinations taken over by the reason, which provides them with their true objects, allots them a place in the higher synthesis of the human personality, and gives them a share in its highest life.⁴²

Left to themselves, these natural inclinations towards virtue clash with each other, e.g. the bad-tempered man is lacking in tenderness.⁴³ The stronger they are the more dangerous they are.⁴⁴ All of which goes to show that they are not true virtues, which (as I shall demonstrate later) on the contrary are interconnected, enrich each other, and synthesize and perfect the individual.

Faithful to the Greek tradition, St Thomas recognizes that the planets and

other heavenly bodies influence our acts on the level of the organic inclinations towards virtue.⁴⁵ Only the wise man, he says (following Ptolemy), can master the influence of the heavenly bodies. This is why an astrologer can forecast the behaviour of men, most of whom are not masters of their passions, on which the heavenly bodies exert their influence through the body.⁴⁶

But these natural inclinations towards virtue may also be the happy result of a gift of grace.⁴⁷ St. Thomas, in insisting on this, is no doubt thinking of the miraculous gift bestowed on him of no longer experiencing sexual desire.⁴⁸

These natural inclinations are equally the effect of habit and custom, which in the long run produce the same effects in us as Nature herself.⁴⁹ In themselves, these habits and customs are not virtues; nevertheless they help to awaken and strengthen the virtues, and this should be the aim of parents and legislators.⁵⁰ These habits and customs are themselves like the matter of the spirit, animated by which they become virtues.

The same is true of the passions. According to St. Thomas, the passions are activities of animal desire. An animal, confronted with an object which it knows and recognizes, reacts accordingly, and the consequent attraction or repulsion sets the organism in motion: there ensues a rise or fall of temperature, an acceleration or slowing down of the pulse, a change of expression, a gesture, etc.: and these symptoms in their turn, if induced by some other means, furnish the material for the passion which they release.⁵¹ This is the explanation of the emotional effects produced by alcohol or chemical substances such as hormones employed by modern medicine; they can by themselves bring about or change an emotional state.

But in man, as I have already pointed out, the passions require to take part in the rational activities; they then become virtues⁵² (or vices), such as temperance and fortitude. Moreover, such is the unity of man that a violent passion can prevent, weaken or distort the working of the mind.⁵³ Once passion is integrated in the hierarchy of the higher life of the personality, it is entitled to be called good. It is a good thing to do good from virtue, but even better to do good with passion.⁵⁴

None of these 'inferior causes' which influence our higher activities can be purely and simply identified with unconscious drives. Nevertheless depth-psychologists will have noticed more than one analogy between the two,⁵⁵ and there are others even more remarkable.

LOVE, JOY AND THEIR OBJECTS

EVERYONE knows the fundamental role assigned in Freudian psychology to the libido and the pleasure principle. Nevertheless, it may be worth while to recall that towards the end of his life Freud widened his conception of the libido:

With the discovery of narcissistic libido, and the extension of the libido-concept to the individual cells, the sexual instinct became for us transformed into the Eros that endeavours to impel the separate parts of living matter to one another and to hold them together; what is commonly called the sexual instinct appears as that part of the Eros that is turned towards the object. Our speculation then supposes that this Eros is at work from

the beginnings of life, manifesting itself as the 'life-instinct' in contradistinction to the 'death-instinct' which developed through the animation of the inorganic.⁵⁶

It would therefore be a misrepresentation of Freud to restrict the libido to the sexual impulses, and even more to identify the 'sexual' with the 'genital'.⁵⁷ Freud's 'libido' and 'pleasure,' when conceived as vital instincts, have more than one point of comparison with the "appetite" and *ldelectatio* of St. Thomas.⁵⁸

According to St. Thomas every 'form' bears within it an inclination towards its own appropriate good.⁵⁹ This vital instinct he calls natural appetite. In man this natural appetite, unique in its root, varies with the different functions of the soul. The animal appetite attains its end in the passions, the spiritual appetite in the will. Even before an object is known and recognized, both these natural appetites are to a certain extent active. This is what the Thomistic philosophy calls *conatus* or *nisus*.⁶⁰ This as yet blind propulsive force of appetite may be compared by analogy to the Freudian 'drives.' To this natural inclination of the *conatus* St. Thomas allowed a specific good, order and system of laws,⁶¹ on which he unfortunately did not expatiate. He merely remarks in passing that this natural inclination should be understood as a middle term between its root (nature) and its end (virtue).⁶² Nevertheless, what he says is enough to open the way to a more advanced study of the stages through which the natural appetite must pass before attaining to its fullest exercise.

It can attain this end only by the enlightenment conferred by the knowledge of its object. It is the known, recognized and loved object which gives to the appetite its specific movement; which, in other words, allows it to be itself, in accordance with its specific quality and final flowering.⁶³

The object exerts on the appetite a kind of attraction which goes out to meet the movement of the appetite, forms or deforms it, defines it and enables it to reach its goal.⁶⁴

M. Mouroux puts the situation admirably:

It is obvious that knowledge and appetite (*affectivité*) represent two basic reactions of the human being, and that they cannot be separated. Knowledge releases appetite, appetite is coloured by knowledge; indeed appetite is at one and the same time a reaction to knowledge and a reaction on it; it presupposes knowledge and conditions it, is steeped in it and modifies it. But primarily appetite depends on knowledge for its upsurging: before man can react to his objects, his aims and his specific values, he must be aware of them; and appetite (affective) reaction stems from a perception, an image or an idea. Control by the known object is one of the principal data of our problem.

There are, however, other data. For appetite brings into play the entire personality, operating as it does on three levels: (1) basic impulses supplied by Nature herself—instincts and 'native wit' (*forces instinctives et élan de l'esprit*); modifications of these impulses brought about by individual experience—psychophysical and spiritual 'habits,' and (3) acts and operations which spring from the human being as he is at a given moment. Thus the appetites are steeped in the unconscious from which, because it is both animal and spiritual, they derive their formidable ambivalence; to the unconscious they owe in part their unexpectedness, their strangeness, their violence and their beneficent or calamitous polymorphism. The emotional life can thus be figured as the meeting-point of the external and internal worlds, and these two worlds react on each other.⁶⁵

How apt in this connection is the following quotation from Freud!

We have been obliged repeatedly to emphasize the fact that the ego

owes its origin as well as the most important of its acquired characteristics to its relation to the real external world; and we are thus prepared to assume that the pathological states of the ego—those in which it most approximates once again to the id—are founded upon a cessation or slackening of that relation to the external world.⁶⁶

And again:

In the course of more deliberate advance it came under psycho-analytic observation how regularly libido is withdrawn from the object and directed towards the ego (introversion), and through the study of the libido-development of the child in its earliest phases it became clear that the ego is the true and original reservoir of the libido, which is extended to the object only from this.⁶⁷

Both the Thomistic appetite and the Freudian libido find, therefore, their normal expression in movement towards an object.⁶⁸

This love-object is the principle and end of all human activity, whether it be conceived as useful (*utile*—as a means), pleasurable (*delectabile*) or intrinsically valuable in its own right (*honestum*).

In the first place it is an object of desire. As soon as it is attained, enjoyment follows. It is, in fact, the enjoyment which is pursued, and the moral order consists, in short, in grading these loves and enjoyments with reference to final happiness (*beatitudo*). The moral teaching of St. Thomas is a dynamism of love and happiness.⁶⁹ It is not fortuitous that his moral treatise begins *De Beatitudine* with the examination of happiness⁷⁰ and culminates in the Gospel beatitudes and the fruits of the Holy Ghost.⁷¹ The alpha and omega of St Thomas's moral teaching is joy.

Admittedly there are joys which are dangerous, mistaken or forbidden. But it is only in these cases that joys are evil.⁷² In all other cases joys are good, and it would be a mistake to avoid them more than is necessary.⁷³ It may even be said that these joys are indispensable: man cannot live without any joy. For this reason a man who is incapable of appreciating the joys of the mind throws himself into those of the body.⁷⁴ It follows that it is dangerous and foolhardy to wish to deprive oneself of all joy. The delight which a man experiences in doing good is, indeed, one of the most certain criteria of virtue. As Aristotle pointed out, 'it is impossible to experience the pleasure of the just man if one is not oneself just, nor the pleasure of the musician if one is not oneself a musician'.⁷⁵ St. Thomas, too, teaches that the virtuous man derives pleasure from behaving virtuously⁷⁶; the absence of pleasure can only mean that his motive in acting was not virtue. For example:

An action can be called 'an act of virtue' in two ways. Firstly, in a merely material sense (*materialiter*): thus, to do just things is an act of justice, and such an act of virtue can be performed without the virtue, for there are many people who lack the *habitus* of justice who nevertheless do just things, because of their innate reasonableness, or from timidity or from hope of gaining something from it. But secondly, an action can be called 'an act of virtue' in the complete and specific sense (*formaliter*): thus, an act of justice is to do just things in the way in which a just man does them, namely with spontaneity and joy. In this latter sense there can be no act of virtue without the virtue. Accordingly, it is possible to give alms in a purely material sense without one's having charity; but to give alms in the specific sense (*formaliter*)—i.e. for God's sake and with joy and spontaneity, and in every other way in which one should—cannot come about without charity.⁷⁷

This delight which normally succeeds the act is a sign that the appetite has attained to its proper object. In the absence of this delight, the act—and indeed the agent—would be imperfect.⁷⁸

To sum up, virtue does not consist in suppressing the love and joy which its satisfaction produces; on the contrary, it ensures the flowering, the harmony and the purity of that satisfaction.

The special effect of virtue is to ensure the correctness of the value-judgment, thanks to which the virtuous man desires his true good, and spontaneously makes for it. 'Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei.'⁷⁹ The value assigned by a man to any object depends on the bio-psychological or moral attitude he adopts towards it, which makes it so to speak connatural to him, and therefore desirable.⁸⁰ The virtuous man is as if instinctively attracted by the good; he distinguishes, values and desires it with infallible certainty.

Must we then conclude that the moral science of St. Thomas is pure and simple hedonism? Certainly not; in the first place because the virtues have as their object something which is lovable in itself (*bonum honestum*), and not for the joy it gives, and in the second because that which is loved is in the last analysis the object in itself, as it is in reality. Love is of its very nature 'ecstatic', taking a man out of himself and making him live in the beloved.⁸¹ It is by cutting free from himself that a man achieves his proper good and perfection. The joy which he experiences in union with the beloved object is added to the object as bloom to youth;⁸² in other words, it resembles the normal completion and manifestation of an activity carried to its fulfilment. It is impossible to separate the joy from the possession of the object. Nevertheless, it is the object for its own sake which should be pursued, rather than the joy; to achieve his object is man's only possible end—happiness will follow after.

This 'going beyond' pleasure is obviously akin to the 'object-love' by reference to which psychoanalysis measures psychological maturity. For example, Freud says: 'the ego has the task of bringing the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality-principle for the pleasure-principle which reigns supreme in the id'.⁸³

Freud even uses the term 'altruism':

... we may expect that within the very period of life which we reckon as childhood, altruistic impulses and morality will awake in the little egoist, and that... a secondary ego will overlay and inhabit the primary ego.⁸⁴

There is another theme which suggests a comparison, by analogy, between the teaching of St. Thomas and of Freud: both attribute to love a unifying effect. Freud refers to 'the main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in so far as it helped towards establishing that unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego'.⁸⁵ St. Thomas, for his part, taking up the thesis of the pseudo-Dionysius, never tires of asserting that love has a unifying effect: it brings about the internal unity of the lover, and also his union with beloved objects.

We may surely conclude that these two doctrines, whatever their differences, which assign so important and related a place to love, joy and their objects deserve to make each other's acquaintance to their mutual benefit.

THE UNITY OF THE PERSONALITY

3. The Unity of the Personality

I have already mentioned that, according to Freud, the principal aim of both Eros and the ego is to re-unite, to bind together, to achieve unity. Freud speaks of "bound energy", at work particularly in the preconscious: "We seem to recognize that nervous or psychical energy exists in two forms, one freely mobile and the other, by contrast, bound; we speak of cathexes and hyper-cathexes of the material of the mind and even venture to suppose that a hyper-cathexis brings about a sort of synthesis of different processes—a synthesis in the course of which free energy is transformed into bound energy."⁸⁶

As we have seen, Freud attributes to Eros this function of unifying the ego. The creator of depth-psychology formed the opinion, towards the end of his life, that "we escape ambiguity if we contrast not the conscious and the unconscious, but the coherent ego and the repressed."⁸⁷

This coherent ego is the result of "integration": "As the child approaches maturity, its personality becomes more and more integrated, that is to say its various propensities and aims, which had hitherto developed independently of each other, combine and fuse." Elsewhere, Freud speaks of synthesis:

On the way it over and over again happens that particular instincts, or portions of them, prove irreconcilable in their aims or demands with others which can be welded into the comprehensive unity of the ego. They are thereupon split off from this unity by the process of repression, retained on lower stages of psychic development, and for the time being cut off from all possibility of gratification.⁸⁸

This conception of the unity of the personality,⁸⁹ brought about by the synthetic integration of its lower strata with its higher strata, is paralleled in the Thomistic philosophy, in which, as we have seen, it constitutes a general cosmic principle.⁹⁰ Each higher degree incorporates the next lower degree, which in its turn reappears in a more perfect,⁹¹ i.e. a more single and simpler form.⁹² Herein, indeed, consists its quality of being "higher," for the simpler a being is, the closer it is to God:⁹³ its component parts are more closely linked and better integrated. Its "form" has a stronger hold over its matter.⁹⁴

The personality, in fact, is nothing else but this integration of everything which goes to make a human being.⁹⁵ Should any essential part, a body for instance, be missing, it ceases to be a person: the soul, when separated from the body after death, is not a "person".⁹⁶

According, therefore, to St. Thomas, a person is the living and orderly integration of everything that goes to make up a man. The principle which brings about this integration is that essential part of him which is most excellent—his soul, and his spiritual soul at that. It is with reference to the soul, and owing to the soul's quickening influence, that all his other potentialities are ordered and united. In short, the differentia of the human personality is that it is master of its actions: it is not merely acted upon by external causes, but acts of itself, and only in so doing does it perform a "human act".⁹⁷ It is free.

The human personality, then, on the operational level is made up of the integration of the whole human being in virtue of the result of free acts.⁹⁸ These human acts are carried out not only on the higher and specifically spiritual level of the personality, but equally on its lower level. This is possible because, ontologically, man's lower faculties already share in his higher faculties. In man, the animal faculties seem already to be humanized. For example, the "estimative"

faculty (*vis aestimativa*), by which an animal is enabled to judge instinctively what is suitable or unsuitable to it, is called the "cognitive" faculty in man, because in man this faculty, while remaining animal, resembles the reason and operates by processes akin to reasoning; it plays a decisive part in what we call experience, in the exercise of forethought, etc.⁹⁹ The same is true of memory, which in man we call recollection (*reminiscentia*).¹⁰⁰

The same law governing the participation of the lower in the higher operates on the level of the appetite, as we have seen in the case of the passions, which require to be integrated with the life of the intellect before they can attain to their proper excellence, or achieve harmony among themselves.

Generally speaking, this participation may be thought of as taking place either on the ontological level, where all the faculties have their root in one and the same person, or on the level of the influence exerted by the highest on the lower faculties.

On the first level we are dealing with what St. Thomas calls *redundantia*.¹⁰¹ This can be compared with what modern psychology calls the law of the economy of psychic energy. An act performed with passion occupies the entire energy of the agent, thus polarizing around it certain of the agent's potentialities while impoverishing or inhibiting all the others. St. Thomas is aware of these two alternatives: impoverishment or inhibition on the one hand,¹⁰² enrichment on the other. He notes that passion sharpens sense-perception,¹⁰³ and that the pleasures of the spirit are reflected in the pleasures of the senses. A man cannot have an ardent love of spiritual goods unless his passions also are directed upon them.¹⁰⁴

Conversely it can happen that passion drags the movement of the will after it;¹⁰⁵ *redundantia* is then reversed, resulting in psychological and moral disturbances.

On the second (operational) level, *redundantia* operates through the government (*imperium*) of the will, i.e. through the radiation, the overpowering attraction, the contagion of love brought to bear by the spiritual on the animal appetite.¹⁰⁶ The human mind is endowed by nature with everything required for the exercise of this government, which is, in short, nothing more than the perfect animation of the body by the human soul.

It should be emphasized once more that animation is not destruction. The passions are necessary to virtue, as the tool is to the workman. Should there be some defect (of a relevant kind) in the sensible appetite, it is of no avail for the spiritual appetite on its part to be perfect and to exercise its control over the passions; the "governed function" (*actus imperatus*) will not be perfect.¹⁰⁷ For example, a man whose intellectual appetite values and loves the goods of chastity, but whose animal appetite is not integrated with this higher love, will possess control (*continentia*), which is an imperfect and "mixed" virtue, but not the virtue of chastity. He will not be truly chaste until his sexuality is integrated with his spirituality: only then will his virtue become perfect.¹⁰⁸ In short, the virtuous man continues to desire, but his animal appetite, being completely integrated with his mind, desires only that which is proper (and only so far as it is proper) to man and not to the animals. *Temperati est concupiscere sicut oportet et quae oportet*.¹⁰⁹

If he desires like an animal and not like a man, the reason is that he is not truly virtuous, even if he refuses to satisfy his desire: his refusal might be due

merely to those "natural inclinations" of which we have already spoken, or to habit.¹¹⁰ As St. Thomas says: "looked at closely the virtue of the appetite is merely an inclination or a 'form', stamped upon and inserted in the 'form' of the appetite by the reason."¹¹¹ It is from within themselves that the lower powers are attracted towards the objects aimed at by the higher power, thanks to which circumstance the fundamental cause of emotional disturbances is eradicated.¹¹² St. Thomas seems to go half-way to meet Freud when he distinguishes two methods by which reason exercises its ascendancy over the passions; by the first, the passions submit to reason under duress; by the second, the influence exerted by the reason becomes a quality inherent in the passions. The first method (which reminds us of the repression exerted by the super-ego) is pronounced imperfect by St. Thomas, as giving rise to difficulties and unhappiness. The second is the correct method: it allows the passions an easy and pleasurable outlet, and it alone deserves the name of virtue.¹¹³ Only at this point can a man be called perfect, for only then can all his faculties come into play harmoniously without opposing or destroying each other; the supreme example of this condition is to be seen in the life on earth of Christ.¹¹⁴

Difficulties arise owing to the circumstance that we experience animal pleasures more intensely than intellectual.¹¹⁵ This will not surprise the depth-psychologist: Freud finds a similar law obtaining in the lowest levels of the psyche and its integration:

It appears quite beyond doubt that the "unbound", the primary, processes give rise to much more intense sensations in both directions (i.e. of pleasure and "pain") than the bound ones, those of the "secondary processes".¹¹⁶

This diminution of sensation is undoubtedly due to integration:

Our observations have shown beyond any doubt that the psychical and physical strength of a desire is much greater when the desire springs from the unconscious than when it forces itself on the conscious. This will be readily understood if one bears in mind that an unconscious desire is not subject to any influence; no conflicting desire has any hold on it. On the other hand a conscious desire can be influenced by all the other intrapsychic phenomena which are opposed to it.¹¹⁷

But if the lowest order of desires, when left to themselves, are more intense, their greatest intensity is reached when they are integrated by the reason. The frugal eater will appreciate all the more the subtle pleasure of eating. St. Thomas even holds that, in the state of innocence, the pleasures of the flesh were more intense than they are today, because more readily inspired by the soul.¹¹⁸

From this it can be seen how great, in the Thomistic view, is the renewal of vitality and nobility which the animal gains through its integration with the reason. The law governing the human personality is thus to integrate all its constituent parts with the reason. All Thomists will support such statements as the following by Dr. Odier:

The pre-requisite of balance between the will and the senses, between instinct and the ideal, is knowledge, whose function in its turn is to condition and regulate the secondary activity of the "principles of coincidence and prevalence". The formulation of these principles amounts, in short, to a description of Goethe's Apollonian type, in which, as M. Thibon well says, "the ideal of the person is realized when a high stage of intellectual evolution is based on powerful vital foundations", on condition, it should be added, that these foundations are understood and clearly discriminated, and not confused with repressed vital trends.¹¹⁹

According to St. Thomas, the strictly spiritual activities also have their demands and laws of integration with the human personality. Habits of virtue¹²⁰ not only bring a man's powers to perfection, but allow them to achieve a greater harmoniousness and a fuller integration with the personality. As the eye sees on behalf of the whole body, so does the intelligence understand on behalf of all the spiritual powers.¹²¹ Not only can one virtue bring to perfection several powers and constitute their unity of action,¹²² but several virtues can join together and submit to one another within the unity of one and the same act;¹²³ this is notably the case with free acts, which result from the interplay of the reason and the will.

As a result of *redundantia* and of the interplay of their acts, the virtues are inter-connected:¹²⁴ a man possesses either all of them or none.¹²⁵ The natural virtues are related to each other by prudence: on the supernatural level it is charity which, by inspiring them to seek their proper end, links all the virtues, both natural and supernatural, and brings them to their proper perfection.¹²⁶ The virtues are inter-connected also in their growth; as St. Thomas puts it, they grow in proportion to one another like the fingers of a hand.¹²⁷

The vices, on the contrary, are not inter-connected.¹²⁸ It is true that they all give rise to each other—whence the name "capital" vices¹²⁹—but this process resembles the breaking down of a chain of atoms: they split the personality, aggravating that contradiction between spirit and matter which is natural to mankind as a result of original sin,¹³⁰ a contradiction which is healed and sublimated by sanctifying grace.¹³¹

The virtuous man loves one unique good, and loves all other goods in relation to that final end, wherein he finds his unity. The vicious man is attracted by goods which are not only false, but manifold and contradictory;¹³² he falls a victim to dissociation.

The material cause and the consequence of this moral disintegration, or failure to integrate the personality, is the psychical disintegration of the human personality. Sin is, in short, a psychological dissociation, which is sin only in so far as it is a conscious and deliberate transgression of God's law. Even if the sin is merely material, i.e. if the circumstances in which it is committed involve no moral blame, it still acts as a dissociating influence on the personality: it results from vicious habits or, at the very least, it is an act falling outside the moral synthesis: its repetition will give rise to a vice, i.e. a permanent tendency to dissociation of the personality. The moralist must not forget this, nor restrict his study of sin to the question of guilt.

In depth-psychology this disintegration is called a neurosis, or, in the severest cases, a psychosis. By analogy the process is the same as in sin: it is a question of dissociation¹³³ or splitting of the ego:

We may probably take it as being generally true that what occurs in all such cases is a *split* in the mind. Two mental attitudes have been formed instead of a single one—one, the normal one, which takes account of reality, and another which under the influence of the instincts detaches the ego from reality. The two exist alongside each other. The issue depends upon their relative strength. If the second is or becomes the stronger, the necessary condition for a psychosis is present. If the relation is reversed, then there is an apparent cure of the delusional disorder. Actually it has only retreated into the unconscious, as indeed we are driven to conclude from numerous observations showing that a delusion has existed ready-made for a long time before its manifest outbreak.

The view which postulates that in all psychoses there is a *split in the ego* could not demand so much notice, if it were not for the fact that it turns out to apply also to other conditions more like the neuroses and, finally, to the neuroses themselves.¹⁸⁴

Freud gives a typical example of the process of integration and disintegration which takes place in the course of the genesis of the two instincts of Eros and Death:

Once we have admitted the conception of a fusion of the two classes of instincts with each other, the possibility of a—more or less complete—"defusion" of them forces itself upon us. The sadistic component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of instinctual fusion serving a useful purpose; and the perversion in which sadism has made itself independent would be typical of defusion, though not of absolutely complete defusion. From this point we obtain a new view of a great array of facts which have not before been considered in this light. We perceive that for purposes of discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually enlisted in the service of Eros; we suspect that the epileptic fit is a product and sign of instinctual defusion; and we come to understand that defusion and the marked emergence of the death-instinct are among the most noteworthy effects of many severe neuroses, e.g. the obsessional neuroses. Making a swift generalization, we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido, e.g. from the genital to the sadistic-anal level, would lie in a defusion of instincts, just as, conversely, the advance from an earlier to the definitive genital phase would be conditioned by an accession of erotic components. The question also arises whether ordinary ambivalence, which is so often unusually strong in the constitutional disposition to neurosis, should not be regarded as the product of a defusion; ambivalence, however, is such a fundamental phenomenon that it more probably represents a state of incomplete fusion.¹⁸⁵

If, as is commonly the case, the child is unable to achieve the required synthesis the reason is that, since its ego is too weak, the easy solution of repression presents itself:

Even in beings who later have an Ego-organization capable of high achievement this Ego is at first, in childhood, weak, and little differentiated from the Id. Now consider what happens if this powerless Ego feels a demand from an instinct which it wishes to withstand, because it suspects that satisfaction is dangerous, would evoke a traumatic situation, a collision with the outer world; but it cannot master it, because it has not yet the strength necessary. The Ego then treats the risk from the instinct as though it were an outside danger, and makes an attempt at flight; it withdraws from that part of the Id, leaving it to its fate, after having refused it all the help which it normally affords to instinctual impulses. We put it, that Ego undertakes a *repression* of these instinctual impulses. At first sight, this has the successful result of warding off the danger, but one cannot change "inner" and "outer" about with impunity. One cannot run away from oneself. By the act of repression the Ego follows the pleasure principle, which otherwise it is wont to correct, and it suffers harm on this account. The harm consists in the fact that the Ego has now imposed a lasting limitation on its sphere of power. The repressed instinctual impulse is henceforth isolated; it is left to itself and inaccessible, but this means that it cannot be influenced. It goes its own way.

Even later, when the Ego is stronger, it usually cannot lift the repression; its synthesis is disturbed, and a part of the Id remains forbidden ground for it. And further, the isolated impulse does not remain idle. It contrives to indemnify itself for the fact that normal satisfaction is denied it. It produces psychical derivatives to represent it, and links itself with other processes which under its influence are equally severed from the Ego; and finally it breaks through into the Ego and into consciousness with a sub-

stitute-formation, unrecognizable in origin—creating what one calls a symptom. At one stroke we see the real case of a neurotic disturbance: an Ego, prevented in its synthetizing activity, with no influence over a part of the Id, obliged to renounce some of its activities in order to avoid a fresh collision with what is repressed, exhausting itself in defence-reactions, largely in vain, against the symptoms or derivatives of the repressed impulses; and an Id in which individual instincts have made themselves independent, pursuing their own aims without regard for interests of the whole personality, and obeying only the laws of the primitive psychology which reigns in the depths of the Id.

If we survey the whole situation it becomes clear that there is a simple formula for the arising of a neurosis; the Ego has made an attempt to suppress certain parts of the Id by an *inappropriate method*, and this has miscarried, and the Id has taken its revenge. Neurosis is thus the consequence of a conflict between Ego and Id, on which the Ego enters because—as further investigation shows—it insists throughout on retaining its adaptability towards the outer world. The opposition lies between outer world and Id, and because the Ego, true to its inmost nature, takes sides with the outer world, it becomes involved in conflict with its own Id. But mark well that it is not the fact of this conflict which brings about the illness—for such opposition between reality and Id is unavoidable, and the Ego's constant task is to mediate between them. It is the fact that the Ego, for settling the conflict, has employed the inadequate method of repression. But this in turn arises from the fact that at the time when this task was presented to it the Ego was undeveloped and weak. Decisive repressions all occur in early childhood.¹³⁶

Sublimation itself is an imperfect synthesis. Freud ascribes to it an effect of dissociation:

The super-ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father regarded as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even of a sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place there occurs at the same time an instinctual defusion. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructive elements that were previously combined with it, and these are released in the form of inclinations to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal—its dictatorial "Thou shalt".¹³⁷

The effect of psychoanalytic treatment is to set free such unconscious desires as have eluded the synthesis of the ego: they can then be integrated by various means which Freud enumerates:

It frequently happens that, in the course of treatment, these desires are suppressed by conscious reflection. In this case repression is replaced by a kind of criticism or condemnation. This criticism is made easier by its being directed on the products of an infantile stage of the ego. Formerly the individual, being weak and not fully developed, and incapable of withstanding a desire impossible to satisfy, was obliged to repress it: but now, having reached maturity, he is able to master it.

The second means by which psychoanalysis affords an outlet to the instincts whose existence it has revealed consists in restoring them to what would have been their normal function, had not the development of the individual been disturbed. It is not, in fact, to his interest to eradicate his infantile desires. His neurosis, operating through repressions, has deprived him of many sources of psychic energy which would greatly have contributed to the formation of his character and the exercise of his activities.

We know of yet another, and perhaps a better means whereby infantile desires are enabled to put forth all their energy, and to substitute for the

individual's unattainable desire a higher end, sometimes entirely remote from sexuality: I refer to *sublimation*. The drives which make up the sexual instinct are indeed characterized by just this capacity for sublimation: their sexual aim is replaced by one which is both higher and socially more valuable. To the psychical enrichment which follows this process of sublimation are to be ascribed all the finest attainments of the human mind.¹³⁸

One of the most serious gaps in Freudian theory is that Freud, in his exploration of the process of integrating the personality, concentrated solely on sublimation.¹³⁹ In the case of the instincts, sublimation resembles an unconscious displacement of their objects: the instincts, forbidden free play, finally find of their own accord an outlet on a completely inappropriate object. For example, the sexual instincts, if they fail to find satisfaction in their appropriate object, are "sublimated" and directed towards art or religion.

Freud himself seems to have recognized that sublimation is accompanied by a certain amount of dissociation; in the passage quoted he speaks of the enrichment which *follows* sublimation. What does he mean by this? One cannot in any case agree that sublimation by itself can bring about any real integration of the personality.

There are times when Freud recognizes the part played by the conscious ego and by intellectual activity:

Starting from conscious perception, it (the ego) has brought under its influence ever larger regions and ever deeper layers of the id; and, in the persistence with which it maintains its dependence upon the external world, it bears the indelible stamp of its origin (as it might be "Made in Germany"). Its psychological function consists in raising the processes in the id to a higher dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely mobile into bound energy, such as corresponds to the preconscious condition); its constructive function consists in interposing, between the demand made by an instinct and the action that satisfies it, an intellectual activity which, after considering the present state of things and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavors by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed line of conduct.¹⁴⁰

But Freud never made a systematic study of the laws by which the ego succeeds in "raising the processes in the id to a higher dynamic level."

I should prefer to think that the true and complete integration of the specifically human personality, even if it be preceded by and dependent on a sublimation (which has already been achieved when the "age of reason" is reached) is structurally entirely different from sublimation. Total and successful integration resembles an "assumption" exercised by the highest on the lower levels of our psychical apparatus—Freud himself uses the term "raising." It is not the lower levels which of their own accord find an outlet into the higher: it is the higher level which attracts the lower levels, coordinates them, unifies them *from above* and allows them to partake of its own excellence.

Sublimation is an unconscious process. How is it possible to maintain that the unity of man is achieved only unconsciously? "Assumption" is by definition conscious: it resembles a radiance shed by consciousness (in the psychological as well as the moral sense of the word) upon our entire being.¹⁴¹

I do not see why psychologists should not explore the conscious process of integration of the personality. They would themselves derive benefit from such a study. Moreover the moralist would gain from the psychologist a wider appre-

ciation of the psychological laws governing the moral integration of the human personality.

This hope brings me naturally to the conclusion of my comparison between St. Thomas and Freud. I shall have achieved my object if the disciples of both set to work seriously and patiently in a spirit of mutual regard for their respective disciplines. Each can provide the other with working hypotheses, confirmations and suggestions for further research, at the end of which we should all have a better knowledge of the whole man in his multiplicity and unity.

Translated by ERIC EARNSHAW SMITH

¹ Cf. de Lubac, *Catholicisme*, pp. 64-65 (Ed. du Cerf, 2nd edition), [English translation published by Burns Oates, 1950], and *Corpus Mysticum*, *passim* (Aubier, 1940). See also No. 22 of *La Maison Dieu*, especially the article by Michel Carrouges entitled "La Nature est une parole."

² Cf. "Loi et Amour", *Supplément de La Vie Spirituelle*, May 1951.

³ *De Veritate*, 24, 10, 1m. The perfection bestowed upon us by the Holy Ghost effects something in us; it establishes in us the harmony and the power of love. "Primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinatur; secundo vero ordinatur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt infra." And he goes on: "Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa quando mens hominis bene se habet in bonis et malis. Prima autem dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum est per amorem, qui est prima affectio et omnium affectionum radix." (*Summa Theologica* Ia IIae, 70, a. 3, corp.)

⁴ *Summa Theologica* Ia IIae, q.i.

⁵ Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, Hogarth Press, 1927, p.80. "Ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality." "As the child was once compelled to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative pronounced by its super-ego." (*Ibid.*, p. 69).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁷ Besides Adler, Jung and the Chicago school (which is little known in Europe), reference may be made from the spiritual and Christian points of view to the work of M. Roland Dalbiez, Dr. Odier, Prof. Baudouin, Dr. Nodet, Canon Nuttin, Father O'Doherty and Father Mailloux, and to the splendid work carried out by Father Bruno in the ETUDES CARMELITAINES. Especially noteworthy is the recent book by Dr. Zilboorg, *Sigmund Freud and his Exploration of the mind of man* (Scribners, 1952), particularly pp. 84-88.

⁸ Cf. Ia IIae, 5, 1m; IIa IIae, 95, 5, 2m; IIa IIae, 35, 4, 2m, etc.

⁹ IIa IIae, 142, 2, c. Cf. *In Ethic.*, III, lect. 22.

¹⁰ Nodet, "Vie affective infantile et adulte, notions 'analogues'" in the *Supplément de La Vie Spirituelle*, February 1948, p. 391.

¹¹ *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1, 5m.

¹² The very important book by M. Roland Dalbiez, *La méthode psychoanalytique et la doctrine freudienne*, does not pretend to draw such a comparison, which has, however, been brilliantly sketched by Father Thomas Gilby, O.P., in an article entitled "Vienne and Vienna", (*THOUGHT*, March 1946, Vol. XXI, No. 80).

See also Mortimer J. Adler, "What man has made of man, a study of the consequences of Platonism and Positivism" in *Psychology*, New York, 1947.

Mention should also be made of the treatment of a very marginal aspect of our subject in a special number of the Flemish Review *Kulturleven* (particularly the article by Father J. H. Walgrave, O. P., pp. 277-296).

¹³ We clearly need more than these three themes for a comprehensive discussion of our comparison: we should need to add a complete theory of sexuality, narcissism, altruism, dreams, etc. As for the psychological development of the child, St. Thomas seems to have been unaware of the psychological importance for the adult of the years of childhood: herein undoubtedly consists the most original contribution of Freud.

¹⁴ Every science has its own technical terminology, which is indispensable if it is to conduct its enquiries with precision. Theology is no exception to this rule. The reader who is unused to this terminology can nevertheless overcome this inevitable difficulty. To those who wish to embark seriously on the Thomistic theology I recommend *St. Thomas Aquinas* by Sertillanges (Paris, Alcan, 1910), *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* by Gilson (Cambridge, W. Heffer and Sons Ltd.), Chenu's *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas* (Montreal), Farrell's *Companion to the Summa Theologica* (Sheed & Ward).

¹⁵ According to Aristotle all being is composed of two metaphysical principles: "matter" which is potentiality, absolute passivity, in relation to "form", which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called this or that. The actuality of this radical potentiality of matter is called "entelechy", which Aristotle likens either to knowledge (as related to ignorance) or to the exercise of knowledge (as related to knowledge which is possessed but not exercised). Cf. *De Anima*, II, 1, 412a, 10-12.

¹⁶ *De Anima*, II, 1, 412b, 5-8. Cf. A. Festugière, "Les meilleures méthodes de la définition de l'âme" (*Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Feb. 1911, pp. 83-90).

¹⁷ IIIa, 62, 1, 2m.

¹⁸ Ia, 76, 3, c.

¹⁹ "Cum anima rationalis excedit proportionem materiae corporalis pars animae quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quamdam habet infinitatem respectu corporis" (Ia IIae, 2, 6, c.).

²⁰ It seems better, in this connection, to speak of spiritual rather than rational operations. The rationalism of the last centuries has given to the word "reason" an appreciably different meaning from that attributed to it by St. Thomas. Furthermore, soul and reason have for St. Thomas an additional meaning to that in which they are employed by Aristotle. "The genius of St. Thomas consisted in reconciling the somewhat ethereal spirituality of St. Augustine with the views of Aristotle, which, though more matter-of-fact, took more account of the connection between the soul and its body. Consequently St. Thomas was able to construct a complete system, equally naturalistic and spiritual, of the human soul." (Gardail, *La Structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique*, Introduction p. xxix, Gabalda, 3rd edition).

²¹ Ia, 76.

²² "In nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum angelis" (Ia IIae, 31, 4, 3m).

²³ Ia, 65, 2, c.

²⁴ Ia IIae, 74, 3, 1m; Ia, 78, 4, 5m; IIIa, 8, 2, 2m; IIIa, 5, 4, c.

²⁵ IIIa, 5, 4, 3m.

²⁶ *Quaest. disp. De Anima*, a. 8 c. It is true that, since St. Thomas wrote, scientific research has demonstrated that certain sensory activities of some animals are superior to those of man (e.g. the olfactory sense, vision in birds, the pigeon's sense of direction, etc.). Nevertheless, it remains true that man, if we look at his organism as a whole and at the quality of its working, enjoys both sensory and affective superiority.

²⁷ Ia IIae, 71, 2, 3m.

²⁸ Ia IIae, 74, 3m.

²⁹ III, *Contra Gentiles*, 144.

³⁰ III, 8, 2, c; IV, *Contra Gentiles*, 41, etc.

³¹ Ia, 45, 5; Ia IIae, 16, 1; IIIa, 62, 1 and 4, etc.

³² Ia IIae, 72, 2, 1m.

³³ *Quaest. disp. De Veritate*, 24, 1, 19m.

³⁴ Ia IIae, 66, 2, c.

³⁵ One might here draw attention to recent discoveries in neurology, endocrinology and psychiatry.

³⁶ Ia, IIae, 51, 1, c.; 63, 1, 3; 65, 1, c. and 3m; 78, 3, c.; IIa IIae, 108, 2, c.; 182, 4, 3m.

³⁷ Ia IIae, 51, 1, c.; 65, 1, c.; 66, 2, c.; IIa IIae, 108, 2, c.; 123, 1, 3m; *De Virtutibus in communi*, a. 8, c.; 6m and 10m.

³⁸ *De Virt. in com.*, 8, 10m; Ia IIae, 51, 1, c.

³⁹ Ia IIae, 65, 1, c.

⁴⁰ Ia IIae, 17, 7, c.

⁴¹ Ia, IIae, 50, 5, c.

⁴² This is not the case with the supernatural, or "infused" virtues, which do not of themselves affect the natural dispositions: Ia, IIae, 65, 3, 2m and 3m; IIIa, 89, 1, 3m.

⁴³ *De Virt. in com.*, 8, 10m; Ia, IIae, 65, 1, 1m.

⁴⁴ Ia, IIae, 58, 4, 3m.

⁴⁵ *De Virt. in com.*, 8, c; *De Veritate*, 24, 1, 19m; Ia, IIae, 9, 5, 3m.

⁴⁶ Ia, IIae, 9, 5, 3m; Ia, 115, 4, 3m; IIa, IIae, 95, 2, 2m; IIIa *Contra Gent.* 85; *De Veritate*, 5, 10c and 7m. Whatever may be the truth about this celestial influence, it is easy to see how a similar explanation can be given of the influence exerted on the psyche by climate, sun spots and all other cosmic forces.

⁴⁷ Ia, IIae, 66, 2, c.

⁴⁸ Cf. Petitot, *Saint Thomas D'Aquin* (Ed. de la Revue des Jeunes), pp. 31-32.

⁴⁹ Ia, IIae, 75, i, c; 63, 4, 2m; *In Ethic.*, I IaI, lec. 1.

⁵⁰ *In Ethic.* II, lec. 1; Ia, IIae, 105, 1, c.: 51, 2, 3m.

⁵¹ *In De Anima*, I, lect. 2; Ia, 1, 1, 2m; 37, 4, etc. The effect of alcohol on our passions, and through them on our reason, can also be brought about by the devil: Ia, IIae, 80, 2.

⁵² Ia IIae, 59, 1, 2m; 45, 1, 1m; IIa, IIae, 127, 1, c. and 3m.

⁵³ Ia, IIae, 77, 2.

⁵⁴ Ia, IIae, 25, 3; 77, 6, c., etc.

⁵⁵ There is no question of anything more than analogy. For instance, we must not equate the distinction drawn by St. Thomas between the passions of concupiscence and irascibility with Freud's distinction between the libido and aggression. Nevertheless, the parallel is very remarkable. Cf. Philippe de la Trinité, "Amour et Violence" (*Etudes Carmelitaines*, Desclée de Brouwer, pp. 84-seq.). It should however, be remarked that the distinction drawn by Freud towards the end of his life between Eros, which establishes unity in the life of the psyche, and the death instinct, which aims at destroying that unity by dissociation, no longer has any connection with the Thomistic concepts of concupiscence and irascibility. Cf. Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Hogarth Press, 1949, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Hogarth Press, 1922, p. 79.

⁵⁷ Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 10-11. "It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the concepts of sexual and genital. The former is the wider concept and includes many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals. Sexual life comprises the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body—a function which is subsequently brought into the service of that of reproduction. The two functions often fail to coincide completely."

⁵⁸ I should like here to call special attention to the very fully documented comparison between the psychological systems of Sartre and St. Thomas contained in the recently published book by the Irish Capuchin Father J. K. Dempsey, *The Psychology of Sartre* (Cork University Press, 1950); see especially pp. 150-156 for a discussion of St. Thomas's views on the emotions.

⁵⁹ Ia, 80, 1; *De Veritate*, 22, 1.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hugon, *Cursus philosophiae thomisticae*, Vol. 3, p. 230 (Lethielleux, 1905).

⁶¹ Ia, IIae, 85, 4, c.

⁶² Ia, IIae, 85, 2, c.

⁶³ Ia, IIae, 1, 3, c.

⁶⁴ Ia, IIae, 26, 2, c; *Compendium theologiae*, 46.

⁶⁵ J. Mouroux, "Affectivité et expérience chrétienne" in the *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, April 1951, p. 203.

⁶⁶ Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, p. 72.

⁶⁷ Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 65.

⁶⁸ Cf. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, *Sigmund Freud, his exploration of the mind of man*, p. 66: "Object-libidinous love has this unique psychological characteristic: the libidinous forces are directed definitely toward an object outside own's own self, and the feeling of love arises not only from the wish to gratify one's own desires or needs, but primarily from the wish to have the needs and the desires of the other person also gratified and fulfilled. In other words, the pre-genital drives are all *egotistic*, the object-libidinous *altruistic*. A desexualized, isolated egotistic drive (in the psychoanalytic sense) is unthinkable, whereas object-libidinous drives can be desexualized as to expression, and socialized, spiritualized, in substance." St. Thomas, for his part says: "Actus appetitivae virtutis perficitur per hoc quod appetitus inclinatur ad rem ipsam." (IIa, IIae, 24, 4, c.)

⁶⁹ Cf. *Supplément de La Vie Spirituelle*, May 1951, "Loi et Amour".

⁷⁰ Ia IIae, 2 to 5.

⁷¹ Ia IIae, 69 and 70. "Actus virtutis vel est perficiens et sic est beatitudo, vel est delectans, et sic est fructus" (*In Galat.* 5, lec. 6).

⁷² IIa IIae, 142, 1, 2m and 3m.

⁷³ Cf. the vice of indifference: IIa IIae, 142, 1, and 150, 1, 1m.

⁷⁴ IIa IIae, 35, 4, 2m; *In Ethic.*, 8, lec. 5 and 6.

⁷⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 1178b, 28.

76 Ia IIae, 34, 4, c.

77 IIa, IIae, 32, 1, 1m.

78 Ia, IIae, 33, 4; 34, 4; 35, 4, 3m; *In Galat.* 5, lec. 6, and Ia, IIae, 69, 70.

79 *In Ethic.* 3, lec. 13; Ia, 83, 1, 5m; Ia IIae, 9, 2, c.; 58, 5, IIa IIae, 24, 11; 45, 2; *De Veritate*, 24, 10, c., etc.

80 St. Thomas calls attention to the part played by this "connatural knowledge" in the chaste man (IIa IIae, 45, 2, c.), the prudent man (Ia IIae, 95, 2, 4m), the believer (IIa, IIae, 1, 4, 3m and 2, 3, 2m) and particularly in the man who is moved by the gifts of the Holy Ghost (IIa IIae, 9, 1, 1m), of wisdom (IIa IIae, 45, 2, c.; *In III Sent.*, 35, 2, 1, 3a, sol. 1) and of knowledge (IIa, IIae, 9, 3, 3m.).

The importance assigned to "connatural knowledge", and the part played by *conatus* show that St. Thomas, even more than Aristotle, was aware of the priority of the psychical and emotional life to the knowledge of their objects.

81 Ia IIae, 22, 2, 2m.

82 *In Ethic.* 1 and 10, lec. 5 and 6.

83 *The Ego and the Id*, pp. 29-30.

84 *The Interpretation of Dreams*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 244.

85 *The Ego and the Id*, p. 64. Cf. also *Outline*, p. 6: "The aim of the first of these basic instincts (Eros) is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the second (destructive instinct), on the contrary, is to reduce living things to an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the *death instinct*. If we suppose that living things appeared later than inanimate ones and arose out of them, then the death instinct agrees with the formula that we have stated, to the effect that instincts tend toward a return to an earlier state. We are unable to apply the formula to Eros (the love instinct). That would be to imply that living substance had once a unity but had subsequently been torn apart and was now tending towards re-union."

86 *Outline*, pp. 24-25.

87 *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 19.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

89 This conception does not belong solely to depth psychology. Cf., for example, Gordon W. Allport's *Personality, a psychological interpretation* (Constable, 1949). The same principle of integration is met with in the field of psychology (cf. Ey, *Etudes psychiatriques*, Vol. 1, Desclée, 1948).

90 Ia, 65, 2, c.

91 *De Veritate*, 14, 1, 9m. *In De Anima*, II, lect. 13.

92 Ia, 57, 1, c.; Ia IIae, 19, 2, c.

93 IIIa, 6, 5, 2m; Ia, 50, 3, 2m.

94 *De Rat. Fidei*, 6; IIa IIae, 49, 6, 1m.

95 IIIa, 2, 2, c. For the Thomistic conception of personality see Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, pp. 457 seq. and H. F. Dondaine, "Notes doctrinales sur la Trinité" (in the French transl. of the *Summa Theologica*, Ed. Revue des Jeunes, Vol 1, pp. 237 seq.)

96 Ia, 29, 1, 5m and 75, 4, 2m. This example shows that St. Thomas's metaphysical conception of the person differs fundamentally from the current "personalist" philosophies.

97 Ia, 29, 1, c. and Ia IIae, 1.

98 In this connection, see the scholastic treatise by Dr. Cyrinus Scharff, O.E.S.A., *L'habitus, principe de simplicité et d'unité dans La Vie Spirituelle* (L. V. Dekker and Van de Legt, Utrecht, 1950). Cf. also Dom de Roton, *Les habitus. Leur caractère spirituel* (Labergerie, Paris).

99 Cf. Julien Peghaire, C.S. Sp., "Un sens oublié, la cogitative" in the *Revue de L'Université d'Ottawa* April-June and July-September, 1943, pp. 65-91 and 147-174.

100 Cf. Ia, 78, 4, c.; *De memoria*, lect. 5, etc.

101 See Louis Jugnet, "L'Idée de Redundantia" in *La Pensée catholique*, No. 13, 1950, Ed. du Cèdre.

102 Ia IIae, 77, 1, c.

103 Ia IIae, 80, 2, c.; *In Arist. De Somno et Vigilantia*, 2, in fine.

104 Ia IIae, 30, 1, 1m; 59, 5, c.; *De Veritate*, 26, 7, c.

105 Ia IIae, 9, 2; 10, 3; 77, 1, 2 and 6.

106 Cf. Plé, "La loi royale" in *Supplément de La Vie Spirituelle*, May 1951, pp. 237-238.

107 IIa IIae, 141, 1, 2m.

108 IIa IIae, 155, 1.

109 Ia 95, 2, 3m. Cf. *In Ethic.*, 3, lec. 11.

110 IIa IIae, 141, 1, 2m. St. Thomas is well aware of the existence of 'pseudo-morality'.

111 *De Viri in comm.*, 9, c. in fine.

- 112 Cf., for example, Ia Hae, 66, 4, 2m.
- 113 III *Sent.* 23, 1, 1, c. and *De Virt. in comm.*, 4, c.
- 114 IIIa, 15, 9, 3m.
- 115 Ia Hae, 31, 5, 1m; Hae, 141, 4, 4m. This is the reason why most men are capable of experiencing only the lower pleasures (IIa Hae, 35, 4, 2m).
- 116 *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 81.
- 117 Freud, 'Cinq leçons de psychanalyse' in *Psychologie collective et analyse du moi* (Ed. Payot, 1950), pp. 174-175.
- 118 Ia, 98, 2, 3m.
- 119 Dr. Charles Odier, *Les deux sources consciente et inconsciente de la vie morale* (Ed. de la Baconnière, 1948), p. 177.
- 120 Cf. Plé "La loi royale" in *Supplément de La Vie Spirituelle*, May 1951, p. 234.
- 121 Ia Hae, 17, 5, 2m.
- 122 Ia Hae, 56, 2.
- 123 Ia Hae, 13, 1, c.; 14, 1, 1m; 17, 1 and 4; 18, 6 etc.
- 124 Ia Hae, 61, 4, 1m.
- 125 Ia Hae, 65, 2; and IIa Hae, 23, 7 and 8.
- 126 Ia Hae, 65, 2; and IIa Hae, 23, 7 and 8.
- 127 Ia Hae, 66, 2, c.
- 128 Ia Hae, 73, 1.
- 129 Ia Hae, 84, 3, c.
- 130 Ia Hae, 82, 2, 2m.
- 131 Ia Hae, 82, 3, c.; *De Verit.*, 25, 6; *Contra Gent.*, 4, 1; *Questio unica De Anima*, 8, 7m. Nevertheless, grace does not effect a complete cure of the disturbance due to original sin (*Contra Gent.*, 4, 52).
- 132 Ia Hae, 73, 1, c.
- 133 It would be of real interest to be able to define precisely the differences which constitute an absolute distinction between the forms assumed by psychological disintegration and by sin. Both their similarities and their interdependence merit further examination. Here I can only call attention to the importance of conducting research on these lines.
- 134 *Outline*, p. 73.
- 135 *The Ego and the Id*, p. 57.
- 136 Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis* (London, Imago Publishing Company, 1947), p. 23. This failure to achieve synthesis appears equally in the rejection of a part of reality, in 'negation':
- "We can now supplement this by a further assertion that, during the same period of life (that of the infant), the ego often enough finds itself in the position of warding off some claim from the external world which it feels as painful, and that this is effected by denying the perceptions that bring to knowledge such a demand on the part of reality. Denials of this kind often occur, and not only with fetishists; and whenever we are in a position to study them, they turn out to be half-measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from reality. The rejection is always supplemented by an acceptance; two contrary and independent attitudes always arise and this produces the fact of a split in the greater intensity." (*An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, p. 75).
- 137 *Outline*, p. 80.
- 138 "Cinq Leçons", pp. 175-176.
- 139 Zilboorg, *Sigmund Freud, his exploration of the mind of man*, p. 97: "It is extremely interesting to note how Freud, who stressed so much the need to free ourselves from the unconscious, the irrational, and to establish the primacy of reason, would time and again hope for our salvation on this earth through identification and sublimations which are unconscious—emotional processes, not rational procedures. Even his Eros in its mature form is not anything rational."
- 140 *Outline*, p. 69.
- 141 This fundamental distinction between Freud's sublimation and what we call "assumption" is not sufficiently emphasized in Father Konstanty Michalski's essay on "La sublimation thomiste" in *Angelicum*, January 1937, pp. 212-222.

WHAT SHOULD THEOLOGY BE DOING ?

HANS URS VON BALTHASAR

THE Word that is God has become man, without ceasing to be God. The Word that is eternal has become temporal, without ceasing to be eternal. The Word that is God has assumed a fleshly body in order to be man. Since it is the Word, and as such has become flesh, it has at the same time assumed a body made of the letter, scripture, idea, image, voice and preaching. Otherwise men would either not have understood that the Word had really become *flesh*, or that this Divine Person who had become flesh, really was the *Word*. All problems of Scripture must commence with Christology. The letter is related to the Spirit as the body of Christ is related to His divine nature and person.

This means that the flesh and its appearance are useless in themselves unless we find the spirit through the flesh (Pauline), or unless we hear, see, taste the spirit (Johannine.) The letter is important and worthy of attention insofar as it can serve us as a bridge to the spirit. The finiteness of human ideas, images and words is important insofar as they can serve as a passage to the infiniteness of the divine Logos. In the order of intelligence this means that we only grasp revelation in the flesh and the letter properly if we hold ourselves ready, in the finiteness of the flesh and the letter, to be open to the infinity of divine truth, which is one with the divine person of the Son (Himself indivisible from the Father and the Holy Ghost, and of their very being.) It is this very holding of oneself in readiness that is faith. It is the surrender of the total finite person to the infinite Person, inasmuch as the persons possess truth and insight. To the extent that their lives reflect the Word of God, this same surrender is Love, which appears as hope through the temporal structure of existence (and its overlapping into the eternity immanent within it.)

Two existences are contrasted: on the one hand, the existence of an infinite person who is the Word, contained in the flesh and in the worldly-finite existence of its infinite-divine capacities. For the flesh-word is word experienced in human life to the utmost and, where the flesh presents itself as letter, it is spirit also fulfilled to the utmost. Fulfilled not only with the divine-infinite content, but with the divinely human, that is to say, a content experienced in the bodily existence of Christ. The other existence is that of the believers, insofar as belief, as a grace given by Christ, is for man the only approximation to the divinely human. Surrender to the infinite, a basically unlimited surrender, that which is *a priori* possible for mankind, the *a priori* in which the finite qualities of revelation, flesh and letter, have an opportunity to become what they truly are: the speech and expression of the infinite.

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This surrender expresses in the first place absolute will, absolute expectation of encountering God in the human, in a finite concept of infinite content. It is therefore the fulfillment of the worship which formerly received the Word of God, Scripture, on its knees in the dust, convinced that the written, expressed word had within itself the spirit and the force to allow the encounter of those believing with the infinity of the Word. All the more since the Word of Scripture is certainly not word from the time before the cross, flesh in the manner of the Old Testament, which very rarely allowed divinity to shine through it (as on Mt. Tabor); it is a word from the time after the cross, resurrected flesh, the letter already immersed in the infinity and glory of God. It is not a word which the resurrection could pass by without leaving a trace, so that the letter of the New Testament would simply take its place according to its inner form next to the letter of the old, within two similar volumes. It is, rather, a word which takes its inner form from the sign of the resurrection: the word is of the risen Christ (who reveals himself and the Old Testament in the forty days of the Church), who presents his glorified humanity, his infinite finiteness, in that speech, so important for us, expressing his infinite continuity in human form. One can encounter this word only in worship, which delivers the word not only beyond all human insights (or lack of insights) and reasons (or lack of them) into the infinite, but supersedes all comprehended temporal senses and significances from previous times, and allows itself to be rounded out to an infinite sense and an infinite significance.

Secondly, this surrender expresses the absolute will to make this infinite sense (to which no final understanding can be adequate in this time) a basis of meaning for one's own existence ("Let it be done to me according to Thy Word"). This means a decision to live not only according to the Word, but to live by the Word in order to reach the Word as a goal. The Word is humanly fulfilled to the utmost; it is incarnated, dead, resurrected Word, and it is a luminous finite-infinite guide from above and from within the collective existence of those who, believing in Christ, have submitted to Him. This is true to such an extent that inwardly the life of this collective existence becomes the life of Christ (in Him and in itself), so that it becomes a life which is a testimony and a repetition of the Word in time. The world must read from the holiness of the community of saints what the holiness (that is the divinity) of the incarnated Word on earth was. Without this sanctity of the Word lived here and now, the sanctity of the worshipped Word would no longer have the full truth of incarnation. The authenticity of the Word in the world (which stems from its power to change theory into being, duty into devoted service, theology into Christian action, reflection into an irrefutable testimony of one's life even to martyrdom): this authenticity stems from the worship, the renunciation and the surrender of the collective existence according to its inner belief, love and hope.

Whatever the Church has received in the way of authentic graces and "signs" from her very institution is not in itself a goal, but only a means to the goal, a formal impulse towards this content, a beginning towards this fulfillment. The holiness which was infused into and dwelt with the Church as "Institution" from her very inception is nothing but the spring, the source of the determination of individual Christians to enter and to continue on the path of holiness. Her authentic unity, visible in the hierarchy, is nothing but the substructure of

the experienced, accomplished unity of love which preserves and builds up the body of Christ within. The totality (Catholicity) of truth and love deposited with her from her very beginning has to be constantly developed through the workings of the Holy Spirit in the fullness of her life. And the Apostleship as an unbroken succession in time is only the guarantee and the beginning of that new direct relationship of all Christian generations in the manner of the apostolic relation at its beginning and the apostolic testimony of later ages through worship and sanctity. A "means" is not a dispensable vehicle to be overtaken by reaching the goal and then made superfluous. The means or the scaffolding is given together with this world-form, and it belongs to the Church as a form so long as this world-form has validity. But with it the means will pass away; it is already directed towards the Other who is alone a goal in Himself by means of its worship and sanctity (or: love of God and love of neighbor).

THIS is true of offices in the Church in general. It is just as true for Theology insofar as it is something else than the act of direct worship of the divine word in the finite word, something other than the act of direct submission to the Word in Christian existence. Insofar as there is something which interpolates itself between these two directly demanding poles of Christian rotation about the Word of God, there is something which can be called theoretical pursuit of the Word. It is a contemplation which is not the same as the act of worship, nor is it the same as the action or practice of incarnating truth. Just as preaching in the Church can find its orientation only by these two poles, at the same time it must find its orientation by the purity and fullness of her preaching, with which she is incompletely permeated. Itself a special form of preaching (for the theologian too has his office), theology is at the same time function, corrective and formal preparation for office teaching. Together with preaching and with the sacraments, theology is means, mediator; it has rendered possible, it has rendered accessible the infinite kingdom of divine truth in the finite vessels in which Revelation has been given to us, so that believers might be made ready to encounter this infinity in worship and in submission of life. The truth of revelation, because it is both divine and humanly experienced, is so formed that theology, which is a theoretical consideration in the areas between worship and submission of life, must be measured in the truth of its contents by worship and submission. For Christ is no theory, certainly not inasmuch as He is truth. And a theory about Christ must be measured and judged by the truth as Christ is the truth, not as worldly sciences are true. The passion of worship and submission must flame through the dispassionateness of theory as it flames through the whole Word of God: the Word that was Christ and was burned by this fire and let itself be consumed; the Word that still is Christ and is called "Scripture," the glowing letter of spirit and fire which destroys anyone who does not approach it with bowed head.

To be sure, the fleshly existence of God presupposes a field on which God's Word, because it is a truly human word, places itself in relation to other human words. It is a field of disputations, debates, reasons pro and con, the cavillings and quibblings of the scribes, the groping ignorance of youth. Here God's Word always speaks in the infinite manner which already characterized it in the Old Testament, but it does so in a truly human situation. It allows itself to meet and

to be met. It submits to contradiction, to the syllogism, to theological deduction. The Word reveals itself in these encounters. But let man consider well: this compromise with human reason is made only to lead man away from his own immanent sphere into the sphere of faith where he must make his great decision. Even more, and this is quite clear in John, the theological disputation is always, from the beginning, pursuing a path which leads either to an act of belief or to an act of disbelief. The disputation of Jesus with the Samaritan woman, the adulteress, the man born blind, the sister of Lazarus: these are all words of salvation which lead His partner in the conversation along a path toward total submission in worship. The disputation with the Jews [John 8, 46-59, the Gospel for Passion Sunday] breaks off the encounter because of the hardness of heart of the auditors, and for this reason John has the Passion of the Word already in full motion with this disputation. There are hours of darkness into whose desire not to understand the light penetrates nonetheless. Now is the massacre of the divine Word. Philology, which does not want to meddle in worship and in submission, is content within its own scope: "Your testimony is not true." It is theology which, while it has already shaken the foundations, continues to speak. To this great extent is the apparent neutrality of disputation characterized by the eternal need for decision. Theology in the Church is not a long dallying in the field of theory as the Jews were permitted to go about for so long with the word of God. Not for a single moment can theology forget the roots from which it draws all nourishment: worship, in which, believing, we see the heavens open, and submission of our lives, which makes us free to understand the truth.

MANY things follow from what we have been discussing which are important for the structure of theology. First of all the general comment that in theology all preoccupation with the finiteness of the Word (concept, image, proposition, book) has to be only a path to the incarnated infiniteness within it. It is high time that the formal study of the logic of the speech and the thought of God's Word be undertaken, in the course of which it would appear that the formal laws of human speech and thought are not cancelled, but lead beyond themselves. Because all laws valid for the finiteness of this world are functions of a never-ending truth, parcelled out to be sure in finite laws and statutes, but nevertheless truth, infinite even in each of its "parts," in each of its manifestations. In many ways such a study would be analogous to Bultmann's, and yet entirely different, because it would proceed not from historical and philosophical-existential hypotheses, but from the basic fact of the (believed) Incarnation. One cannot say that through the Incarnation or even through the Resurrection human "flesh" (human nature with all its finite laws of being and thinking) has acquired an existence relative to these events. That would be a familiar category in regard to worldly events that is insufficient for this absolutely singular event, which cannot be repeated and is comparable with no other event. In this manner Modernism, though often near, certainly shot past the goal in a basic manner.

Not history, not development, not philosophy have the Word, but belief alone, which demands from theology the form which will lead to deeper worship,

to a better obedience of life. It is expected that the theologian will so employ the laws of human thought that he will make visible in them the laws of belief. Precepts of thought are primarily exclusive, delimiting, de-fining, even when they undertake to set these limits for the sake of a better definition of the inner relationships of the delimited fields. So long as the contents of truth themselves are finite, no objection can be raised to such a game of encircling, bounding and contrasting. It is quite different when precepts of faith are involved. For now the Included truth is the same as the Excluded—not merely generically but also substantially and personally the same. This Including is not false (since it fulfills the impulse towards incarnation) under the condition that one is simultaneously aware that this is a boundary of the boundless, a concept of the inconceivable, definition of the acceptedly divine. And this awareness must continue, strengthened, in the succeeding operations in which these boundaries (of boundless content) are to be brought into relation with other boundaries (of similarly boundless content.)

In other words: every concept of theology must be catholic in its embrace, that is, universal, encompassing all truth; or else such a concept must be exclusive of all truth, delimiting, and rising through death to a heavenly truth. This has to do with belief and not, in the manner of Hegelian dialectic, with knowledge. Or else it is knowledge of such a kind that it is seeking and finding belief according to its measure of worship and submission and grace. A Catholic concept is not at all the same as a Platonic or Aristotelian concept, since God's Word in human form (whether flesh or Scripture) cannot be limited to a meaning we choose. This inclusive or exclusive catholic logic is not, however, an invitation to permit everything to pile up in a vague edifying endlessness, but is rather a logic which makes the highest demands on thinkers. That is, it constantly places our thought in respect to a decision about the Word of God, not only in content but in formal aspect as well, in the very act of thought which, in this act, must bear on itself the stigma of Catholic logic. Theology is fulfilled in the judgment of a decision of the Divine Word about the human word; the whole of Scripture expresses this from beginning to end. How theology wishes to escape this!

FROM these general considerations comes the specific, the material.

1. This material must orient itself to revelation in its beginning, its basic structure, its essential articulations, indeed in the way in which it is delineated in concrete historical fashion—better yet, as it has happened to mankind as concrete history, as it is delineated in Scripture. This requires that theology must understand and present this history in its Divine content, and therefore may not, by ignoring and abandoning this history, draw up an ahistorical, timeless (and consequently not truly eternal) "Meaning of History." The Incarnation is not an "example" of a truth—it is the Truth itself. A further requirement is that theology must reflect these histories of revelation (for the didactic element in both Old and New Testaments is a function of this history) in their essential course and not in an arbitrary selection of episodes or concepts. Scripture is not a stone quarry from which theologians may break off single sentences that seem appropriate; Scripture is the testimony of a total, unified event which, precisely in this totality, is the concern of theology.

Theology must be guided in its structure and internal relationships by the structure and internal relationships of revelation. I do not speak of Scripture as of a book, but in the sense of the events happening within it. For certainly there remains the scope of the Holy Spirit who breathes where he wishes, introducing truth into all things as he wishes, throwing his clarifying light on the Word in the springs of revelation as he wishes; we must then always read Scripture in the light of the Spirit (who is a churchly and a Catholic spirit).

This does not deny the theologian's right to withdraw into a corner comfortably, and to specialize there without taking into consideration the entirety of revelation. That there must be individual inquiry is in keeping with the finiteness of our knowledge. But beware: this finiteness of our task does not correspond (as it does in other sciences) to a finiteness of subject. And yet more keenly beware: the infinitude of the labor does not (as is the case with the secular sciences) proceed in the direction of ever-increasing differentiation and fragmentation, of ever more subtle specialization, but rather the reverse of this—in the direction of the inner infinity (because divinity) of the subject, which tenders itself to us in a clear, surveyable unified finite form. It is not necessary that everyone who professes dogmatics write a complete dogmatics. But he must always be conscious of the totality, the catholicity of the truth in every thread of his thought.

As important as the study of Mary may be today, one cannot rid himself of the feeling that this study serves for whole regiments of Mary-scientists (Mariologist—not a handsome word) as a welcome alibi for leaving the main path to busy themselves with details which would of course have to be studied within the proportioned requirements of revelation, but which would perhaps deserve more boldness and skill in exegesis. The study of the Trinity, of the God-Man, of Redemption, of the cross and the resurrection, of predestination and eschatology stand out as loci of questions which no one approaches, but before which everyone makes a timid little genuflection. This genuflection is a misunderstanding. The thinking of earlier generations (even if it has come down in the form of conciliar definitions) is never a bed (to relax on) for the thinking of later generations. Definitions are much less an end than a beginning. A *Hic Rhodus*—this way lies the wealth of Rhodes. An opening into the question. Nothing which the Church has really gained in its struggles ever is lost. But nothing excuses theologians from continued labor. What has only been stored up, what has only been handed down becomes stale as did the manna without new, original substantiation, and actually *ab ovo*, from the fount of revelation. The longer a living tradition remains trammelled by purely mechanical tradition the more difficult it becomes to knit it anew to life.

2. The span of uncurtailed revelation, which must serve theology as its basic dimension, becomes broadened to the extent that theology must provide regulation, not of a timeless but of a contemporary preaching. This certainly does not mean that theology must anxiously and servilely be ruled by the most fashionable modernity in order to remain at the crest of the tide—for example an existential or mythologistic approach—; nor does it mean that theology ought to construct a complaisant "eristic" for modern man, that is to say an apologetic; but it does mean that theology, still according to its own innermost law, must set itself towards that light which the Holy Ghost still casts today upon revelation. The spirit that breathes wheresoever it wishes is not a mild, diffuse, timeless sun of enlighten-

ment, eternally and uniformly on tap; it is a spirit of missions and mandates within that mystical, truly secret body which continues the historicity of the Old Testament by the mode of realization and not that of interruption, and which provides ever new and unpredictable mandates of God. It would be entirely too practical (and it would substantiate Martin Buber's profound objections) if Christ were to put behind Himself the strange, powerful unrest of the present and the future and instead were able to live in a pallid temporal past which thereby would recede ever farther into the past. But who, unless it be the theologian, must walk as watchman along the ramparts to call out the hour, not the hour of world-history but of Christian history, calling out the position of the sun of eternal revelation—for today?

Various signs are given to us in order to help us read and understand and distinguish one spiritual manifestation from another. There is in the first place the sign of a century gifted in sanctities and missions, which in turn probably recall other sanctities of earlier times in the light of the present and of actuality, and thereby enable what has been overlooked to appear. The truly prayerful and the truly obedient are those in whom the contemporaneous truth of the Word is embodied most visibly; their life is doctrine experienced; and if their life is a particular mission then it is to a heightened degree a divinely appointed, actualized light upon doctrine—light of the spirit, that illuminates the light of the Son. This has nothing to do with persons, much less with psychology and biography, but is concerned only with the invested capacity of these missions to the extent that this capacity is the voice, the word, the light of God for our times.¹

Such light however will not be denied to the theologian himself so long as he approaches his work in the spirit of prayer and obedience. It is the same light that infallibly directs the magisterium (and which in turn, through the magisterium, points out the way for the individual theologian) on condition that it is also the personally besought, fought for and experienced light in the Supreme Head of the Church and of the Christian community, and not merely a borrowing from the stock of the ecclesiastical means of assistance which are simply at hand. Deep and awesome secrets of the Church are concealed here: the "angels of the community" stand in the severest judgment from the Lord of the Church, who tolerates in them no rest from the ministerium, no relaxation from the first love but rather fosters every zeal of the guardians and pastors. But the theologian who is guided by the magisterium must realize his own responsibility to it: his own thoughtful interpretation, the plans he makes in accordance with his understanding, and even his penetration to a deeper level of meaning can have a significant place in the formulation of doctrine and the preaching of it if he has worked in earnest and intense personal submission to the spirit.

3. Now for the first time may be mentioned the third span of revelation, probably the most difficult to master: that which is between revelation today (as in 1. and 2. above) and tradition yesterday, flowing into tradition today. It is difficult because tradition must remain a living principle, otherwise one could easily see that the direction of the spirit for yesterday is not related to the direction of the spirit for today, but rather the opposite: to the extent that it was direction for the specific situation yesterday, it is by the same token not direction for the situation today.

THIS is not to insist on mistrust of the formulas and formulations, the systems and cosmogonies of yesterday's theology. Mistrust is not a fruitful, elucidating position. But such a certainty and fullness for today is provided by the eternal fullness of revelation, the fullness of the spirit granted for today, the fullness of transmitted tradition, so that in this fullness of today the fullness of yesterday remains alive and attains new vitality. But the vitality of today's theologians in the continuity of the tradition of yesterday means a new, difficult responsibility: combining respect for the imperishable values (the Church Fathers, the scholastics. . .), along with the incorruptible search for the index of the times which cleaves to every phenomenon.

Nothing takes bitterer revenge than the failure to appreciate the meaning of the historical situation: the work of the present always suffers. It is the well-known policy of the ostrich with this difference: the bird sticking his head into the sand figures that he will not be seen, while the theologian who sticks his head into the sand of timelessness figures that he will be noticed by history in spite of the fact that he takes no notice of history. We need neither an enthusiastic revival of anything at all (for example the Church Fathers), nor the burial of historical research, but rather that species of Christian humanism that seeks, in opposition to a dried-up school of scholars, in the sources themselves for the living, originating well-springs in a truly joyous mood of freedom that at the same time is aware of the true gravity of things. Thus a true realization of tradition may be expected.

Like all good things in the world surrender demands a full share of freedom, responsibility and Christian daring. This can be clearly seen as far back as Paul's time, in the way in which he transmitted that which had come to him. He who without these virtues wishes to enter into the chains of surrender and would like to pass on to others the good things of theology is doing approximately what those laborers do who toss bricks from hand to hand so that the bricks will be minimally damaged, or altered as little as possible—he is thereby trapped in a deep deception. Simply because thoughts are not bricks, indeed because ever since the first Easter morning a battle has raged between stone and spirit.

A space has only been staked out with the indication of these three spans, but it is an open building-plot, inviting all spiritual undertakings. When one has once surveyed it he is unable to understand why so few nowadays attempt to build upon it. And even these few become sidetracked and leave the main track almost abandoned. That such is the fortune of the main track can be explained on many grounds, which we can discuss another time. It is not committees, which bespeak prejudices, who can help here, but only individuals who dedicate their lives to the glory of theology: to this consuming fire between the dark abyss of prayer and the dark abyss of obedience.

Translated by BERNARD STAMBLER and SALLY S. CUNNEEN

¹ Cf. The study by Walter Dirks, *The Monks and the World* (Mc Kay, 1954), a notable undertaking and, despite several flaws of interpretation, quite worthy of being seriously considered for method.

THE IGNATIAN VISION OF THE UNIVERSE AND OF MAN

JEAN DANIÉLOU

ST. IGNATIUS and his first companions never took the time to develop speculatively the theology implied in the new inspiration which they produced, nor to describe the religious universe in which their field of activity was situated. If it appears important for us to do this today, it is because the need to define the dogmatic foundations of spirituality has been felt in a particularly acute way by our contemporaries. If, to borrow an expression of Karl Marx, we tend to reject a *theoria*, which has never been expressed in a *praxis*, we find equally distasteful a spirituality made up of practical directions but whose doctrinal justification is not apparent. The Ignatian school of spirituality has given little (perhaps too little) consideration to this problem up to now. In the pages that follow, we should like to suggest a solution of this problem.

Jean Daniélou, S. J., is well known to our readers. This article, which appeared in the REVUE D'ASCETIQUE ET MYSTIQUE 1950, pp. 5-17, derives from conferences held at Versailles in 1948 on The Spiritual Problems of Our Times and the Spirit of St. Ignatius. Since Ignatian spirituality can almost be said to characterize the Catholic Church in modern times, the importance of the subject is manifest.

The religious perspectives implied in the Ignatian writings correspond in two essential points with the vision of the world insisted upon by present day Christianity. First of all, the Ignatian spirituality is fundamentally biblical. The essential ideas of the Exercises are developments of the central themes of biblical theology, those master ideas of the Old Testament which are also those of the New and which our present theology has just recently rediscovered. Secondly, the Ignatian vision is in singular harmony with the perspective which dominates all contemporary thought, a perspective, that is, of a history in reference to which the existence of man takes on value and direction. What is more important, the harmony between Ignatian thought and contemporary mentality is as helpful in correcting the errors of the latter as it is in fulfilling its aspirations. We will try then, to describe some of the traits of the Ignatian universe while comparing it on each point to the scriptures and to the trends of our times, especially those of Marxism. In the second part of our study we will attempt to show how these doctrinal perspectives are at work in the man who is totally engaged in this Ignatian universe.

THE first characteristic of the Ignatian spirit is a sense of the holiness and of the infinite majesty of the triune God. This appears from the first lines of the Exercises whose end is to restore man to his true vocation, the reverence and service of God. And at the end of the Exercises, the "Contemplation for obtaining Divine Love" describes the stature of a soul in which this spirit of religion is

completely restored. No expression occurs more often in the Constitution than the divine *majestas et bonitas*. At the bottom of this whole scheme we can discover the Ignatian experience of Manresa in which the soul of the saint was overwhelmed by the sovereign majesty and loveableness of God. The mystery of the Trinity is the center of the Ignatian vision. We have, besides the *Journal* of Ignatius, the testimony of Nadal on this point: "He received from God a singular grace freely to engage himself in and rest upon the bosom of the Holy Trinity." (Mon. Nadal, IV, p. 591)

But the object of Ignatian contemplation—and this is its characteristic point—is not only the Holy Trinity in its eternal relations, but also in its great works, the *magnalia*, which It accomplishes in the creation and redemption of the world. The Ignatian God is a God Who acts, Who accomplishes marvelous and holy deeds. As he says in the Contemplation on Love, "He works and labors in all things" (third point). This is a God at work, *operarius*. That is why the man of Ignatian spirituality will be essentially a "worker with God," *operarius*, according to the splendid expression our province catalogues have preserved for us. This contemplation of the works of salvation as flowing out of the love of the Three Divine Persons is the true subject of the *Contemplatio ad amorem*.¹

This was very familiar to the first disciples of St. Ignatius. We have some remarkable texts on this subject from Nadal: "Christ is in heaven; from Him flows an infinite power by which He rules the heaven and earth. Behold the Divine works emanating from His hands, from His lips, from His body" (*Journal Spiritual*, Fr. trans., *Dieu Vivant*, V., p. 39). And again there is an explicit reference to the Holy Trinity: "A certain person on the feast of the Holy Trinity contemplated the Divine works as emanating from the Divine infinity" (*ibid.*, p. 70). These Divine works are the marvelous operations of the Three Persons in history, the Creation of angels and men, the Choice of Abraham, the Flight from Egypt, the Incarnation, and the Resurrection of the Word. Only the Spirit of God, Who accomplishes these works, can give the understanding of them. This understanding is the spirit of prophecy which is the divine meaning of history.

Now this is precisely the object of Ignatian contemplation, of apostolic contemplation. It is an admiration or wonder at the great works of God. Ignatius was seized by the grandeur of God's accomplishments. A phrase that often recurs in his writing is *Voluntas Dei*. The search for that Will is the end of the Exercises (Annotation I). But Will here should not be taken only in the sense of the particular Will of God for this soul, but rather as the Will expressed in the whole of the Divine plan, where each soul's place is inscribed as an historical vocation, a personal engagement in sacred history. It is only by this reference to sacred history that the purposes of the Exercises can be fully understood.

There is no need to underline the biblical character of all this. The Bible in its totality is not only an exposition of doctrine, but also a concrete history of the marvelous works of God. From the creation to the Parousia it describes for us the works by which the spirit of Jahweh, the divine *ruah*, accomplishes with an irresistible power the designs of the divine love. Biblical religion is essentially belief in divine deeds, in the interventions of God in the course of human existence. These interventions are the "mysteries" of faith. Through these mysteries the divine habits are revealed to us, those ways of God in history, so different from the mean and narrow views of mankind: "My ways are not your ways." It

was the contemplation of these divine *magnalia* which inspired the Virgin Mary, seized by the prophetic spirit, to cry across the ages: "Magnificat." There is no need to underline the modern character of all this. All the great philosophies of the last century have been marked by the discovery of this new dimension which is history. And this is no caprice of thought. This attitude corresponds to the contemporary fact that humanity is now mature enough to have at last become conscious of its past. And yet we know this history is interpreted by various systems according to false principles. For example, the Marxists see in this history, man creating himself by means of this transformation of the material conditions of his life. But true history is a sacred history; what God does, not what man does. This sacred history is the background of Ignatian spirituality. That is why Ignatian spirituality appears as the answer to the need of our times by giving us the deep significance of a life taking place in this history.

THE second characteristic of the Ignatian vision of the world is the central place which Christ holds. Father Hugo Rahner has shown how the contemplation of the *Kingdom of Christ* was the intuition which produced the whole of Ignatian spirituality.² In this sacred history, which we have said is the point of departure for the spirituality of St. Ignatius, the essential event is the appearance of Christ. The purpose, indeed the goal of history, the end of the plan of Providence, is the establishment of the "Kingdom of God." That is to say, an order of things where the sovereignty of God is recognized freely by His spiritual creatures. This constitutes "the glory of God," that most cherished expression of St. Ignatius, which is the recognition itself of the divine holiness by spiritual creatures. But this is accomplished in the mysteries of Christ by which He is united to humanity in order to bring it through the Ascension into the house of His Father, after having washed it in His Blood. By these mysteries God is perfectly glorified, the end of history is attained, and the world is restored. They are the essential object of Ignatian contemplation.

We ought to indicate one very important point which has been justly brought out by Father Rahner. These mysteries of Christ are not realities of the past; they are continuing even in the present. The Christ of St. Ignatius is not the Christ of Protestants, Who is only the Christ of the Gospels towards Whom memory likes to turn to draw some edifying lessons. It is the risen Christ, living now, continuing to accomplish His work until the Parousia. The Christ of the Kingdom is the Christ of glory, spreading the Kingdom of the Father over the entire human race. But where is the Christ of glory actually working now? In the Church. Therefore it is in the Church and in obedience to the Holy Father that Ignatius looks for Christ. His attachment to the Church is the direct result of his attachment to the risen living Christ.

This sacred history is an actual reality; such is the great affirmation of St. Ignatius against Protestants, for whom nothing happens between the Resurrection and the Parousia. What are the great works which Christ accomplishes now and which continue the great works of biblical and evangelical history, filling up the interval between the Ascension and the Parousia, the "*sedet ad dexteram*" to the "*iterum venturus est*"? It is the "mission," that is to say, the extension to

the entire world of the grace of Christ through preaching and the sacraments. The mission (a mystery upon which "the angels can satisfy their eager gaze," says the first Epistle of Peter) is a mystery which is always contemporary. Ignatius contemplates this in the meditation of the Kingdom whose object is the present action of Christ winning souls to His Father. And it is in this historical reality that he invites generous souls to cooperate. Here, then the *praxis* and *theoria* join.

This is eminently scriptural. Christ is the center of scripture. The Old Testament prepares and prefigures Him; the New relates to us the great mysteries of His Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension; and the Pauline Epistles show us these mysteries as continuing in the sacraments. A Protestant writer, Oscar Cullman, in *Christ and Time*, has shown how the Christian conception of history is Christo-centric. With the coming of Christ the decisive event has taken place. Nothing as important will ever happen again. The essential event is at the center. History, however, has not ended, and as Cullman himself remarks, the sacraments are the works of God in the present time, continuing the works of the Old and New Testaments. Between the crossing of the Red Sea, the Resurrection and Baptism there is the most rigorous continuity.

These views constitute also the Christian response to the modern conceptions of history. The principal objection which Christianity meets today is this: Christianity has indeed been a great thing in the past; it has produced a civilization. But today it has been superseded; a new world exists now. To this assertion the Christian response is that Christ cannot be superseded because He is truly the End of history, the Last Man, the *Novissimus Homo*, because in Him the absolute end is attained; humanity is indissolubly united to the divinity. The Christian conception is that the historical fact of Christ is an absolute event beyond which there can be no progress. This is precisely the conception of St. Ignatius.

WE COME now to the final trait of this Ignatian vision of history: it is not only sacred history, not only Christo-centric history, but it is finally dramatic history of conflict. These are the three fundamental themes of the Exercises which reveal the three aspects of this vision: the *Foundation*, resumed in the *Contemplatio ad Amorem*, expresses the sacred history; The *Kingdom*, continued in the contemplation of the mysteries, expresses the Christo-centric history; The *Two Standards*, extended by the *Rules for the Discernment of Spirits*, expresses the dramatic history. This last aspect is also a creative element in Ignatian spirituality. Father Rahner places it, along with the Kingdom, among the fundamental intuitions of our Saint.³

Here again the thought of Ignatius is very clearly defined. In contrast to the history which God is fashioning, there is that which the devil is making. In the background of human history there is a spiritual catastrophe which Ignatius makes us contemplate in the *Meditation of the Triple Sin*. The diabolical world is for him always a complete reality, made up of evil spiritual powers who seek to turn man away from God. The meditation on the Two Standards shows us the action of the devil trying to ensnare souls. The Rules for the Discernment of Spirits describe for us in a remarkable way the present situation of the devil in

History. He has been conquered since the Resurrection of Christ; he no longer has power over souls. He tries to frighten them by making out that Christian life is impossible. It is important therefore to know his deceits in order not to be duped by them.

This is very important for apostles; they are the advance guard in the combat for the liberation of captured souls. For the apostolate (before being a matter of human endeavor) is a spiritual conflict against the powers of evil with the weapons of prayer and fasting. It is a mystery. It is necessary then to find out what are the devil's designs for Apostolic men. But about this the experience of St. Ignatius and of his companions will give us testimony, of which the most essential are the letters of St. Francis Xavier. The feeling of being in conflict with the wicked angels of the pagans is constantly present to him and also the fact that his entire security rests in their powerlessness: "God Our Lord has made me understand much about the cruel and dreadful terrors which the enemy arouses when God permits him." (Letter of St. Francis Xavier, Fr. trans. Thibault, III, p. 9) This mission is indissoluble, a conflict and an incarnation.

Here again we are on one of the pivot points of the Bible. From the second chapter of Genesis, in the very presence of God, there appears an adversary who struggles to withdraw man from the adoration and service of Him who alone is worthy to be served, in order to acquire this service for himself. This conflict is continued throughout the entire Old Testament between Jahweh, present in His people, and the evil spirits of the pagan nations. On the threshold of the public life of Christ the scene of the Temptation brings face to face both of the actors in this great spiritual drama. On the evening of Good Friday, Satan seems triumphant, but Christ descends into hell, breaks the gates of death, defemises, and if the real question is the liberation from that unhappiness, the apostles, the missionaries, appear as the true makers of history. Thus the Marxist hermit, to the Curé d'Ars, shows us the great protagonists of true history, the saints, in battle with the power of Satan and continuing the victory of Christ.

But here, you will ask me, are we not at odds with modern thought? And on this point at least hasn't Ignatian thought reached its limits? I think altogether to the contrary. The force of the Marxist conception of history is that it presents history as an effort to free man from his captivity which it calls an alienation. The captivity from which the Marxists wish to free man is economic captivity. Now this is a very superficial point of view. There is a captivity which is greater than the economic captivity and this is the spiritual captivity. One could free men entirely from economic captivity without diminishing notably their true misery which is spiritual. But from this spiritual misery one alone can free men, Jesus Christ and with Jesus Christ the apostles of Jesus Christ. If that is the true misery, and if the real question is the liberation from that unhappiness, the apostles, the missionaries, appear as the true makers of history. Thus the Marxist perspective appears to us, not so much denied, as surpassed on its own level. Here again the historic and dramatic vision of Ignatius appears as the true response to the problem of man today.

These are the traits of the Ignatian vision of the universe. Certainly I have often used in these pages a modern vocabulary, but I think that I have been profoundly faithful to the great intuitions of St. Ignatius. Brought out in its entirety, this admirable vision of the *magnalia Dei*, of the Christ of glory, of

the combat against spiritual powers, appears capable of furnishing an interpretation of the world from which the spirit of the Exercises takes its whole meaning. It arouses that admiration which draws man from his own path in order to put him in the pathways of God and to make him an instrument in His marvelous designs. It is this subjective aspect of the Ignatian man that we must now consider.

TO the Ignatian vision of the world, as a history of the works of God's Word, there corresponds a certain conception of a man involved in this history. This is found in the *Constitutions* of St. Ignatius and in the writings of his first companions, in particular in the texts of the *Letters* of St. Francis Xavier, the *Memoirale* of Blessed Peter Faber and the *Notes on Prayer* by Jerome Nadal.⁴ This conception of man is the distinctive path of Ignatian spirituality. It constitutes the essential legacy of our Saint. Each great founder has a particular inspiration which is his distinctive path of Sanctity. We have to ask ourselves what characterizes the Ignatian way. Each of these ways is evangelical, but the plenitude of the Gospel divides into various ways, each one of which manifests to advantage one of its aspects. The Ignatian saint is especially patterned on the prophetic and sacerdotal ministry of Christ. Introduced by contemplation into the grandeur of the ways of God, withdrawn from his own ways by obedience, he lives with the life of the Spirit through a transforming union.

I will take briefly these three essential traits. We have said that the point of departure for the Ignatian vision was the deep awareness of the grandeur of God's ways. The Ignatian saint will be above all one who is seized by the grandeur of these ways. God is great: *Magnus Dominus*. The things which He does are great: *Fecit Magna*. They are the *magnalia*. It is necessary then that the soul leave its own ways which are narrow and shabby in order to enter the ways of God, first through admiration and then through dedication: *Reverentiam exhibere et servire*. This disposition is called magnanimity, which is the aptitude of a soul to grasp the grandeur of the divine works and as a result to attach only secondary importance to the rest. This disposition has a certain analogy with the natural nobility of the soul but it is properly supernatural and relative to these great divine works.

We find a number of expressions of this in the text of St. Ignatius. One of the many passages which echo the thought in a very clear manner is the fifth annotation: It will much benefit him who is receiving the Exercises to enter upon them with a large heart and with liberality toward his Creator and Lord, offering all his desires and liberty to Him in order that His divine Majesty may make use of His person and all he possesses according to His most holy Will. The same notion is found in the oblation of the *Kingdom*. He treats of a soul imbued with greater love which will urge the soul, seized by the grandeur of Christ, to show itself outstanding in His service. Moreover we have the letter of Polanco on the dispositions that St. Ignatius demanded of aspirants to the Society: "I have ascertained that he desires above all men capable of doing something great for the love of God."

The Apostle indeed ought to be engaged in the great works of God. He must have then, through the Holy Spirit, a soul corresponding to these great

works, which are difficult because they are great. For everything that is great is difficult, says Rilke. One who is incapable of withdrawing from his own preoccupations so that nothing else can impress or disconcert him is not suitable for these works. St. Francis Xavier admirably explains this in a letter in which he contrasts the pusillanimous man and the magnanimous: "This pusillanimity causes a misery both dangerous and damaging, for man is capable of very little, if he trusts himself, who is such a little thing; however when he knows the need of powers greater than he possesses and he must trust completely in God, he will attempt great works with courage." It is only by the power of God that one can accomplish the works of God. There is no question here of a certain energy of character, but simply of an absolute dependence upon grace by which souls, naturally weak and cowardly, can accomplish heroic actions of sanctity.

This also appears to us as the fundamental attitude of Christ in the Gospel. We find there no depreciation of creatures but a sovereign liberty in their regard. Only one thing has absolute value for Him, the Will of His Father. In comparison with this Will nothing has any importance in His eyes. He renounces for it His comforts, His affections, His life. Such is true magnanimity. It is founded on a judgment of value which puts things in their place; God in His which is first; creatures in theirs which is second. It is a disposition to respect this hierarchy in practical life. This is the Ignatian doctrine of indifference which is not a depreciation of creatures but liberty in their regard, because the soul is seized with the sovereign grandeur of God. When God calls one to participate in these admirable designs, it is a mark of smallness of soul to attach a disproportionate importance to some little personal history; "Do not be worried about what you will eat or what you will drink. Seek first the Kingdom of God and His Justice."

THUS the Ignatian saint is one who has first been seized by the grandeur of the works of God. But it is necessary now that he become a practical instrument, that is to say, he must now leave completely his own ways to enter upon the ways of God. Now this is very precisely the sense of the Ignatian doctrine of Obedience and the reason of its importance. There is no need to disguise the fact that this is one of the most difficult aspects of Ignatian spirituality and poses the most problems. But I think that we have grasped an essential part of it when we realize we are treating of a mystery; the mystery of a will so taken up with the divine Will that it wishes to transform itself into the divine, by divesting itself of its own will: "The highest summit in the matter of obedience is a very ardent and sublime love which the soul feels toward God, a love which enlightens him and makes him realize that the order of his superior comes from God. It is such a love that it could not turn itself away to disobey." (St. Alphonsus Rodrigues, *Vie Admirable*, p. 175)

Here we find ourselves once again face to face with one of the central aspects of the Ignatian vision of reality, the divine Will. This divine Will Which produces the works of God is supremely holy. From the moment when the soul seeks to unite itself with this Will, the more it knows of God, and so the more this Will appears to it as holy. The saints are precisely those who have a deep understanding of sin, because they alone know how much the will of God, against

which sin is an infidelity, is worthy of adoration. Obedience on the other hand is clearly the way of conformity to that Will. Now the fact is that according to the divine plan, it is in the Church that the works of God are continued. Only through cooperation with the Church and in obedience to it is man introduced into this divine plan. Obedience appears not only as a condition of conformity with the views of God, but also as a condition for union with God. In the Ignatian spirituality this is the great way of self-abnegation, the night of one's own will, which permits the purification and transfiguration of the human will into the divine Will.

It is important to emphasize the profoundly evangelical character of this doctrine. Throughout the Gospel, behind the relation of Christ with men, we sense the most profound mystery of His soul, which is His union with His Father. This union with the Will of the Father is the most absolute need of the soul of Christ. It is expressed in the most moving texts of the Gospel: "My Father loves me because I always do that which pleases Him . . . My food is to do the Will of my Father." Between this paternal Will and Himself, Christ does not permit the slightest shadow—and removes everything which would become the least obstacle to it. This is the source of Christian and Ignatian obedience, a loving need of being united to the Will of God. This profound mystery Ignatius compares to the mystery of faith, which unites one directly, not to the divine Truth, as faith does, but to the merciful Will of God, to His *Agape*, by stripping the soul of its own will and clothing it with the divine *Agape*.

WE have now arrived at the final aspect of Ignatian mysticism. We have said that the Ignatian vision is that of the Trinity working in the world. By obedience the soul has left self behind in order to offer itself as an instrument for that divine action. Ignatian mysticism appears then as an experience of the presence within the soul of the working *Agape* of God. Now arises the question of Ignatian prayer, which is found at the meeting point of the two essential traits of the Ignatian man: he ought to be a saint and he ought to live in complete activity. Previous spirituality opposed these two aspects. Activity seemed to be an obstacle to holiness which was conceived as contemplation. The revolution accomplished by St. Ignatius showed that that which appeared to be an obstacle could become a means. To the heart filled with God, all things speak of Him. And it is not a question merely of an orientation of the Will but of a spiritual experience where God is "tasted" in everything.

On this point the texts are numerous and striking: "I shall not fail to recall," writes Nadal, "that grace which he [Ignatius] had in all circumstances, while at work or in conversation, of feeling the presence of God and of tasting spiritual things, of being contemplative even in the midst of action; he used to interpret this as seeking God in all things." (Mon. Nadal, IV, 651-652) We have a formula in Ignatian prayer, in *actione contemplative*, wholly different from the *contemplata tradere* of Saint Thomas. Casting off the last vestiges of the Neo-Platonic techniques, Ignatius affirms that the Christian mystical union is essentially the union of love where correspondence to the divine Will is more important than psychological techniques and which can therefore be acquired no matter what the circumstances.

We can find this stated in numerous passages: "Such is the spirit that I would like to see in those who belong to the Society: namely that they experience no less devotion in any work whatsoever of charity or obedience than they do at meditation." (Mon. Ign. Epist., III, p. 500) "As for prayer and meditation, I prefer that a man would tend toward God in all things rather than devote a lot of time to them for this result." (III, p. 508) "Seeking the presence of God in all things, for example in speaking, in walking, in looking, in listening, in eating, in working, is easier than to raise oneself by some very abstract divine considerations, and disposes us to receive special visits of the Lord even in short prayers." (IV, p. 126) And this is not a very low, but rather the highest perfection: "There is more virtue and more happiness in being able to enjoy the possession of the Lord in the midst of various works and places than being alone with Him." (II, p. 283)

The meaning of this way of prayer, of holiness and of mystical life, which can be called apostolic mysticism⁵ has been wonderfully explained by one of the most faithful interpreters of Ignatian thought, Jerome Nadal. He has seen that Ignatius treats of a way which surpasses the opposition of action and contemplation, in a transforming union with the divinizing action of the Holy Spirit. This is to say, it is in the apostolate itself that God is known and tasted: "The grace proper to the Society is that there might be in the Church of God a religious order, which, uniting action and contemplation in a life superior by itself to the other two, permits at the same time perfection and carries this heavy burden of assisting in the salvation of abandoned souls." (*Journal*, French trans., p. 53) This life is properly spiritual because it is a participation in the mission of the Holy Spirit: "The mission of the Holy Spirit is to give us the life of the Spirit, a life superior to the purely active and to the purely contemplative; in that life we not only live with a spiritual and contemplative life but we teach others and reveal to them the spiritual meaning of life; charity sets our hearts on fire and overflows to bring salvation and perfection to our neighbor." (*Ibid.*, p. 75) This way of prayer consists in transforming every action by giving it an interior meaning and making it a kind of prayer; in making it also a means of union: "Do not stop on any created thing without penetrating through it to God, and Christ will give it His interior meaning." (p. 46)

We can see this way of union worked out in that precious document on the truly Ignatian mysticism, the *Memoriale* of Favre. We see how, led by this vocation to a life of perpetual travel, he found God in the very exercise of his apostolic life. First he explains the theoretical side: "We begin by applying ourselves to the search of devotion and fervor not only in things purely spiritual, as contemplation and mental prayer, but we turn all our efforts to seek this same devotion and fervor in the mixed life of the apostolate." (Fr. trans. Buix, 1874, p. 159) Then here are some examples: "When you cross the mountains, the fields, the vineyards, different kinds of prayer present themselves to you: You ask the multiplication and growth of these blessings, you give thanks for them in the name of the owners; you ask pardon for those who do not recognize in spirit these blessings." (p. 22) "On this trip God inspired me with a devotion which I shall keep until my death and which concerns the spiritual blessings of seven cities: Wittenberg in Saxony, Geneva in the Duchy of Savoy, Constantinople in Greece, An-

tioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria in Africa and the capital of the Samartians, whose name I have forgotten." (p. 30) The name is Moscow!

This is precisely what St. Ignatius describes in the *Contemplatio ad amorem*. Creatures come from God and are made to lead us to Him. This is the truth of which the Foundation reminds us. But in fact, these are often obstacles, not because they are evil but because we are evil, whence the necessity of breaking the sinful attachments we have formed with them. It would be imprudent to believe that one could go very quickly to God through creatures. This is the error of a certain modern humanism. St. Francis of Assisi chanted the "cantic of the Sun," but only after having been the stigmatist of Alverno. What St. Ignatius describes to us then is an idea of consummated perfection, of a soul so totally filled with God that everything leads to God. Thus the spiritual itinerary takes place completely between the moment when creatures are obstacles and the moment they become means. The *Contemplatio ad amorem*, as well as the *Memoriale* of Favre, describes for us the state of a man who has arrived at this perfection. According to the works of St. Ignatius, "He loves God in all His creatures and all creatures in God."

Then just as we have discovered in St. Ignatius a vision of the spiritual world proper to himself, so we see in his spirituality a distinctive way of holiness. Moreover the two are directly dependent the one upon the other. A single phrase can express the substance of all this: the idea of the great works which the Holy Spirit, sent by the Father and the Son, accomplishes in the Church. Such is the vision of the world of Ignatius. He has been seized by the grandeur of this present sacred history, whose blinding light, even though hidden, turns the grandeurs of human history pale in his eyes. This is also his way of holiness. This is the history which God accomplishes. The apostle is one whom the Holy Spirit seizes, empties of self by obedience, transforms into God by prayer, in order to be the instrument in the accomplishment of His designs, and who expresses in himself the life of the Holy Spirit. It is in the profound power of this way that the holiness of the Society and the fruitfulness of its ministry is to be found.

Translated by THOMAS R. ROYCE, S. J.

¹ See also the first point of the Contemplation on the Incarnation.

² *Ignatius von Loyola und das geschichtliche Werden seiner Frömmigkeit*, 1948, p. 42. (English translation: *Spirituality of St. Ignatius*, trans. by Francis John Smith, 1953, The Newman Press).

³ *Urchristentum und Gottesdienst*, p. 42.

⁴ Mon. Nadal, IV, p. 682, ff.

⁵ See Jules Lebreton, *Tu Solus Sanctus*, p. 174, 599.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO DOUBT?

SOREN KIERKEGAARD

Translator's Preface

The editors of *Kierkegaard's Papers* have placed *De omnibus dubitandum est* in the entries of the year 1842. Thus Kierkegaard would have been 29 years old when he wrote it. One should keep in mind that this selection stands outside the complex whole of the authorship proper. It is one of the many entries we find in his papers but does not belong within the more finished work of the Journals. It is one of the many "finger-exercises," a practice session "behind the scenes." Though this short work, as far as we know, has not been translated in full for publication, the reader is referred to *The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard* (translated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University Press), if he is interested in another selection from Johannes Climacus or *De omnibus dubitandum est*.

This selection from the work of Soren Kierkegaard, widely accepted as the greatest religious and philosophical thinker of the 19th century, represents one chapter from *JOHANNES CLIMACUS, OR DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM EST*, a short work found in the collection of Kierkegaard's papers (Heiberg, P. A. and Kuhr, V.: *SOREN KIERKEGAARDS PAPIRER* (Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, Copenhagen, Denmark). This article is taken from vol. 4 (*Fjerde Bind*, ss. 144-150).

This work has been called an unfinished autobiographical novel. Unquestionably it has autobiographical content. However to say that this is an autobiographical novel seems to equate Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of the *Philosophical Fragments* and the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, with Soren Kierkegaard. As known to those acquainted with the Kierkegaard authorship, Johannes Climacus is only one of the cast of pseudonyms. Though the issue of the meaning and purpose of Kierkegaard's use of pseudonymous authors is too involved and complicated to go into here, it is a matter not to be regarded casually since Kierkegaard again and again admonishes the reader to heed their presence and their relation to what has been written. Combining the skill of a dialectician and that of a poet to a degree rare indeed in the history of thought, he makes the form of communication as essential as the content and re-duplicates the one in the other in a contrasting double movement.

Johannes Climacus or *De omnibus dubitandum est*.

A Story

Loquor de vera dubitatione in mente, et non de ea, quam passim videmus contingere, ubi scilicet verbis, quamvis animus non dubitet, dicit quis se dubitare: non est enim methodi hoc emendare, sed potius pertinet ad inquisitionem pertinaciae et ejus emendationem.

*Spinoza de intellectus emendatione Tractatus**

* "I speak of a true doubt in the mind, and not of that sort which we occasionally see, so to speak, in touch with the mind as in an instance when a man says he doubts although he does not really doubt. The transformation of the latter is not something within the province of method; it belongs rather to an investigation into obstinacy and its cure."

Μηδεὶς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονεῖτω** (I Timothy 4:12)

In the chapters that precede and are omitted here the following propositions are dealt with:

1. *Philosophy begins with doubt.*
2. *Before one can philosophize he must have been engaged in doubting.*
3. *Modern philosophy begins with doubt.*

The narrative begins with a brief account of the contemporary situation in philosophy as it appears to Johannes Climacus, a young student of that time. With an ostensibly casual yet penetrating analysis the author describes the expectations of a young man who seriously tries to doubt everything. He observes one characteristic of modern philosophy that distinguishes it from the ancient. Modern philosophy regards it as a matter of foolishness for the philosopher to do what he says he does. Before proceeding to the more directly philosophical discussion the author describes episodes in the home life of the young student, Johannes. We get a picture of the father, a prosperous and now retired merchant, as he appears in relation to his son, an awesome and respected parent, of a brooding religious nature, a dialectician of excellence and an enigma to the son.

Kierkegaard's comments and notes about the narrative in his Loose Papers (S.K.'s Papirer, Fjerde Bind, S. 181:16) contain the following:

The plan of the narrative was as follows: the story of a serious young man, Johannes Climacus, a life steeped in a melancholic irony, a quality never specifically appearing in any one expression yet implicit in the whole of his life, would be the form used to chide the philosophers. This serious and honest youth, quietly and without bombast, struggles to carry out what philosophers advise must be done in order to philosophize. However the attempt leads only to unhappiness for him. Enduring the pain of the effort, he really does doubt everything. He develops cunning to a degree where he feels guilty about it. Having reached the most extreme limit, he wants to withdraw and return but he cannot. Now he sees that in order to remain at this extremity of doubting everything he has had to marshall all the strength of his spirit. Thereby it would be within his power to attain to something but simultaneously he would have given up his doubt of everything. Now he is in despair. He has wasted his life. The days of youth have ebbed away with the increasing flow of his reflections. His life is without significance for him and all of this has come about—for the sake of philosophy.

FROM the outset of his investigation Johannes was well aware of the difficulty of expecting to find an empirical answer to this question. Within the wide range and diversity of life's experiences would lie concealed a profusion of testimony that would do little more than confuse. It was not only that different things could evoke doubt in the same individual but that at once both one thing and its very opposite could evoke doubt. Any individual desiring to stir up another to doubt something might, in that very attempt, evoke belief (Tro), Conversely, if he attempted to instil belief he might evoke doubt. This paradoxical dia-

** Do not let anyone think the less of thee for thy youthfulness.

lectic, to which he had been attentive from the beginning, seemed to have no analogy in any other sphere of knowledge. All cognition lies within a direct and immanent relation between the object and the knower and not within an indirect and transcendent relation to something third. Consequently Johannes was well aware that any empirical investigation would be futile. To find an answer to the question: what does it mean to doubt, he would have to proceed in another direction. He would have to expect to find the ideal possibility of doubt in the individual's consciousness (*Bevidsthed*). This ideality would have to be an invariant and remain such, however different the various occasioning phenomena might be. Then this ideality, without itself being explained by the phenomena, nevertheless would explain the effect of the phenomena. No matter what is included in that which brings forth doubt in any one and/or more individuals, if the capacity to doubt were not already present in the person then nothing would be able to bring forth doubt. Furthermore, since that which is an occasion to doubt might be any of a wide range of possibilities, a range that might include precise opposites, the factor he was looking for would have to be sufficient to account for all the various and differing reports of human experience.

He saw his problem thus. He, as a single individual with consciousness, was attempting to orient himself with this in mind to a notion of consciousness as such that would be adequate to include each particular consciousness and yet be more than an expression of a particular consciousness within the same. So he asks: if we assume that doubt is something external to consciousness, then what would be the nature of consciousness? It is true that we find consciousness in the child but yet doubt is external to the child. How is consciousness in a child determined? Essentially it is not determined. In other words the consciousness of the child is immediate. Immediacy is precisely the non-determined. There is no relation within immediacy since as soon as a relation is present immediacy is revoked.* Immediately, everything is true. Yet in the next moment everything is false because immediately everything is false. If consciousness can exist as immediacy then the question of truth is annulled.

How does the question about the true happen to arise? Through the false, since in the moment I ask about the true already I have asked about the false. In the question about the true, consciousness is brought into relation with something other and that which makes this relationship possible is the false. Which came first? Immediacy or mediacy? A captions question that brings to mind the answer Thales is reported to have given the man who asked whether day or night had come into being first. He answered: the night was one day before.

Cannot consciousness exist in immediacy? This question is also ridiculous since if such were the case consciousness would be non-existent. Just how then is immediacy revoked? Mediacy revokes immediacy by presupposing it. What is immediacy? It is reality. What is mediacy? It is the *word*. In what way does the word

* Recall the statement by the Greek Sophists that everything is true and then Plato's criticism of this, in particular by showing that the negative exists. (*The Sophist*)—Schleiermacher's theory concerning the feeling that everything is true (the beginning of his dogmatics). Heraclitus: his statement that everything is and everything is not, which Aristotle explains as saying that everything is true.

revoke immediacy? By expressing it, for what is expressed is always presupposed. Immediacy is reality, language is ideality and consciousness is the contradiction. In the moment I assert reality the contradiction is there because what I assert is ideality.

The possibility of doubt lies in consciousness, the essence of which is a contradiction, and this contradiction is produced by and produces duplicates.* Necessarily duplicates are two expressions or an expression duplicated. The duplication is both reality and ideality and consciousness is the sustaining inter-relation. I can either bring reality into relation with ideality or ideality into relation with reality.** In reality alone there is no possibility of doubt. Inasmuch as I have made use of the language as the form of expression the contradiction is there since I not only express it but also bring forth something else. In so far as the statement purports to be an expression of reality I have brought reality into relation with ideality and in so far as the statement is produced by me I have brought ideality into relation with reality. So long as this commerce between ideality and reality goes on surreptitiously devoid of any reciprocal differentiation, consciousness is only a possibility. In ideality, as in reality, anything truly is as much as anything else. I can say that immediately everything truly is and immediately everything actually is. Only in the moment that ideality is brought into relation with reality does consciousness as a possibility emerge. In immediacy the most true and the most false to an equal degree truly are; just as the most impossible and the most possible are equally actual. So long as this commerce between ideality and reality goes on apart from any disruptive confrontation of one by the other, consciousness is not present and this submerged colossal well-spring of deception admits of no revocation. Reality is not consciousness anymore than ideality is, yet consciousness is not present without both. This contradiction is at once the origin and essence of consciousness.

Before proceeding he wonders if what he has identified as consciousness is not what otherwise is taken to be reflection.* He develops his answer thus: Re-

* (Translator's note):

Duplicates is the word for the Danish *Duplicitet*. Perhaps too much liberty is presumed in doing so but it seems to add clarity. In another entry in *The Papers* we find the term, *Duplicitaet*. Beside it, in parentheses, is the word *Dualisme*. *Reduplikationen*, translated the re-duplication, is a word appearing often in the Kierkegaardian authorship-activity and is essentially related to the dialectic both as to form and also to what he calls "existential dialectic." *Fordobelse*, another key-term, has been translated re-duplication too and literally is a re-doubling movement. In the sentences above a literal and strict translation of *Duplicitet* would be "duplicity." However to use the term, "duplicity" here seems to convey too much of a sense of intentional deception. "Duplicité" or "double-dealing," though contextually suggestive and etymologically related, are misleading in the above statements. Presuming the liberty to make a free translation, one could translate the above sentence as: "The possibility of doubt lies in consciousness, the essence of which is a contradiction, and this contradiction is produced by a duplication, and produces the duplicates." The distinction indicated is paralleled in the words: *relates* (as a noun) and *relation*.

** (Translator's note): cf. another entry in S.K.'s *Papirer*, op. cit., s. 177: "Doubt comes forth either by bringing reality into relation with ideality—this is a function of cognition or by bringing ideality into relation with reality—which is the ethical task. The "I" that I am interested in is my self. Essentially doubt came into the world with the entrance of Christianity because through that the self was made important. Doubt is overcome not by the system but with faith just as it is faith that has brought doubt into the world. Could doubt be put to rest by the system then the system must stand on a higher level than both faith and doubt. But in such a case and prior to this, doubt must be overcome by faith since to leap over the middle term is not permissible."

flection is the possibility of the relation. Consciousness, however, is the relation whose first form is contradiction. Notice that the determinations of reflection are dichotomous as these examples show: ideality and reality; soul and body; to recognize facts; to desire the good; to love the beautiful; God and the world; etc. . . . Within reflection the *relates* are in touch with each other so that a relation becomes possible. On the contrary the determinations of consciousness are trichotomous and language confirms this. For instance I may say: I have an awareness of a particular sense impression; and thereby I introduce a third relation. Consciousness is spirit and a remarkable character of the realm of spirit is that one divided becomes *three* and never *two*. Thus consciousness presupposes reflection and if they do not stand in this relation to each other it is impossible to explain doubt. It may be that language appears to be in conflict with itself on this point. As far as he knew, the word doubt is etymologically related to the word two in most languages.* Although he realized that therein was only a faint suggestion of what doubt presupposed, it was all the more clear to him that as soon as the self, as spirit, becomes two, it is *eo ipso* three. If nothing more than a dyadic relation obtains, then doubt does not exist. The possibility of doubt precisely lies in the emergence of the triadic *relate* which brings together the dyadic *relates* to form in its entirety the triadic relationship. To say that reflection produces doubt is to express oneself backwards. One might say that doubt presupposes reflection except that this *prius* is something transitory and it is because of a sustained dyadic continuity that doubt is able to emerge. Yet in order for doubt to be present the dyadic relation must be sustained, though all the while doubt, as a higher-level expression, precedes and does not follow.

Reflection is the possibility of the relation. In other words reflection is disinterested. On the contrary consciousness is the relation and therein interest, dual in nature, is present in all of its pregnant ambiguity that is fully expressed in the word, interest (*inter-esse*). Thus all spheres of knowledge that are disinterested knowledge—such as mathematics, aesthetics and metaphysics—as such are merely presupposed by doubt. But to eliminate interest is not to overcome doubt. No, doubt is merely neutralized and all such disinterested knowledge is only a retrogression to what has been. To the extent that one believed he could vanquish doubt by a so-called objective thought he would be guilty of misunderstanding. Doubt is a form higher than all objective thought since it presupposes it and also adds something more, a third relation which is interest or consciousness. In view of this the activities of the Greek Sceptics to him seemed to be much more consistent than those of the moderns who claim to have conquered doubt by objective thought. The Greek Sceptics were well aware that doubt is present in interestedness and therefore quite consistently tried to eliminate doubt by reducing interest to apathy. Indeed their procedure was of no little consequence, whereas that of

* "What is at issue here for Johannes is not without significance. The terminology of modern philosophy is often confusing. After a fashion there is talk about a "sensate consciousness," a perceiving consciousness, understanding, etc.; it would be much better if "sensate consciousness" were called "experience" because consciousness adds something more. In the main it was interesting to see how Hegel wanted to make the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness and from self-consciousness to reason. If this is merely a transition in a caption of course it is easy enough to do."

* (Translator's note): Examples: doubt-double; zweifeln-zweidoppelt; douter-double; tvivle-tvigæld; dubitare-duplus.

the moderns who seek to dispel doubt through systematic, objective thought is of little consequence, and is based upon an ignorance of what doubt is. Yet even if the system were absolutely completed, even if actual fulfillment exceeded the promise, nevertheless, doubt would not be vanquished. It was present from the beginning. Doubt is a consequence of interestedness and all systematic knowledge is dis-interested. Thus it becomes apparent that doubt is the beginning for the highest form of existence since it is able to have all other knowledge as its presupposition. The Greek Sceptics brilliantly perceived that to speak of doubt when interest has been removed is ridiculous. Undoubtedly it would have been obvious to them that it is merely a play on words to speak of an objective doubt. Ideality and reality might conflict with each other throughout endless time, yet so long as no consciousness is present, so long as there is no active interest in what is at stake, doubt will not be present. Or——let ideality and reality be reconciled; doubt can be still present.*

Thus consciousness is the relation and it is a relation whose form is contradiction. But how does consciousness discover the contradiction? Previously reference was made to a submerged, colossal well-spring of deception, viz.: that condition in which ideality and reality are naively interfused one with another. If this condition is not discovered for what it is, consciousness will never appear. Consciousness makes its entry in a collision, precisely as if it presupposed the collision. Immediately there is no collision, mediately there is. Whenever the question of a repetition arises the collision is present, because repetition is conceivable only of that which has been before.

In reality as such there is no repetition. However, by no means does this follow from the assertion that everything is different. If everything in the world were absolutely one, in reality there would be no repetition since repetition occurs only in the moment. Even if everything in the world were nothing but plain, hard stones all of the same size and shape, still there would be no repetition. Throughout eternity and in every moment I would see only a plain, hard stone, yet whether this stone were the same one I had seen before would be a question that would not arise.

In ideality taken by itself there is no repetition since the idea as such is and remains the same and thus can not be repeated. If ideality and reality come in-

* (Translator's note): A footnote in one of the other works of the authorship, (*Anti-Climacus*) *Training in Christianity*, (editor, S. Kierkegaard) notes the distinction between despair and doubt. This is a distinction maintained throughout and is dealt with in various works, two of these being *Either/Or*, particularly vol. II pp. 177-179, and *The Sickness Unto Death*, where despair is shown to be the sickness. But in the aforementioned note it is said that doubt is usually spoken of when one should speak of despair. Strictly speaking, despair is a recognized condition of the self that is chosen in its entirety. Despair may be present though unrecognized, while at the same time doubt is absent. Such despair would be concealed doubt, not of thought, but of the self, an absence of belief in the self as more than the cognitive being that it is; hence it is a despair channeled towards thought and hidden in the dark underground of the self, whose only external trace is a kind of frantic optimism that dissipates any would-be doubt of thought. Yet when despair is chosen and with it an acceptance of the finiteness of the self's potentialities, doubt may enlarge its scope directly in proportion to an accelerating interest in the self that maintains its infinite possibility while tentatively rejecting each of finitude's inescapably under-evaluations of the self. Doubt, then, is seen as the guardian of the spirit and the possibility requisite to the highest form of existence.

to contact with each other, then repetition appears. For example: in a particular moment I see something and ideality comes forth to explain that this visual impression is a repetition. Precisely this is the contradiction since that which is, also was as something other. I can see that this externality is, but in the same moment I bring this externality into relation with something that also is, and which would explain that the externality also is the same as it is. This re-duplication is the locus of the question about repetition. Thus ideality and reality are in contact one with another. In what medium? In time? That is impossible. In eternity? That is just as impossible. In what, then? In consciousness, and that is the contradiction. The question does not arise from a state of disinterestedness, as if a man should ask whether existence were not merely an image of the idea and to this extent in a certain fleeting sense the observed existent were not a repetition.

More precisely the question at issue concerns a repetition in consciousness and consequently is concerned with recollection.* The notion of recollection contains the same contradiction. Recollection is not the ideality; it is the reality that has been. It is not the reality; it is the reality that has been and which once more becomes a double contradiction. Since ideality by definition can not be that which has been, neither can reality by definition be that which has been.

Translated by ARTHUR O. KLANDERUD

* The reader may be interested in one of the books in the authorship in which repetition is the topic discussed. It is entitled: *Repetition*. The notion of recollection is central to the authorship, and amongst other places it is dealt with in the first part of *Stages on Life's Way*.

A MAGAZINE ON THE EASTERN ORTHODOX RELIGION

To all who are looking for a serious religious and theological journal devoted to the Eastern Orthodox Church, we recommend for consideration a subscription to

St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly

This periodical began publication in the Fall of 1952. It has already won reputation among Orthodox and other religious bodies in this country and abroad as a journal outstanding in its presentation in English of the Orthodox tradition. It is noted for its treatment of contemporary theological questions in the light of the Early Church Fathers.

The editor is The V. Rev. George Florovsky, D.D., an archpriest of the Russian Orthodox Church.

St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary of which Father Florovsky is Dean, is the only graduate school of Orthodox theology in America. It has also been acknowledged the United States center of research at the graduate level for all branches of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Quarterly is, therefore, an important vehicle of Orthodox thought in America.

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Notes on other Publications

THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

1.

Church and Society (Arts, Inc.). Father Joseph N. Moody has edited a large and imposing collective work which from now on should be an indispensable reference for anyone studying the various political manifestations of Catholicism in Europe and the United States since the French Revolution. The book is a product of careful scholarship, and displays consistent democratic sympathies; the section on Germany and the Catholic Center Party is particularly outstanding.

The extent of American Catholicism's debt to the late Prof. Waldemar Gurian, founder and editor of *THE REVIEW OF POLITICS*, is again made clear with the publication of *The Catholic Church in World Affairs* (Univ. of Notre Dame), a symposium which he edited, along with M. A. Fitzsimmons. This work does not pretend to possess the range and inclusiveness of the Moody volume, but, freed from the restrictions of historical surveys and reference utility, it can occasionally be even more suggestive. The essay of Father John Courtney Murray reveals an increasing mastery of his materials, and would alone justify the purchase of the book; the other contributors are equally distinguished, including Heinrich Rommen, Yves Simon, Msgr. Koenig, Father McEvoy, and Karl Thieme. The latter's essay, "Continental Protestantism after World War II," dealing with material too little known in America, should be of special interest to readers of *CROSS CURRENTS*. The Spanish contributor's equation of Hispanidad and Catholicism, defending the Spanish Church-State arrangement, jars with the dominant tone of the book.

2.

More Dawson. Sheed and Ward has happily conceived the idea of publishing an extension of Christopher Dawson's earlier *Medieval Religion*; several key essays that were out of print, along with considerable new material, is now available in *Medieval Essays*. Perhaps because these essays represent the fruit of long years of historical scholarship, their reading gives us glimpses of Dawson's considered attitudes towards many fundamental—and currently debated—problems, even when they are only indirectly related to his subject. Questions in regard to the plan of a Christian education, the justification of the study of a past Christian culture, the relationship of Catholicism and history, are all given illumination. One of Dawson's fundamental attitudes is indicated by the following quotation:

It may even be argued that the dualism of religion and culture that existed under the Roman empire, and more or less generally in modern times, is the normal condition of Christianity. Nevertheless, the other alternative, that of a cooperation and collaboration between religion and culture, is undoubtedly a more ideal system, and from this point of view the medieval achievement remains unsurpassed by any other age.

3.

French Catholicism and Communism. It is not too late to call attention to the article on this subject in *THOUGHT* (Fall 1953) by Father Roquette (of *ETUDES*), since it was a balanced and penetrating commentary on a difficult subject that has been widely misinterpreted in America. He discussed the thought and influence of Mounier, the *Jeunesse de L'Eglise* movement, the politico-social situation in France. The conclusion called for understanding of special problems, and a major reform in the workers' living and working conditions, as well as in their mode of participation in industry; a profound change in the attitudes of Christians would also be required if the workers are to be reached by the Church.

4.

Pax Christi. The first international Congress of this important Catholic effort for peace was held this March in Paris, presided over by Cardinal Feltin, and addressed by Giorgio La Pira (Mayor of Florence), J-P Dubois Dumée, Father Ducatillon, O.P., George Hourdin, etc. The major address by Father R. Bosc, S.J., on the recent teaching of Pius XII on war and peace, was reprinted in *REVUE DE L'ACTION POPULAIRE* (May).

Father Bosc oriented his talk around four papal documents of the last quarter of 1953, which marked an important stage in the evolution of his thought on war and peace: the allocution to the members of the International Congress of Penal Law, the allocution to army doctors, the discourse to the Italian jurists, and the Christmas message.

The first of these documents presented the principle of a limited conscientious objection: a soldier can (and ought to) disobey a criminal order given by his superior. To the army doctors, Pius XII spoke of atomic, biological and chemical warfare and the problems of conscience they suggest. In the purpose of legitimate defense, it is natural that these types of war be studied, but the very amplitude of the means of destruction in such a war requires the constant search for peaceful solutions to the problems that divide the world. "In the eventuality of a future conflict, the ultimate decision will depend on the conscience of a few men, or even on one alone. From the reflection, the state of nerves or fatigue of this man, the death of millions and the destruction of civilization might well result. It is inhuman to place such responsibility on a single man. *The only reasonable solution consists in the outlawing of such war by international understanding.*"

The discourse to Italian jurists brought an important contribution to the problem of peaceful co-existence. The Holy Father insisted that the supranational common good, a higher good for humanity as a whole, imposes tolerance and dialogue between diverse and even contradictory ideologies, even if, in the eyes of Christians, they are entirely erroneous. Taking slavery as an example, Father Bosc emphasized that profound reform can be realized only when the idea that inspires it coincides with the common interest, and techniques are available that are capable of realizing it; he based his optimism on the fact that the idea of peace today coincides with the vital interest of all men, and with the techniques capable of realizing it. The Christmas message of 1953 was a reminder that techniques alone are incapable of creating peace. There must be a soul which translates on an international level a spirit of openness to others and acceptance of the risks which every new creation includes.

5.

Economics and Birth Control. Colin Clark, well known Oxford economist, tried to strengthen the economic argument against birth control in his article, "Population growth and living standards" (INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW, August 1953); rejoinders to Clark's thesis and conclusions appear in the January issue. Clark claimed that the majority of industries in the modern community are specifically benefited by increasing population, and that it is the dense populations of Western Europe and North America which account for the great increase in production and the high standard of living. His argument would appear to hold true to the extent that an increase of population favors business expansion, which in turn yields increasing returns. Even where the law of diminishing returns holds good, it can be indefinitely retarded by improved methods of production or by using more capital per head. Clark argued that if all the world over could achieve the *per capita* production of Denmark, the world could support four or five times its present population. His critics were not slow to point out that this takes time, and that of all people peasants are the hardest to change.

Recognizing that the big problem remains that at the present rate of growth the world population is likely to double itself in about 20 years time, Clark made the following challenging suggestions: (1) free emigration should be facilitated from overcrowded areas to others less densely populated, (2) foreign markets should be left open to countries which have to industrialize to support a larger population, (3) sufficient capital should be provided for economic development of under-developed countries. Unfortunately, prejudices of race and culture, selfish motives of national well-being, the desire to preserve privileges and national advantages, militate against the active enforcement of any such ideas (which have many parallels with those in Francois Perroux's article, "From the avarice of nations to an economy for mankind," CROSS CURRENTS, Spring 1953).

Clark's critics considered him overly optimistic in his attitude to the law of diminishing returns, and the problem of getting people in under-developed countries to adopt new methods. One of them, Sten Nilson of the Norwegian Central of Statistics, while pleading for a policy of birth control in India, adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the moral obligations which Clark, a Catholic, accepts. Indeed, he felt that Clark has stressed exclusively only one aspect of the Catholic solution, and suggested that much could be done to popularize the use of the "safe period" on a large scale. In this he may well be guilty of an understandably impatient over-simplification of the population problem of a country like India.

Another creative response to economic reality by Christians is described by Robert Faulhauber's "*Economie et Humanisme's* Search for a Human Economic System" (THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, April 1954). It is to be hoped that this article will lead more Americans to become further acquainted with the *Economie et Humanisme* movement and its publications, which are of interest to many other groups besides economists.

6.

Franco as theologian. The awarding to General Franco of a doctorate in canon law (*honoris causa*) by the Pontifical University of Salamanca was the

occasion of a frank and full statement by him (reported in *L'ACTUALITE RELIGIEUSE*, June 1) that the separation of Church and State was inconceivable in a country like Spain. In ceremonies attended by the Cardinal-Primate of Spain, the head of the Spanish government did not hesitate to declare that the spiritual and the temporal cannot be separated in Spain, proposing a new theology which seems to correct the Gospel:

The authorized voice of the Primate of Spain has explained perfectly how incomprehensible this separation is. It may be proper for societies and countries which unfortunately do not possess a unity in faith, but it is not acceptable when, by its one and true faith, a nation wishes to bear the title of Catholic (long applause). The Gospel phrase in regard to the coin—"Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's"—is without meaning in a Catholic society. It was addressed to the pagan society in which the Gospel was born. Do you wish to tell me where the temporal begins and where the spiritual ends in a Catholic society?

7.

European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (Pantheon). As the world grows older the task of the polymath becomes ever more difficult. Since every scholar (or at least every teacher) must make an occasional bold gesture in the direction of polymathy, he is compelled to lean heavily on the judgments of "authorities" in the fields he has not yet had an opportunity to study. But what is he to do when the authorities (and these, like translations, rarely outlive their generation) have themselves been trained on authorities?

Such thoughts are aroused—all too infrequently—when a new work, written with an open mind from the "sources," makes us realize that a certain set of pronouncements on a period was not accurate to begin with and has not been improved by being bandied about for a scholarly generation or two. Ernst Robert Curtius' present book is a mammoth work of this kind: with only an occasional gentle reprimand to an "authority," he makes many of the current generalizations about the Middle Ages seem quite inapt. He demonstrates deeper connections than have been generally realized between classical and medieval Latin literature (particularly that of the 10th through the 13th century); even more, that a rich portion of the attitudes and themes from medieval writers such as Alan of Lille and Bernard Silvestris descended to vernacular literature of the Renaissance and later (including Mallarmé and Joyce).

The vernacular writer with whom Curtius spends most time is Dante—almost as though he had written his book for the end of setting Dante scholarship on the right track. It is difficult to conceive any considerable study of the *Commedia* that can now be done without attending to Curtius' treatment of medieval rhetoric and poetic.

It might be complained that a writer like Hroswitha might well have been used to provide better illustrations than those Curtius employs for several of his categories, or that Curtius repeats some misleading German generalizations on Greek drama. A more pervasive criticism might be made in terms of his lack of steady attention to medieval theology; even though Curtius' intentions are not to treat such a subject directly, he cannot, for example, escape the need for alertness to the structural demands of Dante's theology. These strictures are, however,

only minor cautions to be observed in using what is undeniably a widely applicable book.

8.

Dylan Thomas and Baudelaire. The recent death of the widely-appreciated Welsh poet Dylan Thomas made the appearance of a first full-length study of his work by Elder Olsen (*The Poetry of Dylan Thomas*, Univ. of Chicago) of particular value. Olsen's work should be widely discussed in critical circles, as an example of the so-called neo-Aristotelian criticism, which has already attracted much attention but has generally been restricted to theoretical pronouncement.

Martin Turnell's *Baudelaire* will rightly enhance the reputation of this British critic. In it he argued for the existence of a plan in the writing of *Fleurs du mal*, and ably discussed the individual poems in terms of a total architecture.

9.

International Understanding? The way in which Catholic response to political and social phenomena is colored by varying national attitudes is again emphasized in the wide-spread foreign reaction to Senator McCarthy and American anti-Communism. Tristao de Ataíde, Brazilian Catholic lay leader and disciple of Jacques Maritain, is typical of Catholic commentators outside the United States in insisting that McCarthy's actions represent a contradiction of the Catholic tradition. Editorial comment in the Belgian Catholic *REVUE NOUVELLE* (May 15) speaks of America's "translating their fear of the future into an hysterical defense complex. . . . We regret that we must state that in this frightening adventure, American Catholicism seems rather to lean on McCarthy's side, in favor of a short-sighted anti-Communism, which will cause the Church some rude awakenings."

In such a context mutual understanding is all but impossible. It is difficult, for example, not to detect a note of resentment in *L'ACTUALITE RELIGIEUSE*'s account (June 1) of Cardinal Spellman's talk at a banquet opening the drive for an American Catholic Church in Paris:

This speech astonished some Catholic milieux by the violence of the proposals, the political perspectives which were presented in it, and the exceptionally combative tone. These anti-Communist proposals are probably general enough in the United States, in the ambiance of McCarthyism. In France and pronounced by a foreign Prelate, they are able to seem a little indiscreet, and may have caused some embarrassment in official circles. We can with difficulty imagine a French Cardinal intervening as peremptorily in a neighboring country.

10.

The Origins and History of Consciousness (Pantheon). This is a valuable addition to the Bollingen Series by Erich Neumann, a follower of Jung in his interest in the intertwining of historical and mythological concepts and their influence on our consciousness. Neumann's historical-descriptive illumination of ancient myths has many important suggestions even for those not attracted by Jung's approach to psychology. A wealth of archeological and anthropological knowledge is at the author's disposal as he uses the myths to suggest the evolution of human awareness.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

1.

Natural Right and History. (Chicago) Leo Strauss' new book indicates a dissatisfaction both with historicism and with pure natural right dogma. The author gives us a basic interpretation of the theories underlying each of these attitudes, as well as careful historical depiction of the rise and development of each idea through the centuries: from the Greeks to Rousseau, Burke, and Max Weber.

2.

Therese of Lisieux. (Sheed and Ward). The author, Hans Urs von Balthasar, calls this book "an attempt at theological phenomenology"; he believes his subject is the greatest saint of modern times. Reacting against what he considers excessive "psychologizing," Balthasar insists that hagiography must emphasize "the mission which each individual receives"; it is this which "contains within itself the form of sanctity which has been granted to him and is required of him."

Therese's is the "representative" type of sanctity, that of an individual singled out as a model of sanctity for the Church. She is blamed, however, for telling her sister of her childhood vision, and for losing her sense of sin and with it a consciousness of her place in the community of sinners: this was recovered only shortly before death.

3.

Catholics and Protestants. The Spring issue of RELIGION IN LIFE featured three discussions of "Issues between Catholics and Protestants at Midcentury." A consistent attempt at understanding and balanced statement was maintained by contributors George H. Williams, Waldo Beach, H. Richard Niebuhr. The first of these articles was a highly useful review of much of the relevant recently-published material in this area. Williams described seven areas of conflict in the 1945-54 period of "ecclesio-political skirmishes"; (1) the treatment of Protestants in "Catholic" countries; (2) diplomatic recognition of the Vatican; (3) the comparative loyalty of Protestants and Catholics to democracy and the nation—in which Senator McCarthy, J. B. Matthews' charges against Protestant clergymen and Blanshard's books must all be taken into consideration; (4) education; (5) Catholic "separatist" movement and/or attempt to dominate major organizations like labor unions, etc.; (6) moral theology and the natural law; (7) the Boston Heresy Case. He emphasizes that in America Protestantism is the old religion, and Catholicism the new, almost revolutionary force. He makes a fundamental criticism of American Protestantism's response to this force:

... Protestantism either has tried to close its eyes to the Catholic challenge in order to preserve civil peace or has lapsed back into anti-Roman polemic in order, by reflex action as it were, to recover its identity. Anxious or uncertain about its proper role, Protestantism at one extreme has been betrayed into an alliance with anti-clerical and doctrinaire secularism. At the other extreme, many Protestants of the politically anxious middle classes, whose ministers frequently reflect the concerns of the business community,

are increasingly disposed to see in the Roman Church, domestically and internationally, an invaluable ally.

Williams distinguishes between political confessionalism, idealistic secularism, and critical pluralism, and describes with sympathy recent Catholic approaches of the latter position. Although he praises the effort of Father John Courtney Murray, and rightly rejects the works of Blanshard as representing the Protestant side of any resultant controversy, he feels that the principal contentions of a work like James Nichols' *Democracy and the Churches* (Westminster Press, 1951) have never been directly met.

4.

Christianity and Liberty. This is the title of a collective volume (*Récherches et débats*, no. 1, Arthème Fayard), which together with the 1952 *Semaine des intellectuels Catholiques* on "The Church and Liberty" (published by Pierre Horay) indicates a healthy preoccupation with this subject. The first of these works considered the situation of freedom in various societies and offered various projections of the same fundamental theme in Christianity, Islam, ancient Greece, oriental anthropology; the second, because of the very nature of the *Semaine*, is less well organized, and its contributions are on varying levels. There is also at times a tendency to excessive generalization, and a desire to claim too much for Christianity, a type of mistaken zeal criticized in Father Maydieu's article in the current issue. Nevertheless, the level of both volumes is high, and we may call special attention to the *Semaine* articles by Fathers Congar, and Daniélou, as well as Adrien Dansette's "L'Eglise et la liberté dans l'histoire du 19e siècle," Father Roquette's "Le problème du pluralisme religieux," Father Régamey's defense of his initiative in modern religious art, and Etienne De Greef's discussion of man's freedom from the standpoint of modern psychology. Further contributions to this same discussion have been presented in the *WORT UND WAHRHEIT* (April 1953), a special issue, "Why so little freedom in the church?", and *DOKUMENTE* (Feb. 1953).

5.

Also noted. Roger Aubert give an excellent summary of Catholic theological activity in France and Belgium from 1935 to 1950 in *La théologie catholique au milieu du XXe siècle* (Casterman). . . Jacques Leclercq continues the discussion begun in his article, "Holiness and the Temporal" *CROSS CURRENTS*, Winter 1954, with "Sainteté des laïcs" (*REVUE NOUVELLE*, May 15, 1954). . . John T. McNeill's *History and Character of Calvinism* (Oxford) is an indispensable historical reference volume on its subject, but seems to avoid theological discussion. . . Richard McKeon's *Thought, Action, and Passion* (Chicago) is a major contribution to intellectual history. His dense but well-written chapters on love, truth, freedom and imitation are excellent attempts to discover what these terms meant to the various authors that have used them. . . Walter Dirks' *The Monk and the World* (McKay) is a good general interpretation of the part played by religious orders—he includes the Jesuits—in the task of sanctifying mankind. He connects the religious vows with the containment of human drives toward sexual materialism, abuse of power and worship of wealth. . . A Soborne doctoral dis-

sertation of scholarly distinction and more than casual contemporary interest is Abbé Martimont's *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet* (Cerf). The author emphasizes that beyond the various "Gallicanisms"—for there are more than one—there is the opposition, in the interior of the Church, between the religious temperaments of the French and the Italians. . . C. J. Dumont, O.P., director of the Ecumenical center *Istina*, has made a book of his articles in the review *VERS L'UNITÉ CHRETIENNE*, and it is published by Cerf as *Les voies de l'Unité chrétienne, doctrine et spiritualité*. This is a worthy addition to the *Unam Sanctam* series, and contains an excellent treatment of the relation of "dissidents" to the Church. . . Joseph Colomb's *Plaie ouverte au flanc de l'Eglise* (Vitte) is an important re-examination of the problem of catechetical instruction. Most often the catechetical instruction that is now given is insufficient to form Christians for today's world. Father Colomb emphasizes that too often the problem of catechism is confused with that of defending the Catholic schools, which cannot reach all those baptized. Catholic parents who feel themselves badly prepared to give a religious formation to their children will be glad to have the aid of Jean Rimaud's *De l'éducation religieuse* (Aubier). . . Two recent Protestant studies of Communism are worth attention: Alasdair McIntyre's *Marxism an interpretation* (S.C.M. Press), and the collective volume *Marxismusstudien*, a publication from the *Evangelischen Akademien* in Tübingen. The latter is distinguished by a unique combination of detailed scholarship with an almost electric atmosphere of existential concern. These German writers understand Marxism and Communism not in terms of their "scientific materialism," their "reason" and their economics and power politics, but in terms of the impulses of the spirit which came by way of Hegel to the younger Marx, and thence inform the whole Communist movement with their demonic power. McIntyre finds "the religious significance of Marxism" in its attempt "in our post-Christian era to create an entirely secular view of the world." This secularism is formed by Christianity, however; it is a protest on Christian ground which thrives by reaction to Christians' attempts to identify God's order with their own—to deny the proper autonomy of the secular.

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
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